IVOIRIEN CAPITALISM

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African Entrepreneurs in Côte d'Ivoire

John Rapley

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John Rapley

Côte d'Ivoire

1

The Study of Capitalism in the Third World

A good deal has been written about capitalism in Africa, but not much has been said about African capitalism. Though capitalist development has always been an important topic in development studies, most of the time indigenous capitalism has been relegated to a secondary status. Most of the literature on African capitalism has focused on capitalism as an extension of the economies of Western Europe and North America. Allowing that indigenous entrepreneurs might be dragged along in the wave of modernization that capitalist penetration brought about, few theorists have been willing to believe that those entrepreneurs might in fact be at the heart of capitalism in Africa.

There are several reasons for this. By comparison with Latin America or much of Asia, Africa is largely pre-industrial. Statistically, indigenous capital appears rather marginal in the economy. Unlike major industrial firms in East Asia, India, or Latin America, those in Africa are typically foreign-owned, and industry appears to be a preserve of foreign capital. Where it is not, the state has so often displaced foreign capital that few theorists have seriously entertained the possibility that private domestic capital might also be taking its place. Consequently, studies of economic activity by Africans have tended to focus on agriculture or small-scale urban enterprise.

But the neglect of indigenous capital also reflects the long shadow that dependency theory has cast over the literature of African political economy. Some of the most influential texts, such as Colin Leys's *Underdevelopment in Kenya*[1] or Samir Amin's voluminous corpus on a number of West African countries (in particular his *Le Développement du capitalisme en Côte d'Ivoire*[2]) were written from the perspective of the dependency school. Samir Amin magnified his own influence when, under his direction, the United Nations' African Institute for Economic Development and Planning adopted a role in the academic development and dissemination of dependency theory. This role was similar to (if somewhat less influential than) that of the UN's

Economic Commission for Latin America when under the direction of Raul Prebisch. Another African intellectual center, the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, also came under the sway of dependency theorists for a time.

Dependency theory has a number of antecedents. Among them are nineteenth-century Indian nationalist thought, the seminal work of Raul Prebisch and ECLA, the writings of Paul Sweezy and Paul Baran, the critiques of Latin American structuralist economists and sociologists, and finally, the influential work of André Gunder Frank. The theory of dependency reached its highest level of development in Latin America, from where it spread to universities in the First World and Africa.[3]

The shortcomings of dependency theory, and particularly of its Latin American variety, were quickly exposed by a host of critics, many of them Marxists,[4] yet the effect of these repeated assaults on dependency theory was not to destroy it. Rather, it was broken into numerous component parts, each of which was then converted into a field of study in its own right. The general assumptions of these fields are the new "miniparadigms" that have succeeded dependency theory. Taken together, all these miniparadigms combine to form a broad and relatively coherent general perspective that has come to be known as underdevelopment theory.

Arguably originated by Frank, underdevelopment theory is the legacy of dependency theory with some additions by people like Samir Amin, Immanuel Wallerstein, and Arghiri Emmanuel,[5] all of whom approached the subject of Third World underdevelopment from a slightly different angle from that of the classical *dependentistas*. Although underdevelopment theory transcended dependency theory's repudiation of the possibility of Third World capitalist development, it still doubted the potential of that development. While underdevelopment theorists conceded that industrial development could occur in the Third World, they maintained that this development would produce only import substitution industries, or export industries reliant on foreign technology, such as the world sourcing that resulted in sectoral disarticulation in the host (Third World) economy. A disarticulated economy had few linkages among its own industries; instead, they were linked to counterparts in advanced capitalist countries in such a way as to make its industrial base dependent on the First World. The outcome was that the secondary sector of the economy—the engine of growth in modern industrial economies—was foreign-controlled. This left Third World governments economically dependent on the bourgeoisies of the advanced capitalist countries, ultimately ruling in their interests even after formal colonialism had come to an end. Thus the term "neocolonialism," though predating underdevelopment theory, became important in the underdevelopment lexicon.

What is especially important to this study is underdevelopment theory's attitude toward indigenous capitalism. Underdevelopment theory created a

conception of class structure that by definition denied the possibility of indigenous capitalist development. As far as underdevelopment theory was concerned, Third World bourgeoisies, where they existed at all, were at best auxiliaries: they existed essentially to serve foreign capital, making whatever domestic capitalism existed an appendage to foreign capitalism. Domestic capital was confined to the unproductive trade and service sectors that assisted foreign capital or transported its goods, or it was parasitic and dependent on foreign capital or the state; either way, it offered little dynamism that could be channeled into developing the local economy. A Third World country's bourgeoisie might rule, but it would be fulfilling the wishes of foreign capitalists in so doing. Being dependent on foreign capitalism meant that the more money foreign capitalists made, the richer the local bourgeoisie got, regardless of whatever detrimental effects this might have on the local economy. Thus, even if a local bourgeoisie ruled, the dominant class was necessarily foreign.

In the late 1970s, academic debate about Kenya had a formidable impact on the underdevelopment paradigm. It originated in the work done on indigenous capitalism by Michael Cowen[6] and Nicola Swainson,[7] but strengthened when Colin Leys entered the fray with a celebrated reconsideration of his own *Underdevelopment in Kenya*.[8] Leys's renunciation of dependency theory provoked an exchange of letters between himself and Rafael Kaplinsky in the *Review of African Political Economy*,[9] with Kaplinsky rallying to the defence of dependency theory. Others, including J. S. Henley[10] and Steven Langdon,[11] joined the debate.

While the debate continued (as it does to this day) other studies of indigenous capitalism began to trickle in. Some were ambitious in their breadth but wanting in depth, arguing that capitalism was (or was not) developing in Africa by pointing to broad criteria but providing insufficient detail with regard to indigenous capitalism.[12] Country-specific studies soon began to provide this depth. Some, like Fatima Babiker Mahmoud's study of Sudan,[13] affirmed underdevelopment theory, while others, such as Tom Forrest's work on Nigeria,[14] drew it further into question. Arguably, the most remarkable was Janet MacGaffey's study of indigenous capitalism in Zaire,[15] because it revealed entrepreneurial activity in a place where, many theorists believed, capitalism could not possibly emerge.[16]

As it became increasingly accepted that indigenous capitalism was a worthy object of study, attention inevitably came to be directed toward Côte d'Ivoire, among the most capitalist of countries in sub-Saharan Africa and therefore regarded by supporters and critics alike as a model of capitalism in Africa. The findings in Côte d'Ivoire, along with those in Nigeria and Kenya, would be considered instructive to the study of indigenous capitalism in Africa as a whole. Moreover, Côte d'Ivoire had been among the first African countries to which underdevelopment theory had been applied, through the

work of Samir Amin. Côte d'Ivoire also appeared to be a patent example of neocolonialism: the Ivoirien state and state firms were staffed to a considerable degree by expatriates (mainly French), and the regime was very pro-Western. If underdevelopment theory was to be substantiated in the African context, Côte d'Ivoire appeared on the surface to be the country that would confirm the paradigm.

Perhaps not surprisingly, when the gaze was directed at Côte d'Ivoire, the typical conclusion held that indigenous capitalism was of little significance. Even theorists who took issue with underdevelopment theory accepted its assumptions regarding indigenous capital. Bonnie Campbell's contribution to Paul Lubeck's survey of African bourgeoisies[17] was generally dismissive of the domestic bourgeoisie. An earlier book edited by Y.-A. Fauré and J.-F. Médard,[18] meantime, had driven the last nail in the coffin of dependency theory in the case of Côte d'Ivoire by effectively refuting the idea of foreign capitalist domination in alliance with a local plantocracy, but it did not affirm the existence of an autonomous indigenous bourgeoisie. Rather, it emphasized the role of the state, as did a book by Fauré and Bernard Contamin.[19] Roger Riddell's study of manufacturing in Côte d'Ivoire[20] largely neglected the issue, focusing on the weaknesses in the manufacturing sector as a whole, but not making the distinction—a distinction that it will later be argued is essential to make, because it reveals differences in performance—between foreign and domestic capital. Most recently, Catherine Boone has argued that state policies notwithstanding, a significant African bourgeoisie has not emerged in Côte d'Ivoire.[21] J.-F Médard has been uncompromising in agreeing: "We cannot define Ivoirian businessmen as a private economic bourgeoisie," he has argued recently, suggesting that Côte d'Ivoire has no "proto-private bourgeoisie."[22] Taken together, these authors (through the evidence they have collected and their interpretations of it) suggest that any hopes of finding a success story of indigenous capitalism in the archetypal capitalist case of Côte d'Ivoire have been largely disappointed.

THE CASE FOR AN INDIGENOUS IVOIRIEN BOURGEOISIE

Ivoirien capitalism is healthy and dynamic. Moreover, the growth of capitalism in Côte d'Ivoire—which nobody questions, even if they often doubt its prospects—would arguably not have occurred had it not been for Ivoirien capital.

Ivoirien capitalists first emerged in the 1920s and 1930s, starting out as plantation farmers; these planters were not, as has often been supposed, scions of the traditional ruling class, but represented a new and rising class. Their emergence was intimately linked to the activities in the colony of a

class of French settlers, from whom they learned new techniques of economic enterprise. The profits their farms generated were then reinvested in urban enterprise, and in the postcolonial period the planter-capitalists were supplemented by young, urban entrepreneurs. What assured the future prosperity of the class, however, was that in the late colonial period it succeeded in organizing itself politically and as a result took control of the state at the time of decolonization. Then and since, the Ivoirien state has devoted its energies to the promotion of capitalism in general, and of Ivoirien capitalism in particular. The close links between the state and Ivoirien capital, therefore, stem from the latter's colonization of the former, and not vice versa, as has been commonly assumed. However, the advances of Ivoirien capitalism have not been accomplished at the expense of foreign capitalists, as dependency theory tended to assume they would, nor at the expense of the peasantry, as the neopopulists have been inclined to think.[23] Ivoirien capital has prospered in a symbiotic relationship with both these classes, sometimes at conflict but always interdependent with them.

Like virtually all countries in modern Africa, Côte d'Ivoire did not exist prior to the arrival of the Europeans. It was colonial rulers who drew the boundaries that now divide Africa, often doing so from offices in Europe and rarely with any regard to the existing ethnic boundaries. Sixty ethnic groups make up the population of today's Côte d'Ivoire, but they are divided into four larger groupings, each united by common ancestry. None of these traditional groups lived entirely within the boundaries imposed by the colonizers. The precolonial territories of the Akans of southeast Côte d'Ivoire spread into modern-day Ghana, at one time forming the basis for the Asante kingdom; those of the Krous, in the southwest, spread westward into what is today Guinea, while those of the Mandé peoples of the northwest spread up into modern-day Mali, and the Voltaic peoples of the northeast had strong ties in what became Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) and northern Ghana.

The boundaries that separated these peoples were usually ambiguous. At various times localised kingdoms emerged, such as those of Bouna, Kong, Kabadougou, Indenié, Sanwi, Moronou, the Abron and Baoulé kingdoms, and, most notably, the great Samory empire in the north, which proved to be a thorn in the side of the French imperialists until the capture of Samory Touré himself. However, most territories were not rigidly defined: ethnic groups had their lands, but passage between them was relatively unhindered provided one was willing to pay the prescribed tribute to local rulers.

When the Europeans arrived, they found a land of dense tropical forest in the south and savannah in the north, and they named it the Ivory Coast because large elephant herds roamed the area (today, hunted nearly to extinction, only a few elephants remain in the country). In the early days, Europeans knew Côte d'Ivoire more familiarly as "the white man's grave" because of the yellow fever epidemics that could decimate entire European

communities. The French, not terribly interested in this exotic but harsh land, claimed it not because of what it offered, but rather because they feared that the British, who were pushing westward from Nigeria, would do so if they did not. Such an eventuality would have jeopardized French plans for the economic exploitation of the more northwesterly part of West Africa.

Apart from its ivory, which still made it less a gem than the neighboring British colony of Gold Coast, Côte d'Ivoire was not particularly rich in natural wealth. Early traders came looking for slaves, but found that they could do better in nearby Guinea than in sparsely populated southern Côte d'Ivoire. The colony possessed little in the way of mineral wealth: a century after the French colonized the region oil would be discovered, though its quality turned out to be rather low. Throughout all of its history and right up to the present day the only resource that Côte d'Ivoire ever had in abundance was arable land. Farming, therefore, was the only useful economic function this colony could perform for its new masters.

Before farming could begin, the land had first to be cleared, a none-too-easy task for prospective colonizers who might have had visions of the good life in Africa. Côte d'Ivoire was neither Kenya nor Rhodesia; it lacked the pleasant, dry climate of those colonies. Instead, it was hot, sometimes oppressively so, the air thick with a moisture so dense that it made blue skies seem grey for months on end and obscured direct sunlight, and it was beset by torrential tropical downpours during the rainy seasons. It lacked the highland plateaus that appealed to prospective European settlers. The British could sip an afternoon shandy or lemonade in the shaded groves of Kenya's White Highlands; but in this medium-sized French colony on the Gulf of Guinea, where the humidity held the heat and carried it on every breeze, the shade offered only partial respite from the sun and the red wine was warm unless kept on ice, which no right-thinking Frenchman would ever stoop to do.

Still, in time they came. They did so because the colonial regime, motivated by economic concerns, made the terms of their settlement in the colony as generous as it could: French settlers got free land on which to set up plantations, suitable crop varieties, and access to cheap labor (through the use of forced labor, and the establishment of labor importation). Above all, they got the opportunity to become part of a privileged elite. Looking for work in the war-ravaged France of the 1920s, the rootless unemployed sometimes found these terms too good to resist.

Although there had been trade—sometimes over long distances—and artisanal manufacturing in the precolonial period, capitalism as such did not exist in Côte d'Ivoire prior to the arrival of the Europeans. Initially, the French conquerors who began to settle in the region in the late nineteenth century did little to alter this. African society did undergo a series of traumatic changes, and in time the old society and its ruling class were effectively destroyed by the colonialists, but capitalism did not automatically

follow to fill the breach. Though French traders did business with African counterparts along the coast, they themselves had only a limited impact on the people with whom they engaged in exchange.

However, France's organization of French West Africa's economy laid foundations for the first pillars of capitalist development. Certain colonies were designated to be suppliers of cash crops for French markets, while others became labor reserves and food suppliers to the cash crop–producing regions. To a certain extent, colonialism benefited the first group while harming the latter so severely that its economies have not yet emerged from poverty. In the words of G. B. Kay, the colonies in the second group (labor reserves and suppliers of food) suffered from under-exploitation relative to their neighbors in the first group (cash crop producers).[24]

Côte d'Ivoire was fortunate to be in the first group. As a result, it did relatively well, at least in economic terms, out of colonialism. However, prosperity and capitalism are not coterminous. Other French West African colonies that supplied France with cash crops did not develop indigenous capitalism. In time, however, indigenous capitalism did appear in Côte d'Ivoire because its relationship to the French economy differed from that of other colonies. Linked to French capitalism by trade and little else, other colonies bought French manufactures and shipped raw materials to French consumer markets and industrial plants. Capitalist production, as opposed to capitalist trade, did not penetrate these colonies very deeply, if at all.

It did so in Côte d'Ivoire because a few hundred French settlers established and operated plantations which operated on capitalist principles: large-scale units of production, mechanized farming, the extensive use of wage labor, and the reinvestment of profits into expanding or improving farm operations. While some settlers had also gone to other French colonies, they did not end up being as significant there as were their compatriots in Côte d'Ivoire.

Of course, settler capitalism was not Ivoirien capitalism, for the settlers saw themselves as extensions of France and its economy. However, where settlers established plantations, Africans soon followed, using European methods and techniques learned from the imperialists. Ivoiriens first became planters of consequence in the 1920s, though Ivoirien capitalism really began to grow only in the 1930s.

However, the new class of African planters was never the agrarian oligarchy Amin described in the context of his dependency paradigm. From the beginning, Ivoirien planters, who prospered and expanded their numbers rapidly, behaved like capitalists in the way they disposed of their surpluses, employed wage labor, and diversified their holdings. It is true that right up to the end of the colonial period they were primarily an agricultural class, but behind this facade they—and particularly their families—were expanding their urban interests more rapidly than their rural ones.

The emergence of the planter bourgeoisie signaled a quiet revolution of sorts: capitalism was growing out of the ruins of the old society. Many of these capitalists came from among the poorer segments of the old society, and most did not come from among the old ruling class. Their success amounted to an overthrow of the old by a new and rising generation. Though they first learned the principles of capitalist production from settlers, the planters were more than mimics; unlike white settlers, they were not just extensions of the French economy. They assimilated the new ideas and blended them with some of their own, for they knew the African topography, its climate, and its peoples far better than the French did.

Blending European with African ideas, Ivoirien capitalists created a new type of production that soon proved itself considerably superior not only to precolonial methods but to the French variety as well. Spawned by the European settler class, African planters very soon overtook them in numbers, and by the end of the colonial period had left them far behind. Ivoirien capitalism was therefore something quite new, not a European model learned abroad and transplanted intact to another continent.

Ultimately, political power assured the Ivoirien capitalist class its economic success: of necessity, it took control of the postcolonial state. Basically contented and apolitical individuals in their early days, the indigenous planters soon proved too much competition for the settlers. Turning to a sympathetic Vichy regime, the colonial settlers did everything in their power to drive the planters out of business and convert them back into small peasant farmers. This provoked the indigenous planters to organize themselves in self-defense, laying the groundwork for what would be Côte d'Ivoire's best-organized and most effective political movement. Between the mid-1940s and the early 1950s, the Ivoirien bourgeoisie established itself as the colony's leading African class, forming a critically important alliance with a sympathetic colonial regime during the brief period of Gaullist rule. In the 1950s, seeing the opportunities the state could provide in advancing their business interests, Ivoirien capitalists used their political organization to seize power when the French made preparations to leave.

For better or worse, capital provides economic lifeblood to modern industrial societies, whether in Europe, North America, or elsewhere. In a developed country, a government that runs roughshod over its capitalists by taxing them heavily, restricting their activities, and raising their costs through very generous labor and social legislation jeopardizes its own existence: capitalists respond by scaling back their investments, slowing their business activity, perhaps moving operations abroad. Ultimately, tax revenues fall; thus for government to shoot at capital is to shoot at itself. Government needs to keep the capitalist economy vigorous and healthy, if only to maintain the tax flows that provide its own sustenance. Thus, the

modern state is structurally dependent on capitalism even if capitalists do not exercise direct political control.

This situation did not confront most of Africa's new states. With only a few exceptions, African capitalism was nascent and immature at the time of independence. Provided good relations were maintained with foreign powers, particularly capitalist ones, and thus that the foreign corporations that took care of selling the country's goods abroad were treated with a certain degree of tolerance, African capitalism could be suppressed. This placed African bourgeoisies in a position of some vulnerability.

Recognizing its own insecurity, the Ivoirien bourgeoisie embarked on an ambitious program not only to extend capitalism throughout Côte d'Ivoire, but indeed to foster the development of the country's African capitalism. This entailed a planned expansion in the country's output of export crops, in particular coffee and cocoa. Export revenues provided the Ivoirien bourgeoisie—through the agency of the state—with a pool of investment capital. However, Côte d'Ivoire's capitalists recognized there was a limit to what they could grab without jeopardizing their class interests: only so much could be taken out of the hands of peasants before peasants would cease to produce cash crops, or smuggle what they did produce to buyers who would offer them a better price. Marketing board administrators in other countries were not always so sensitive, unwittingly provoking retreats from production, or at least from the formal economy. In Côte d'Ivoire, on the other hand, peasants continued to get what they considered a fair price, and expanded their production in leaps and bounds in order to make themselves richer, becoming West Africa's most prosperous farmers in the process. Robert M. Hecht has pointed out that in the 1960s and 1970s consistent increases in producer prices—despite the fact that they were only marginally better than the inflation rate—gave farmers the impression that the national marketing board was being generous to them.[25]

In order to be able to rule in such a way as to protect their class interests (not merely their separate interests as individual capitalists), and in order to be able to recognize at what point their personal actions in the state would begin to jeopardize their class interests, Côte d'Ivoire's businesspeople had to come together in order to find a common ground. They had to develop an ideology and a program to which all the individual members could subscribe. Otherwise, there would be nothing stopping them from plundering their fellow capitalists once in power. In a sense, they had to articulate a general will that could take precedence over their individual wills. Building on the organizations it had put in place during the colonial period, the Ivoirien capitalist class did a remarkable job of cultivating and maintaining its cohesion. This has served its political purposes well, for no other class in Côte d'Ivoire can yet rival the bourgeoisie, with all its wealth, in the degree of its organization. Its hold on the state has thereby been reinforced to the

point that it would be very difficult for an opposition movement to break it. In fact, part of the opposition that does exist has been co-opted or even created by elements within the Ivoirien bourgeoisie.

Côte d'Ivoire's economic expansion of the past three decades has not been just foreign-driven or just the result of leaps in peasant production. Both of these have played their part, but Ivoirien capitalism, that part of the economy in the hands of Ivoirien capitalists rather than small operators, has grown at a faster pace than either the peasant economy or the foreign economy. These three—foreign capitalism, the peasant economy, and Ivoirien capitalism—are not mutually exclusive, nor are they locked in a life-and-death battle in which one will shortly prevail. They are closely intertwined, and all feed off one another in a relationship of mutual benefit, although the relationship is organized and mediated by the Ivoirien capitalist class through the agency of the state it so firmly controls.

Today, not all of the capitalism in Côte d'Ivoire is Ivoirien, but the view of Ivoirien capitalism as sluggish, parasitic, and dependent is long overdue for revision. The record of Ivoirien capitalism over the last several decades stands up extremely well next to that of the advanced capitalist countries. Clearly, Ivoirien capitalism has been at the forefront of Côte d'Ivoire's postcolonial growth and development.

NOTES

1. London: Heinemann, 1975.
2. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1967.
3. For a survey of the development of this school of thought, see Magnus Blomstrom and Bjorn Hettne, *Development Theory in Transition* (London: Zed Books, 1984).
4. Prominent Marxist critiques included Ernesto Laclau, "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America," *New Left Review* 67 (1971); Robert Brenner, "The Origins of Capitalist Development," *New Left Review* 104 (1977): 25–92; Bill Warren, *Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism* (London: New Left Books, 1980); and G. B. Kay, *Development and Underdevelopment: A Marxist Analysis* (London: Macmillan, 1975).
5. See Amin, *Unequal Development* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976); Wallerstein's and Emmanuel's writings, like Amin's, are numerous, but important statements of their theory can be found in Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16 (1974): 387–415, and Emmanuel, "Myths of Development Versus Myths of Underdevelopment," *New Left Review* 85 (1974): 61–82. Amin, Frank, and Wallerstein collaborated with Giovanni Arrighi to try to find their common ground (while specifying their differences) when they published *Dynamics of Global Crisis* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982).
6. Cowen's early work includes "Differentiation in a Kenyan Location"

(Nairobi: East African Universities Social Sciences Council Conference, 1972) and "Capital and Peasant Household" (mimeo, CDS Swansea, 1976).

7. Her initial statement on the subject was "The Rise of a National Bourgeoisie in Kenya," in the *Review of African Political Economy* 8 (1977): 39–55; this was followed by the more complete *The Development of Corporate Capitalism in Kenya 1918–77* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). Swainson was not the first to argue that an industrial bourgeoisie existed in Kenya. Peter Marris and Anthony Somerset had conducted a study in the late 1960s entitled *African Businessmen* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971), but their conclusions were a bit more ambivalent than Swainson's: they were clearly dealing with a smaller-scale class than the one Swainson examined a decade later.

8. See "Capital Accumulation, Class Formation and Dependency—The Significance of the Kenyan Case," *Socialist Register* (1978) and "Development and Dependency: Critical Notes," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 7 no. 7 (1977): 92–107.

9. See the debates section in no. 17 (Jan.–Apr. 1980): 83–113.

10. In Ibid.

11. See the postscript to Fred Cooper, "Africa and the World Economy," *African Studies Review* 24 no. 2–3 (June–Sept. 1981): 1–86, in which Cooper acknowledges and summarizes a defense of dependency theory by Steven Langdon.

12. Noteworthy is John Sender's and Sheila Smith's *The Development of Capitalism in Africa* (London and New York: Methuen, 1986). See also John Iliffe, *The Emergence of African Capitalism* (London: MacMillan, 1983).

13. *The Sudanese Bourgeoisie: Vanguard of Development?* (London: Zed Books, 1984).

14. See Tom Forrest, "State Capital, Capitalist Development, and Class Formation in Nigeria," in *The African Bourgeoisie: Capitalist Development in Nigeria, Kenya, and the Ivory Coast*, edited by Paul M. Lubeck (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987). Nigeria has been a contentious case for longer than most: as early as 1977 E. Wayne Nafziger had documented the existence of large-scale Nigerian capitalists (*African Capitalism: A Case Study in Nigerian Entrepreneurship* [Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1977]). Still, his assertions did not receive unanimous acclaim, and the underdevelopment paradigm was still widely accepted a decade later when Forrest wrote his contribution to the Lubeck book.

15. *Entrepreneurs and Parasites: The Struggle for Indigenous Capitalism in Zaire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). One should note that the capitalist activities Professor MacGaffey uncovered generally involved small-scale services, leading some to question whether what she had studied was truly capitalism.

16. Among others, Richard Sandbrook had argued (in a lecture presented at Queen's University at Kingston, Feb. 26, 1986) that a neopatrimonial state made capital accumulation all but impossible in Zaire.

17. "The State and Capitalist Development in the Ivory Coast," in Lubeck, *The African Bourgeoisie.*

18. *Etat et bourgeoisie en Côte d'Ivoire* (Paris: Editions Karthala, 1982).

19. *La Bataille des entreprises publiques en Côte d'Ivoire.* (Paris: Editions Karthala, Editions de l'ORSTOM, 1990). The precursor to this state-centered analysis may perhaps be found in Michael A. Cohen's study of the Ivoirien

administrative elite, *Urban Policy and Political Conflict in Africa* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), especially chapter 3.

20. See his chapter on Côte d'Ivoire in Roger C. Riddell, ed., *Manufacturing Africa: Performance and Prospects of Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa* (London: James Currey, and Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 1990).

21. Catherine Boone, "Commerce and Capitalism in the Côte d'Ivoire" (paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, St. Louis, Mo., 1991). One hastens to point out, however, that Professor Boone's study focuses exclusively on the trade sector, which she considered to be the most likely sector to produce an African bourgeoisie. However, as this book will argue, Ivoirien capitalists have (contrary to expectations) preferred manufacturing over trade, while foreigners have retained a predilection for trade. Thus her findings need not be incompatible with those in this book.

22. J.-F. Médard, "The Historical Trajectories of the Ivorian and Kenyan States," in *Rethinking Third World Development*, edited by James Manor (London: Longman, 1991), pp. 195, 197.

23. A good example of such thinking is Eddy Lee's "Export-Led Rural Development: The Ivory Coast," *Development and Change* 11 (October 1980): 607–642.

24. See Kay, *Development and Underdevelopment*, preface and Chapter 5. Kay argues that "capital created underdevelopment not because it exploited the underdeveloped world, but because it did not exploit it enough," trade links alone constituting underexploitation. His general statement provides an excellent rule for explaining the development of some parts of French West Africa and the underdevelopment of others in the course of the colonial period.

25. See "The Ivory Coast Economic 'Miracle': What Benefits for Peasant Farmers?" *Journal of Modern African Studies* 21 no. 1 (March 1983): 30–31.

2

Early Ivoirien Capitalism

The role Côte d'Ivoire was assigned in the imperial economy, and more specifically in the economy of French West Africa, exercised a profound impact on it and its neighboring territories. Designated as an exporter of cash crops to France, Côte d'Ivoire benefited from a net influx of resources from neighboring territories. The colony also harbored Côte d'Ivoire's first capitalist producers, in the form of French settlers who came to establish plantations.

Meantime the spread of the cash economy, and the territory's new export orientation, had brought about the collapse of the Ivoirien *ancien régime.* Constraints to capitalist development were thereby swept aside. The ground was fertile for the dissemination of capitalism. The seeds sown by the settlers quickly multiplied as Africans learned the techniques of plantation agriculture and made them their own.

Thus, there soon emerged a class of wealthy indigenous planters who made use of capitalist farming techniques. These planters soon moved out of the rural economy by investing in urban business operations, thereby transforming themselves into urban capitalists. Consequently, by the end of the colonial period there existed—in an early stage of formation—a small Ivoirien bourgeoisie.

#

In 1471, a Portuguese ship in search of gold and slaves landed on the coast of what is today Ghana, initiating Europe's modern contact with that part of West Africa bordering on the Gulf of Guinea. The trade the Portuguese introduced would dominate European and West African relations for the next 300 years.[1]

French traders first arrived in the region around modern-day Côte d'Ivoire in the 1530s, operating off the Guinea coast.[2] In time they would squeeze the Portuguese out of almost all of West Africa. In the early days, though, they

rarely set foot on land, preferring to barter with African traders while their ships were anchored off the coast.

However, Côte d'Ivoire was not hospitable to European ships, given its dangerous surf and the absence of a good location for a port, so French activity was concentrated at Dakar, where a permanent colony had come into being at the end of the sixteenth century. Côte d'Ivoire was long neglected. As late as 1889, the French administration denied a request for some elements of basic colonization on the grounds that the resources of the colony were insufficient and too "uncertain" to justify investment; the request had been for a doctor, an administrator, and a telegraph line.[3] Initially, the French sought to open up the West African interior by moving eastward from Dakar to Niger, but in time they would abandon this plan and focus on developing the coastal areas, to the interior's neglect.

Though Europeans had been trading along the Ivory Coast since the arrival of the Portuguese, it was only in the nineteenth century that a lasting settlement came into being. Though a few trading outposts had come and gone since the 1840s, it was in 1858 that the first real *colon* arrived. His name was Arthur Verdier, and for a time he was probably the sole Frenchman in all of what is today Côte d'Ivoire. It took him 12 years to attract French investors for a proposed trading post. By then the French government realized he would be its best prospect to initiate the process of colonization, and so in 1871 it entrusted French sovereignty over the entire "colony" to him.

To assist him in the performance of his duties, the government gave him a flag. In reality, his authority extended no further than Assinie and Grand-Bassam. Even in 1881, barely a decade before Côte d'Ivoire was officially made a colony, there were reportedly fewer than a dozen French citizens in the region.[4]

By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the British were pressing westward from Nigeria. Anxious to preserve the gains they had made, the French began to consolidate their hold over their West African territories.

In southern Côte d'Ivoire this process began peacefully. No other option was possible. To enforce French claims along the coast, Côte d'Ivoire's first governor, Louis Binger, had been granted one small pleasure yacht purchased secondhand in London and armed with a "miniscule" cannon that could hit the shore only so long as the ship was anchored close in. For Binger, conquest was clearly out of the question. Instead, he loaded the boat with gifts from France, which he used to curry favor with the coastal chiefs.[5] The tactic worked, and in 1893 Côte d'Ivoire was officially declared a colony of France. Subsequently, rebellions broke out among those ethnic groups that had not consented to French rule. Forced back along a thin coastal strip, the French in 1908 brought in a new governor who employed brutal repression to pacify the region. By 1916, he had eliminated all remaining threats to French authority.

Map 2.1 The French in Western Africa After World War I



Source: Developed from *Atlas of World History* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1987).

Note: Cameroun, formerly a German colony, was administered by the French under a League of Nations Mandate after World War I.

Meantime, in 1891 France had combined all its West African territories into one big colony, known henceforth as French West Africa. It was run from Dakar by a governor-general. In addition to Côte d'Ivoire, the constituent territories that eventually made up this colony were Guinea, Senegal, Dahomey (Benin), Soudan (Mali), Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Mauritania, and Niger. Each territory had its own governor, Côte d'Ivoire's operating first out of Grand-Bassam, then moving in 1899 to Bingerville after a yellow fever epidemic decimated the small capital's European population.

Subordinate to the governor came a descending hierarchy of colonial administrators, *commandants de cercle* and *chefs de subdivision*, all of whom were European. Below them, finally, were the local chiefs, some of whom held their chieftainships by traditional right, others who had simply been appointed by the colonial administration; none possessed any of the autonomy of their counterparts in British colonies. With periodic modifications, this system of administration remained in place until after World War II, at which time the territories were granted elected assemblies with limited powers, though with a limited franchise and overrepresentation of French residents. Thus, the rule of white men introduced by Binger in the late nineteenth century continued uninterrupted for several generations.

FRENCH WEST AFRICA IN THE IMPERIAL ECONOMY

Whereas students of imperialism might once have been tempted to argue that imperialism was either good or bad for the colonized regions, scholars now tend to agree that there can be no grand theory of imperialism. Imperialism's effects varied according to place, time, particular nature, and local conditions. In the case of French West Africa, imperialism both helped and hindered the region's economies.

This is because when it did benefit one colonized region, it damaged another in so doing. Moreover, within regions certain groups suffered badly while others used imperialism to improve their fortunes.

The French did not originally colonize West Africa for purely economic reasons. In the beginning, strategic considerations probably had a greater bearing on France's decisionmakers.[6] However, once the takeover was effected they had every intention of making it pay, and as a result certain sectors of the French economy did build up a degree of reliance on imperialism.[7] Though French West Africa's economy would never become crucial to the French economy's survival,[8] it had an important function to perform and probably was crucial to certain segments of the mother country's economy.

Consequently, the colonial economy was to be subordinated to France's needs. As an entity, French West Africa was to perform the function of a classical colonial economy: it was to supply primary goods and raw materials

for the mother country—for example, cotton to feed French textile factories—and provide an export market for French manufacturers. Initially, France was interested only in trade and had no plans for settlement. The colonial administration built roads and railways to the interior, particularly in Senegal. When it sought supplies of primary goods, the administration was generally happy to rely upon local producers.

That would change. In neighboring Gold Coast (Ghana) the British had succeeded in persuading peasant farmers to grow cocoa, and had thereby made the colony a major supplier to British factories. Gradually the philosophy developed in France that French colonies should be used in a similar fashion.

In 1921, Albert Sarraut, the French Minister of Colonies, developed a plan for the *mise en valeur* of the colonies. The Sarraut plan sought to open up the whole West African interior to French trade and assigned the production of certain crops to colonies in which conditions—climate, labor, soil conditions—were deemed favorable. Although the plan was never fully implemented, it made quite an impact on Côte d'Ivoire. Within a decade, the territory's administration was encouraging the expansion of primary production to fill gaps in French demand, specifically targeting the cultivation of coffee and cocoa. Production of these two crops would consequently expand rapidly.[9]

Whereas West Africa's precolonial economy was essentially internal, integration into the imperial economy gave it an external orientation. Instead of production for local trade, production was to be geared toward export to Europe. This meant emphasis on developing French West Africa's coastal regions, where transportation costs were low and soil and climate were best suited for producing export crops (e.g., coffee, cocoa, bananas). The inland regions, better suited to food production, were neglected by France since it could satisfy its own food needs.[10] Thus, the colonial administration scarcely extended its transportation network into the inland regions.

Later, especially in the 1930s, the colonial administration did extend the railway and built roads that reached all the way into Soudan and Upper Volta. This was because southern mines, plantations, and forest concessions needed to recruit labor, and also to buy food to feed these laborers. Therefore, not only did the inland territories lose their best workers, but the revenue they earned from the sale of food crops to neighboring territories was eclipsed by the revenue these latter territories made on the sale of export crops and minerals. In effect, the inland territories subsidized the development of their coastal neighbors by providing them with cheap workers and food.

Although the sale of food crops was a net benefit to inland territories (albeit a comparatively small one), the drain on labor resources in time proved to be quite severe. By 1956 Côte d'Ivoire alone was importing over 300,000 northern laborers a year; before long, workers' remittances became the chief source of revenue for inland territories like Upper Volta and Chad

(in French Equatorial Africa).[11] This effect recurred all over West Africa, with coastal colonies importing laborers and food from inland neighbors.[12] Moreover, coastal colonies received most of the benefits from the effects of European colonization. Where Europeans settled in Africa, they often provided a ready source of investment capital, while also pressing the colonial regime for increased infrastructural investment. This they did in the coastal regions of French West Africa, largely ignoring the inland territories. As a result, official infrastructure investment tended also to be concentrated in coastal regions.[13]

Because of all these factors—the gap in earnings between food and export crops, the drain of labor, the lack of European settlement and official investment—the inland territories fell increasingly behind their coastal counterparts in terms of prosperity. By 1959, southern Ivoiriens earned on average between six and eight times more than their northern counterparts.[14]

Colonialism imposed a poverty on the inland territories that has persisted to this day. Countries like Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta) and Mali (formerly the French Sudan, or Soudan) are among the world's very poorest countries, whereas their coastal counterparts, such as Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, are relatively prosperous by African standards. A generation after independence, most young men of Burkina Faso continued to work in Côte d'Ivoire, leaving behind women, children, and old men to tend small subsistence farm plots.

Therefore, the term "Ivoirien capitalism" is in some respects an inappropriate one. The Ivoirien economy was never autonomous and internally generated but rather relied on the contributions made by neighboring economies.[15] Moreover the Ivoirien economy, like other coastal colonies, developed at the expense of those of its inland neighbors. However, prosperity did not necessarily amount to capitalism. While the conditions for the emergence of indigenous capitalism were quite favorable in many of the coastal colonies, the process did not necessarily follow. This was because wealth, needed by entrepreneurs in order to mobilize investment capital, was a necessary but not sufficient factor to capitalist development. The process also depended on the changes that colonialism brought about in given territories, and it was in the territories to which French settlers went that this transformation took place. Of all the territories of French West Africa, Côte d'Ivoire was to be the one in which settlers played the most important role.

FRENCH SETTLEMENT

In the early days of colonialism the French rulers showed little interest in settling West Africa, unlike what they had done in French Equatorial Africa, and unlike what the British had done in Kenya and Rhodesia. Governors first

tried to encourage the peasantry to cultivate cash crops for export to France, just as the British had promoted the growth of cocoa in Gold Coast, but the strategy failed. Particularly in Côte d'Ivoire, peasants resisted administrative pressure and continued to grow their traditional food crops.[16] As a result, some territorial governors determined that European settlers should be imported to grow cash crops.[17] Côte d'Ivoire's governors had the added incentive that settlement was deemed to be the best method of stemming the growing tide of British pressure from the east.[18]

Because of the proximity to ports and the more suitable soil and climate conditions for plantation agriculture, coastal territories were the best positioned to attract European settlers. Of these, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea were the most aggressive in granting concessions for settlement, but Côte d'Ivoire—where in 1931 the governor formally committed himself to the expansion of the European plantation economy[19]—soon outstripped even Guinea, accounting for well over half of the concessions granted in French West Africa.[20]

Once land was granted, colonial administrations then had to attract settlers to occupy it. Côte d'Ivoire's government did this by exempting plantation products from customs duties, offering settlers access to new technologies being developed by its department of agriculture, and most important of all, allowing them the use of forced labor.[21] Each year, all Africans who could not afford the exemption fee had to provide the administration with several days of labor at nominal wages. This labor was supposed to be used on public works, but Côte d'Ivoire's governors persuaded themselves that development of the plantation economy served the public interest.[22] For settlers, it meant a guaranteed supply of labor at a low price, in effect, a government subsidy of their operations. Though the issue of forced labor would go on to become a bone of contention in the politics of the territory, the institution helped make Côte d'Ivoire the center of settler activity in French West Africa.

For all that, Côte d'Ivoire's settler economy got off to a slow start. The first European plantation (a coffee farm) was established by Arthur Verdier at Elima (Assinie) in 1881. Verdier, Côte d'Ivoire's first Resident (the representative of the Governor of Senegal in the days before France declared Côte d'Ivoire a colony), was a tireless promoter of the virtues of settlement in the territory. Eventually, Amédée Brétignère and Marcel Treich-Laplène (the latter went on to be the second Resident) joined Verdier in his operation.

It was a lonely enterprise: at any given time only one of the three men might be in the colony, which remained unforgiving and mysterious to Europeans. They brought in some coffee plants from Liberia, built a small shed as living quarters, then began the laborious process of clearing the jungle using workers from nearby villages. During the rainy season's torrential downpours, the man at the plantation would be trapped inside the shed, often con-

fined to the small wooden bed as he spent several days sweating off an attack of malaria while the heavy tropical rain pounded against the roof. Still, the enterprise prospered and Brétignère's dream of building a stately plantation manor became a reality. By the end they had 120 hectares in production, employed 60 permanent workers, and hired more than 500 others at harvest time. As early as 1889, the plantation produced 64 tonnes of coffee plus a variety of fruits. Brétignère later created his own plantation, although the three men remained close associates, Brétignère marrying Verdier's niece.[23]

This early success was slow to be repeated. No more than a dozen new plantations were established before the end of the century, and few of these survived very long. By the turn of the century a mere 160 hectares of coffee had been planted,[24] a scant improvement on Verdier's accomplishment. A few more settlers tried their luck in the early 1900s. Most failed and, disillusioned, returned to France. By the outbreak of World War I Verdier's dreams of a settler economy seemed yet remote: European plantations covered just over 3,000 hectares, and there were only a few dozen settlers in all of Côte d'Ivoire.[25]

When the war ended, settlement gained a strong new impetus. The changing demands of the world economy and the rise in world commodity prices now made plantation agriculture in tropical regions very attractive, especially to Frenchmen who yearned for the upward mobility denied them at home.[26] Within three years of its creation in 1923, a coffee plantation in Gagnoa was so successful that many French immigrants came to Côte d'Ivoire seeking to repeat its achievements.[27] By 1932 there were 142 European farms in operation, some small enough to be run by individuals, others huge plantations owned by companies that sent administrators to manage them.[28] By the outbreak of World War II the figure had surpassed 200, and the total amount of land alienated to settlers in perpetuity came to about 75,000 hectares,[29] a twenty-five-fold increase over the situation less than three decades before.

At about that point the settler class seems to have stabilized both in numbers, at about 200–250, and in total holdings, at between 60,000 and 75,000 hectares.[30] While some of the European plantations were very large, in some cases well over 1,000 hectares, most settler plantations generally averaged around 200 hectares, and there was the odd settler who tilled a meagre plot as small as 20 hectares.[31]

The early settlers established their farms close to the coast: Verdier's overlooked the sea. At the time this was the only part of Côte d'Ivoire the French knew well. It was adventure enough for them to leave their cozy provincial towns and take up life in a dense and inhospitable jungle; to journey inland, where lived peoples largely unfamiliar with European ways and justifiably suspicious of European intentions, was out of the question. Over time, the pattern changed: settlers moved into new areas once the

colonial regime consolidated its hold over them. By the end of World War II there were significant settler communities inland, particularly around Gagnoa. Nevertheless, settlers would move only so far inland: almost all of them created their farms in the southern forest region, only a handful traveling north of Bouaké.

They came to grow the lucrative export crops that the colonial administration had tried to persuade (even coerce) the African peasants to adopt: first cocoa, then coffee after the emergent class of African planters squeezed them out of cocoa production, and when they were squeezed out of coffee planting after World War II, bananas and pineapples.

Settlers operated two types of plantation. The very large ones were owned by French companies; their administrators, company agents, frequently did not even live on the plantation, but in nearby towns. Then there were the genuine settlers, the "*petits blancs*" of low status in French society who were attracted to Côte d'Ivoire by the opportunity suddenly to enter the ranks of a ruling class. Usually former employees of trading companies, lumberjacks, or just plain speculators, those who succeeded made Côte d'Ivoire their home. A small number were also former employees of the colonial administration, enticed into the private sector by the evident success of their compatriots.[32]

The profile of the settler population was therefore very similar to that of colonists elsewhere. Whereas colonial administrators—save at the lowest levels—were well educated, settlers were typically drawn from France's lower classes, in terms both of wealth and education.[33] This gave them an even more "colonial" mentality than the administrators. Both racist and reactionary, they rallied with enthusiasm to the Vichy cause immediately after the fall of France, despised the governor who turned the colony to the Free France government, and labeled the nationalist leader Félix Houphouët-Boigny—a conservative man and ardent capitalist—a radical fanatic. Even the colonial administrators complained of the fury and zealotry of the settlers, criticizing their mistreatment of the African population.[34]

In the end more Europeans went to live in Senegal than in Côte d'Ivoire, but most of them, urban administrators and traders, were more mobile than the Ivoirien settlers because they had few vested interests in the colony. Moreover, traders could prosper without significantly altering the society with which they traded.

The settlers were different. They had tied their economic well-being to that of the colony, owning their land and passing it on to their children as family estates.[35] Though their numbers were small, they exercised considerable power within the territory's European population, and it was of course the Europeans who ruled. Their deep involvement in the colony and the way they influenced changes in its production led to significant social and cultural transformations.

THE FALL OF THE IVOIRIEN *ANCIEN REGIME*

Côte d'Ivoire's indigenous economy, society, and culture—even the geography—were profoundly affected by colonialism. Gradually, the old class system disappeared, its remnants relegated to the margins of colonial society. In its place, slowly but surely, a new class system emerged.

None of this resulted from administrative fiat. Colonial government subverted the traditional ruling class of chiefs, elders, princes, and kings, but the colonial state's apparatus was far too small to enable French administrators to impose their will easily on an unwilling population. During the 1930s fewer than 4,000 European officials administered all of French West Africa, which at the time had a native population of 15 million; in 1908 ten Europeans administered two million people in the Mossi country.[36] What G. B. Kay once said about Ghana is equally relevant to French West Africa: "How was the colony managed? . . . It was managed by extreme caution."[37] Though troops could occasionally be summoned to back up policy with force, by and large administrators were left to rely on a combination of persuasion and co-optation of local elites in order to govern. The colonial governors, therefore, did not slash away at the old system with wanton disregard.

Nor did the changes result merely from the presence of settlers. The number of settlers in Côte d'Ivoire may never have surpassed 250 (not including their families), and in any given *cercle* the settlers rarely, if ever, accounted for more than 1 percent of the local population. Their impact was more insidious—and less intentional—than the transposition of a new society onto a conquered one, as happened in such colonies as the United States, Canada, or Australia. The settlers did not overwhelm the old mode of production, but were rather sprinkled about it like raisins in a plum pudding.

The onset of a money economy and of commodity production substantially altered Ivoirien society, compounding the destructive effect of colonial administration on the class system while bringing about important social, cultural, and geographic changes. Such deep changes also occurred in other coastal colonies in French West Africa. Given this fact, and the modest role played by the settlers in the transformation of the old society, it seems unlikely that settlement could have been crucial to the emergence of Ivoirien capitalism, yet it was.

This is because settlement was not so much destructive as creative. The colonial economy gradually suffocated the old collective forms of production, substituting for them individual or household-based ones: the peasant—a farmer who with his family tills a small plot of land belonging to him that provides his household with its means of subsistence—a creature unknown to precolonial society, emerged in Africa.[38] This occurred in all colonies closely integrated into the imperial economy, but in Côte d'Ivoire something else emerged as a direct consequence of the settler presence: capitalist farming.

Capitalism cannot emerge from just any environment. Certain conditions must prevail in order for capitalists to be able to operate. Not only capital, but also the means to mobilize it for investment—sometimes referred to as capital accumulation—must be present. Individualism and private property are also essential.

The structures of precolonial Ivoirien society made capital accumulation difficult, if not impossible, for it was an organic society based on reciprocal obligations. Private property with the right to alienation did not exist, so resource appropriation for the sake of accumulation was not permitted. Individualism was a somewhat alien concept to a people whose well-being derived entirely from the communities in which they lived.

Precolonial society in Côte d'Ivoire was quite complex.[39] All sorts of social structures existed, including ethnic groups, kingdoms, tribes, chiefdoms, lineages, matriclans, patriclans, age classes, and courts. The boundaries of these structures were ambiguous, so they both coexisted and overlapped, were distinct from yet related to one another. Political sovereignty, for example, never resided in any one agent: villages had chiefs, but groups of villages had kings while within the villages there were age classes and lineage groups, all of which had certain exclusive powers. Land ownership was equally diffuse: though a village might hold the title to the land surrounding it, the lineage groups within the village had the right to work on it while the plots on the land were administered by individuals. Such a web of interconnecting rights was complicated by the fact that different ethnic groups would sometimes share the rights to one piece of land: one, for example, had the exclusive right to cultivate it, while the other had the exclusive right to any mineral wealth found under its surface.

In spite of this complexity and variety, several general statements can be made concerning precolonial Ivoirien societies. With regard to political organization, most precolonial Ivoirien societies were stateless. None had standing armies, bureaucratic organization, or centralized sovereignty, although some of the northern kingdoms came close. The colonial rulers, therefore, did not merely substitute one ruling class for another; they created an entirely new apparatus of power, the modern state, with its institutionalized and highly specified instruments of rule. Under the French colonial regime one sovereign alone held all economic and political power. Ultimately, all power derived from this one source; the days of divided sovereignty were a thing of the past. The new ruling class fused economic with political power to a degree unknown to most of the region's precolonial societies.

With regard to economic organization, production was a collective task. Except for the Dioulas, who were first and foremost traders, almost all of Côte d'Ivoire's ethnic groups were sedentary and agricultural; that is to say, they would settle, clear, and cultivate a given piece of land rather than

moving from place to place as would a pastoralist community.[40] All other economic activities were peripheral to agriculture: many Akan peoples produced gold, and coastal ethnic groups engaged in fishing and trading, but even in these cases agriculture remained the basis of the economy.

Production was for subsistence. Ethnic groups traded among themselves, but the distances traveled were usually small, and the range of goods traded extended to only a few luxury items. Indeed, the Guérés of western Côte d'Ivoire, for instance, kept their trade to the minimum. When trade did occur, it too was collective: the ethnic group, not individual merchants, was the channel for exchange, and one obtained desired items through the group. Since what little trade there was occurred through barter, and since production was not for sale but for consumption within the community, there was little scope for accumulating savings and building up capital.

There was none of the specialization in production that is common to capitalism. Most manufacturers were farmers who engaged in secondary activity on the side. In fact most people practiced small artisanal tasks, such as brewing or cotton spinning, during the seasons in which farming occupied little of their time. There was, however, some specialization in labor since tasks were divided among groups. The sexual division of labor was especially strong; among the northerly Senufos, for example, men cleared the land but women alone sowed it because of their association with fertility.

On the whole, the household was the basic unit of production, but a number of tasks were reserved to collective groups. In Senufo communities the whole village would work together at certain times of the year; in other ethnic groups age classes and lineages had specified tasks. In virtually all ethnic groups, clearing, sowing, and harvesting were collective tasks. The individual, therefore, depended on the community for his or her well-being just as the community depended on all its individuals. The myth of the self-made man could find no expression in precolonial Côte d'Ivoire.

Although a piece of land could sometimes remain in the hands of one family, passed down from generation to generation, there was no land ownership in the Western sense of the term. Individuals could not do with their land as they pleased, for all land typically belonged to the community, which included not only its living members but its dead ancestors as well. Individuals and communities did not own land, they merely had rights to use it. Moreover, rights could be shared, as mentioned above, in a way that ownership cannot be. With rights went obligations, so land could not be sold and those in the ruling class could not expropriate their fellow villagers in order to build a plantation. Land was not a commodity; it was a central part of life and of the community, which was organically bound to it.

In any case, there was not *one* ruling class as such, because different agents held different forms of political power or sovereignty. Lineages, clans, villages, and tribes all had their respective chiefs, while some people had

princes and kings or, as in the case of the Gwas, a supreme chief who exercised a certain authority over village chiefs. Some ethnic groups went further, and had different chiefs for different functions; the Gouros of central Côte d'Ivoire, for instance, had war, land, and tribe chiefs, each of whom possessed separate powers and responsibilities but none of whom was absolute. The only common link among Ivoirien ethnic groups was that in all of them elders always held a special place of power.

Nevertheless, though economic and political power were not fused into one, elders and political authorities possessed certain economic advantages. They had more privileges, more rights to certain goods, and greater access to land than did ordinary villagers. In this regard they constituted a dominant class of sorts. In spite of a certain degree of ambiguity in the class system, one can still speak of a traditional class of rulers without necessarily narrowing it to any one group. Furthermore, those in positions of power at the onset of colonialism faced the opportunity either to entrench their positions within the new political structures or to lose them altogether. The extent to which they did this would determine whether colonialism would strengthen or weaken the traditional dominant class.

As a rule of thumb in French West Africa, one can say there was a direct relationship between the degree of integration into the imperial economy and the degree to which the old society was transformed. Côte d'Ivoire became quite closely linked to the French economy, so the transformations in the economic, sociocultural, and political spheres were profound.

In the economic sphere, trade and migration expanded a previously limited flow of people and goods. This expansion occurred for two principal reasons, one being the introduction of an import-export trade with France, the second being the decline in subsistence agriculture and its replacement with commodity production. Commodity production had expanded in part because of the new opportunities available to Africans, but also because the new regime, unlike the old one, demanded that its taxes be paid in cash rather than in kind. To raise the money to pay their taxes, Africans either had to grow cash crops on at least part of their land, or perform wage-labor on someone else's.

Growing cash crops gave farmers a source of savings, making capital accumulation possible. In addition, the lowering of transportation costs due to the introduction of road and railway travel, and the abolition of precolonial internal tolls, tariffs, and taxes served to lower trade costs.[41] Traders could thus accumulate savings, while producers got higher prices for their goods.

The territory's new import-export orientation not only did away with the traditional east-west caravan trade, but the new cheap imports drove traditional industries such as furniture-making and cloth production out of business.[42] Those that survived were compelled to adopt the new technology

in order to remain competitive. Trade patterns also altered the geography of the territory, as populations moved to locate closer to the new transportation routes. New villages thus came into being, while old ones disappeared altogether.

Patterns of land tenure began to change, initiating a process that continued into the postcolonial period.[43] In some places the principle of communal tenure began to give way to individual ownership.[44] Sometimes this resulted from the transformation in production, sometimes from colonial intervention: in the Gan region of northeastern Côte d'Ivoire, for instance, when the French brutally and totally suppressed an uprising shortly before World War I, they took the land under their control and introduced an altogether new property regime.[45]

The transformations in the social and cultural spheres were especially traumatic for the old society. The spread of commodity production and the money economy eroded Côte d'Ivoire's traditional social structures. The patriarchal collectivity gave way to the nuclear family,[46] while the advent of long-distance trade, migrant labor, and French military service reduced contact among family members.[47] Young people paid less respect to community elders, because their future well-being did not depend on the elders in the way it once had. Whereas in the past the privileges held by elders and chiefs had made them society's wealthiest people, young people were now able to jump the queue to prosperity by cultivating cash crops, engaging in business, or using education to obtain remunerative jobs.[48] The young also began increasingly to ignore traditional religious cere monies, once an important component of the community's authority system; some abandoned the old religions altogether and became Muslims or Christians.[49]

Prosperous villagers further broke the bonds that linked them to their communities by hiring stand-ins to perform village obligations such as communal labor for them.[50] Moreover, when ordinary Africans came into conflict with the colonial regime they were more likely to turn to one of the community's educated young people than to their chiefs for assistance, since these people were more familiar with French ways—having been to their schools—and could do all the translating. These educated young people were more likely to come from the ranks of prosperous farming families than from within the traditional chiefly class.[51]

In such ways, young and prosperous Ivoiriens asserted a new individualism, straining if not severing age-old bonds to their communities. In great numbers they began flocking to the cities and southern plantations. Local notables tried everything they could to stem the outward flow, but despite their efforts some villages lost all their young people.[52]

Nevertheless, for a long time it was assumed that the collapse of the Ivoirien *ancien régime* was more apparent than real. Until recently, the

accepted wisdom among specialists on Côte d'Ivoire has been that the region's traditional ruling class used its control over land and resources to establish itself as a class of plantation farmers, going on from there to occupy the positions of native power in the colonial regime. Thus it was always assumed that at the time of independence they inherited the mantle of government, albeit in a position of considerable dependence on France and its economy. In sum, the new Ivoirien ruling class was said to be simply the old ruling class in new, more European clothing; though the old society and its political system might have been overturned, the power of its ruling class remained intact.[53]

Rather than adapting to the changes in the society, economy, and culture, however, the chiefs did what traditional ruling classes frequently do when threatened by change: they tied themselves ever more firmly to tradition. This tradition, however, was rapidly collapsing, and along with it went their power.

While some chiefs did take advantage of their control over land and made use of certain privileges—such as community labor and taxing rights—in order to join the ranks of the new bourgeoisie, most did not. The bulk of the African bourgeoisie came from humbler backgrounds. Félix Houphouët-Boigny—who *was* a traditional chief, became a rich planter, and later led the country to independence—once remarked that of every ten members of the rising Ivoirien capitalist class only two came from families of the "old bourgeoisie."[54]

In part this was because many of the traditional chiefs lost their positions under colonial rule. The French rulers did employ chiefs in their administrative structure, but these positions were strictly appointive. Often these new administrative structures were superimposed on traditional structures which bore no similarity to them, so the French were not co-opting an old elite but creating a wholly new one. While some administrative chiefs had formerly been traditional ones, many had little if any connection to the old regime. The standard for selection by the colonial administration was not inherited status but loyalty to the new rulers (although the French preferred to find Africans with at least some claim to traditional status). If these chiefs stepped out of line, the French had no qualms about replacing them. This led one contemporary observer to comment that "a traditional chief who receives a salary like the newest temporary clerk is no longer a chief; he is an employee."[55]

Colonial officials were conscious that they were ruining an old class system. Robert Delavignette, a liberal and rather benign administrator by colonial standards, said that traditional authority had died with the arrival of the French and that as a result it was futile to try and reestablish it. "Do not let us be afraid to sweep Africa clean of its feudalists by officializing them," he said, adding:

> The feudal organization that we found in Africa is crumbling. And the village that supported it, and which we did not discover at first, is going to pieces. With our commercial economy, we have introduced an individualistic ferment which has now reached the village and is eating away the ancient community. The canton chief is losing his feudal character and the village chief his religious sanctions.[56]

The social, economic, and cultural effects of colonialism in Côte d'Ivoire were indeed traumatic, but one must not overemphasize their impact. Though individualistic forms of behavior had emerged, new types of production been adopted, and old authorities lost their power to be replaced by new ones, Côte d'Ivoire did not become a nation of Horatio Alger devotees who spent every waking hour trying to mimic the French. It is true that in Côte d'Ivoire many such Ivoiriens wear Italian-tailored suits, dine in French restaurants, struggle with Parisian accents, and even go so far as to ignore children (something very un-African). However, they are a minority. Communitarian consciousness is still very powerful in Côte d'Ivoire. While young people leave their villages to strike it rich, if they do so they send money back to their families and invest generously in their villages. Among practicing Christians and Muslims one meets people who still quietly keep a charm or totem, "just in case." Above all, Ivoiriens have not accepted the Western fiction of the self-made man.

The difference, however, is that these communitarian practices are cultural vestiges, not components of the production process. The restraints these practices once placed on capital accumulation disappeared long ago. Rich Ivoiriens are expected to share their wealth, but there is nothing to impede them from leaving their villages and renouncing daily obligations in order to become rich.

In such respects, colonialism ended the Ivoirien *ancien régime*. Opportunities for capital accumulation that had never existed before were now in place. Out of this context emerged the new African bourgeoisie.

THE SETTLERS AND THE RISE OF THE PLANTER BOURGEOISIE

A number of factors—the collapse of the *ancien régime*, the spread of commodity production, and the possibilities of capital accumulation among them—conspired to produce an Ivoirien bourgeoisie. In addition another key factor was present in Côte d'Ivoire that was less in evidence in other territories of French West Africa: the presence and activities of the settlers.

While Ivoiriens assimilated and improved upon European agricultural technologies, the demonstration effect of the French settlers was clear. African laborers who had come to work on settler plantations were exposed to

new methods and technologies of production. Some took their knowledge and subsequently created their own plantations, using the savings they accumulated as farm laborers.[57]

Most Ivoirien planters appear to have been former plantation laborers. A good many were migrant laborers from the north, sometimes from as far away as the northern territories of French West Africa; this gave the class a very cosmopolitan character. One effect of their successes was that while certain regions of Côte d'Ivoire prospered, the peoples traditionally inhabiting those regions did not necessarily do so to the same extent, since many of the rich farmers had migrated from elsewhere (though in the Baoulé region in the southeast a good number of the successful planters were themselves Baoulés who had worked on European farms).[58]

Other African planters were civil servants who observed the success with farming that their former French colleagues had achieved.[59] The noted Ivoirien planter and politician Gabriel Dadié provides one of the best examples of this pattern. An employee of the colonial regime, he left his job in 1924 when he saw that two of his former French colleagues were making more money from farming than they had in civil service jobs. He started growing coffee and by 1939 was farming over 100 hectares in the Agboville region;[60] he went on to become one of the colony's richest men. Similarly, Joseph Anoma left his position to take up planting at about the same time because he was about to be transferred to Guiglo, one of the most unpopular postings in the colonial civil service.[61] Côte d'Ivoire was exceptional in French West Africa in the number of educated young men like Dadié and Anoma who chose to become planters. With the other exception of Senegal, where the peanut trade offered promise, educated Africans generally saw no future for themselves except in the civil service.[62] The presence of a core of educated individuals within the planter bourgeoisie would later provide a tremendous asset when the class began to organize for political action.

Few planters were drawn from other social groups. Dioula planters were almost exclusively traders who diversified their interests into plantation farming because of its apparent profitability,[63] while some Abouré fishermen abandoned their nets to take up the more lucrative new type of farming.[64]

While most traditional chiefs did not become planters, and while most planters were not drawn from the traditional chiefly class, there were nonetheless some chiefs among the new bourgeoisie. The most significant of these was Gbon Coulibaly, the Senufo chief who began one of Côte d'Ivoire's largest capitalist "dynasties." Particularly among the coastal Abourés, many planters were individuals who were already wealthy in the precolonial period, using this advantage to put themselves in business.[65] Among the Gouro and Baoulé, many (but not all) planters were chiefs, but among the neighboring Agni, who produced a large number of big plantations, the leading planters did not emerge from among the chiefs.[66] In

several other areas or ethnic groups traditional chiefs similarly occupied a relatively small place among the planters.

There were, therefore, some members of the traditional elite in the new bourgeoisie, but they accounted for only a portion of this class. Moreover, given that chiefly status had declined under European rule and technology, the chiefs who became planters were moving into *new* positions of power, not reinforcing old ones. In consequence, less forward-looking chiefs were left behind. The old class had fallen, and a new one was emerging to take its place. So much so, in fact, that the anthropologist Claude Meillassoux puts the representation of the lineage chiefs within the planter bourgeoisie on a parwith veterans, pensioners, civil servants, and private-sector employees who, while lacking the chiefs' control over resources, put themselves in business thanks to large salaries or savings accumulated during their employment.[67] Most studies tend to confirm the findings of David Groff's survey of rich planters in the Assikasso region: the majority came from humble backgrounds.[68]

The Africans did not merely duplicate the European style of plantation farming; they improved upon it, farming smaller plots, scattering them throughout the forest, and not fully clearing the land among other innovations. In so doing they became more productive than the settlers. Nonetheless, the connection between the arrival of the settlers and the emergence of the planters is apparent; more African planters emerged in areas of settler concentration.[69] Moreover, they emerged not only in the same areas, but generally at around the same times that settlers arrived in a given area.[70] It is therefore probably not coincidental that the boom in the planter economy followed that in the settler economy by less than a decade;[71] this happened to be the average amount of time farm laborers needed to save a sufficient amount of capital to start their own plantations.[72]

Despite the critical demonstrative impact the settlers had upon the African planters, they could never have seen themselves as assisting in the creation of this new class, nor indeed would they have wanted to: once the planters emerged and became highly competitive, the settlers did everything in their power to drive them back out of existence.

The colonial administration, on the other hand, at first seemed to think the creation of this class a good thing, since its interest lay in expanding the colony's production. The earliest Residents who participated in the success of the Verdier plantation consciously sought to persuade Africans to adopt the new methods of production.[73] Later, Governor Reste foresaw a promising economic future for the colony because of the daily contact between French settlers and African plantation laborers who, he reasoned correctly, were bound to be influenced by the new ideas.[74] Perhaps not coincidentally, the boom in the planter population began with the commencement of his administration in 1931. To later regimes, however, the planters appeared

more and more like Frankenstein's monster unbound than like a group of good students: they expanded at a rate that startled the settlers, whose increases in production reflected the slow, pleasant pace of colonial living. The planters also later became politically restive.

Once the new planter class had come into existence, conditions were propitious for its rapid growth. The colonial economy of Côte d'Ivoire expanded at a fast pace, particularly after 1930 when the planters began to appear. Massive increases in the export of key commodities brought large new infusions of liquid capital into the colony (see Table 2.1). A lot of this capital found its way into the hands of the planters. Ivoirien farmers, as a group, were French West Africa's richest farmers, only the Senegalese coming close to them in terms of export earnings;[75] this made the relative wealth of the richest among them, the planters, greater yet. Given that the richest Europeans in Côte d'Ivoire were the settlers,[76] not traders or colonial officials, it is reasonable to surmise that the richest Ivoiriens were probably the planters, not traders, civil servants, or teachers. In fact, they may well have been the richest Africans in all of French West Africa. This made it possible for them to obtain the capital necessary for investment on a scale hitherto unknown.

Prospective capitalists had at their disposal a large pool of cheap labor, a proletariat, which they, ironically, had helped to create since so many of them had started out as members of the new working class. Most members of this proletariat were northern peasant farmers who came south for part of the year to supplement their meager incomes, so they were not a full-time working class. Nonetheless, the colonial regime had put in place an elaborate infrastructure for transporting workers to the south, and anybody able to pay the wages had access to this supply.

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When, in the 1960s, André Gunder Frank published his ground-breaking book on Latin American underdevelopment,[77] he contributed a very powerful

Table 2.1: Increases in Exports of Selected Crops, 1900–1959 (tonnes)

Year	Coffee	Cocoa	Bananas
1900	24	N.A.	n.a.
1920	17	1,036	n.a.
1930	485	20,329	2
1939/40	18,000	55,000	14,000
1950	54,190	61,690	n.d.
1958/59	104,700	63,260	46,000

Sources: Cangah and Ekanza, *La Côte d'Ivoire par les textes*, pp. 143, 146; Prey, *L'Histoire des ivoiriens*, p. 205; Suret-Canale, *Afrique noire*, vol. 2, p. 285; vol. 3, pp. 222–223; Tuinder, *Ivory Coast*, p. 15.

image to development theory's conception of the Third World, that of the parasitic and essentially unproductive class of indigenous plantation farmers. Frank argued, very powerfully, that their domination of Third World governments kept these countries in a state of underdevelopment because this was precisely what best suited the planters' interests. Dependence on agricultural exports for national revenue compelled the government to give them pride of place in its agenda, for were a national bourgeoisie to emerge, they would do what emergent capitalists did everywhere: begin demanding tariff barriers to assist the development of their industries, in so doing cutting the access of the plantation owners to their imported luxury goods while also forcing them to reorient their production to the less lucrative local markets. Rich planters, therefore, were the opponents of indigenous capitalism.

Influenced by dependency theorists like André Gunder Frank, most observers of Côte d'Ivoire have been inclined to view the Ivoirien planters in the same light. At one time, particularly in the 1960s, such a perspective seemed well founded, but it is no longer so. If one looks closely at the history of the Ivoirien bourgeoisie, including their economic behavior from the very earliest days of their existence, one must conclude that the planters were capitalists first and planters second. They emerged from the agricultural economy but then expanded into the urban economy.

Unlike the rich estate owners of Frank's Chile, the Ivoirien planters did not spend their surplus revenues on luxury consumption and expensive imported goods. While they honored certain traditional obligations—they were expected to host sumptuous feasts and provide their family members with lavish weddings and funerals—planters were much less likely than settlers to buy imported luxury goods.[78] It may be that the statements made in the 1960s concerning the planters' unproductive investments derived from the survey group used: all planters taken together seemed to devote only a small share of their surplus revenue to accumulation, but as farm size increased, so too did the share of surpluses that went into investment.[79] Richer planters were clearly investors.

In fact, they devoted much of their surplus revenue to accumulation, investing not only in their farms but in other sectors of the economy as well.[80] On their farms, African planters were increasingly mechanizing their production—for example, by buying tractors that would enable them to cultivate larger farms without having to hire additional workers.[81]

Away from their farms, planters pursued differing investment patterns. Dioula planters were the most likely to invest their agricultural surplus revenues in urban business ventures. This is because they had started out as traders and always saw planting as simply part of a diversified portfolio; in fact, they usually administered their farms from urban homes.[82] In the southeast, the richest Agni planters also adopted the practice of appointing

plantation managers in order to devote more time to the urban interests they had built.[83]

Elsewhere in the southeast, Abé planters tended to invest in such things as mechanized shelling machines, which they would rent out to neighboring farmers. They also bought trucks in order to move into the transportation business.[84] Abouré planters, on the other hand, had a penchant for real estate: being close to the territory's—later the country's—capital, they built office and residential complexes that they rented to the colonial administration.[85] The family of Mathieu Ekra, an Abouré who became one of Côte d'Ivoire's most prominent capitalists and politicians, was among the first to take up planting; he established a coffee plantation near Bonoua in 1920. The Ekra family developed interests in pineapple canning and juice production, and a company to manufacture construction materials.[86]

It was not only the Abés who liked buying trucks. Transportation was probably the most popular form of nonagricultural investment among all Ivoirien planters, no doubt because it was (and remains) an investment that guaranteed a profit. However, it would be wrong to argue, as some have tried, that it was almost the exclusive area of investment. Transportation was a secure investment in a diverse portfolio that involved more risky ventures (in new and unproven crops, for example), so it was obviously attractive to planters. Another similar type of venture, which was relatively secure, and which was therefore practiced by a number of planters, was money-lending. As the established banks did not (and still do not) lend to small farmers, planters were in a position to charge high rates of interest to farmers who had nowhere else to turn for credit.

Throughout the colonial period, however, while the planters invested liberally in urban business interests, they rarely ventured into the secondary, or manufacturing, sector. The general view, which has its limitations but is still broadly accepted, is that unless an economy develops its industrial core it may be enriching itself but is not actually developing itself. Dependency theorists make the distinction between growth and development. They argue that growth—increases in national income—without development—increased productivity due to capital intensification accompanied by social developments like higher wages and improved access to health care and education—is ultimately a dead-end street.[87] This is because it is based upon an expanded use of resources to which there are near limits. One can produce only so much cocoa before the supply of land is exhausted, or before the world markets are flooded and prices tumble, as happened to Côte d'Ivoire in the early 1980s. Thus, critics of Ivoirien capitalism were hesitant to think of it as being a potential motor for Côte d'Ivoire's economic development, given its apparent inclination to restrict itself to the primary and tertiary sectors.

From a later vantage point, though, their observations take on a different meaning. It is true that Ivoirien capitalists were investing very little in sec-

ondary industry in the colonial period, but not because of inherent conservatism on their part. Secondary development in the era of advanced industrial capitalism is very expensive; the planters were wealthy by African standards, but they were certainly not yet wealthy enough to build factories. They could have participated in joint ventures with foreign capitalists, but at the time foreign capitalists were investing only in plantations, forestry, or trade. Prior to World War II half of French West Africa's industry was located in Dakar;[88] a 1931 survey of industrial investments in Côte d'Ivoire revealed only a handful of small operations, few of which were Ivoirien-owned.[89] In short, opportunities for portfolio investment in foreign secondary enterprises scarcely existed, although even at that time Ivoiriens did set up a few small factories.

When opportunities for such joint ventures presented themselves, though, particularly after 1960, Ivoirien secondary investment flourished. All along, the Ivoirien bourgeoisie was apparently interested in secondary investment but was simply waiting for possibilities to arise. Thus the bourgeoisie as it appeared in the 1960s, when Samir Amin wrote about the Ivoirien planters, was perhaps not the bourgeoisie as it really was.[90] Certainly the later bourgeoisie bore little resemblance to what Amin described. Over three decades it changed considerably, passing through three transitional stages to become an urban class whose agrarian interests steadily declined in importance in its portfolios.

Each of these stages saw the Ivoirien bourgeoisie shift from agrarian to urban capitalism. The first, a transitional stage, refers to those capitalists who began as planters in the colonial period and later diversified into urban secondary investments. Mathieu Ekra and Georges Auguste Denise are good examples: both were rich farmers who got involved in manufacturing only after 1960.

The second stage, probably more important than the first, could be called generational. This refers not to individuals but to families, and applies to planters whose children invested their fathers' agricultural wealth in the urban economy. Thus we have names like Fulgence Brou, Joseph Anoma, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, Gabriel Dadié, Gbon Coulibaly, Marcel Laubhouet, or Moussa Diabaté, all famous as rich plantation owners. In the second generation appear Gustave Brou, François Guillaume, and Dia Houphouët-Boigny, Raphaël Dadié, Gilles Vally Laubhouet, and various members of the Anoma and Coulibaly families. Born and raised in the city, they have carried out all their economic activity there.

The third stage, representing an entirely new mode of entry into the class, includes people who joined the Ivoirien bourgeoisie after it rose to political power in the late 1950s. Few were ever planters, having been urban entrepreneurs from the start: Paul Akoto Yao, Victor Amagou, Eugène Anvo Guetat, Arsène Assouan Usher, Denis Bra Kanon, Auguste Daubrey, Mohamed Diawara, Zemogo Fofana, Amara Karamoko, Lambert Konan, Jean-Baptiste

Améthier, Emmanuel Dioulo, Joseph and Hortense Aka Anghui, Jean-Baptiste Améthier, François Dacoury-Tabley, Charles Donwahi, Léon Amon, Louis Kouassi Kouadio, and Lambert Amon Tanoh were scarcely teenagers when the African planters formed their first political organization in 1944. Their average age at the time was ten years. They obviously could not be taken into account in studies of the original planter bourgeoisie, but they rose freely into its ranks in the late colonial and postcolonial period. Contrary to the expectations of development theory regarding relations between planters and capitalists, the old planters had no problem with the presence of these young entrepreneurs in their organizations and in the state.

By the end of the colonial period, the Ivoirien bourgeoisie was still a young class in terms of its maturity. In terms of its numbers, however, it had grown rapidly. It is generally estimated that there were 20,000 Ivoirien planters by 1958. These were commodity-producing farmers who operated larger-than-average farms and employed wage labor. The wealthier of this group owned plantations averaging between ten and twelve hectares and employing at least five workers,[91] fairly large enterprises considering the technology of the day. In addition, of course, they held urban business interests. At the pinnacle of the group was a small circle of very wealthy Africans, owning huge estates and living in elegant homes, who would provide leadership when the class organized itself for political action.

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By the end of the colonial period capitalist farming accounted for only a small proportion of Côte d'Ivoire's total agricultural output. The Ivoirien bourgeoisie was a kernel within the big shell of peasant agriculture, but it was a very fruitful kernel indeed. Moreover, like the settlers before them, the Ivoirien bourgeoisie would prove to have a political influence far out of proportion to their numbers.

NOTES

1. Michael Crowder, *Colonial West Africa* (London: Frank Cass, 1978), pp. 1–2.
2. John W. Blake, *West Africa: Quest for God and Gold* (London: Curzon Press, 1977), pp. 106–107.
3. J. Chaput, "Treich-Laplène et la naissance de la Côte d'Ivoire français," *Revue d'histoire des colonies* 36 (1949): 142.
4. L. G. Binger, *Une vie d'explorateur: Carnets de route* (Paris: Fernand Sorlot, 1938), pp. 167–168, 215–216; Chaput, "Treich-Laplène,": 95.
5. Binger, *Une vie d'explorateur*, pp. 215–216.
6. See D. K. Fieldhouse, *Economics and Empire 1830–1914* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973), pp. 316–321.
7. Ibid., p. 130.

8. As a rule, French trade with all French colonies—not simply those in West Africa—usually accounted for around 10 percent of its total trade. See D. K. Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson), p. 307.

9. Guy Cangah and Simon-Pierre Ekanza, *La Côte d'Ivoire par les textes* (Les Nouvelles Editions Africaines, 1978), pp. 142–150.

10. Bastiaan A. den Tuinder, *Ivory Coast: The Challenge of Success* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, for the World Bank, 1978), pp. 13–14.

11. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *French West Africa* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), pp. 492–493; David Guyer, *Ghana and the Ivory Coast: The Impact of Colonialism in an African Setting* (New York: Exposition Press, 1970), p. 52–53.

12. Thompson and Adloff, *French West Africa*, pp. 331, 493.

13. For example, in per capita terms Niger received about one-fifth the FIDES (Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Sociale des territoires d'outre mer) money that Senegal received and between one-quarter and one-third of what Côte d'Ivoire received. Finn Fuglestad, *A History of Niger, 1850–1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 170.

14. Guyer, *Ghana and the Ivory Coast*, p. 52; Anyang' Nyong'o, "The Articulation of Modes of Production: The Political Economy of Coffee in the Ivory Coast, 1840–1975" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1977), p. 173.

15. The inadequacy of the term "national bourgeoisie" was impressed upon me by Bonnie Campbell during a conversation at a conference in Kingston, Canada.

16. P. du Prey, *L'Histoire des ivoiriens* (Abidjan, 1962), pp. 74, 80, 105.

17. Senegal had experimented with settlement strategies much earlier, in the first half of the nineteenth century, but with little success. By the middle of the century, therefore, it had adopted a peasant-based agricultural development strategy. See Rita Cruise O'Brien, *White Society in Black Africa: The French of Senegal* (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), pp. 34–35.

18. Chaput, "Treich-Laplène,": 182.

19. Cangah and Ekanza, *La Côte d'Ivoire par les textes*, pp. 142–150.

20. Aristide Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 57; Michael Crowder, *West Africa Under Colonial Rule* (London: Hutchinson, 1968), p. 317.

21. Christophe Wondji, "La Côte d'Ivoire occidentale: période de pénétration pacifique (1890–1908)," *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer* 50 (1963): 346–351; Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast*, p. 58.

22. John D. Hargreaves, *West Africa: The Former French States* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 113–116.

23. Prey, *L'Histoire des ivoiriens*, p. 191; Cangah and Ekanza, *La Côte d'Ivoire par les textes*, p. 143; Chaput, "Treich-Laplène,": 96; M. A. Brétignère, *Aux temps héroiques de la Côte d'Ivoire* (Paris: Editions Pierre Roger, 1931); A. Köbben, "Le Planteur noir," *Etudes Eburnéenes* V (1956): 17.

24. *Mémorial de la Côte d'Ivoire* (Abidjan: Edition Ami, 1987), vol. 2, p. 56.

25. Jean Suret-Canale, *French Colonialism in Tropical Africa 1900–1945*, translated by Till Gottheiner (New York: Pica Press, 1971), pp. 24–25; Prey, *L'Histoire des ivoiriens*, p. 192.

26. Alain Tirefort, "Le Bon temps: approche de la société coloniale: étude de cas: la communauté française en Basse Côte d'Ivoire pendant l'Entre-Deux-Guerres (1920–1940)," (Thèse de 3e cycle, EHESS, Paris, 1979), pp. 160–161; Hubert Fréchou, *Les planteurs européens en Côte d'Ivoire* (Dakar: Institut des Hautes Etudes de Dakar, 1955, Travaux du Département de Géographie), p. 2.

27. Prey, *L'Histoire des ivoiriens*, p. 206.

28. Laurent Gbagbo, "Les Entreprises coloniales en Côte d'Ivoire à la veille de la Seconde Guerre mondiale," in *Entreprises et entrepreneurs en Afrique*, vol. 1, edited by Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch and Alain Forest (Paris: Editions l'Harmattan, 1983), p. 482.

29. Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast*, pp. 57–58; Robert Delavignette, *Freedom and Authority in the French West Africa* (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1968), p. 23; Jean Suret-Canale, *Afrique noire occidentale et centrale* (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1964), vol. 2, p. 285; Nyong'o, "The Articulation of Modes of Production," p. 107; D. K. Fieldhouse, *Colonialism 1870–1945* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 75.

30. This figure does not include the rapidly growing lumber concessions, which covered up to 2.5 million hectares in the 1940s, some of which were exploited by companies with concessions well in excess of 200,000 hectares. For the most part these were operated not by settlers but by big companies. Suret-Canale, *French Colonialism in Tropical Africa*, pp. 263, 268; Laurent Gbagbo, *La Côte d'Ivoire: Économie et société à la veille de l'indépendance (1940–1960)* (Paris: Editions l'Harmattan, 1982), p. 65; Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), pp. 167–168.

31. Nyong'o, "The Articulation of Modes of Production," p. 114n; Raymond Gauthereau, *Journal d'un colonialiste* (Paris: Seuil, 1986), p. 43.

32. Fréchou, *Les planteurs européens*, pp. 12, 16; Gauthereau, *Journal d'un colonialiste*, p. 54; Thompson and Adloff, *French West Africa*, p. 318; Nyong'o "The Articulation of Modes of Production," pp. 77–78; Dotou Janvier Segla, *Immigration étrangère et économie de plantation dans la région d'Agboville à l'époque coloniale* (Abidjan: ORSTOM, Centre de Petit Bassam, 1978), p. 18.

33. *Mémorial de la Côte d'Ivoire*, vol. 2, p. 231.

34. See, for example, the memoirs of Raymond Gauthereau (*Journal d'un colonialiste*); and of Robert Delavignette: *Robert Delavignette on the French Empire*, edited by William B. Cohen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), especially chapter 3.

35. Delavignette, *Freedom and Authority*, p. 23.

36. Ibid., p. 18.

37. *The Political Economy of Colonialism in Ghana* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 9.

38. The definition of the peasantry is abstracted from Martin Klein's introduction to his edited volume *Peasants in Africa* (Beverly Hills and London: Sage, 1980). The argument that peasant production was a by-product of colonialism was originally made by Ken Post in "Peasantization and Rural Political Movements in Western Africa," *European Journal of Sociology* 13, no. 2 (1972): 223–254.

39. Notes for this section are taken from the following: David H. Groff, "The Development of Capitalism in the Ivory Coast: The Case of Assikasso, 1880–1940" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1980); Y. S. Affou, *Le grand planteur villageois dans le procès de valorisation du capital social* (Abidjan: ORSTOM, Centre Petit-Bassam, 1979); l'Abbé Jean-Albert Ablé, *Histoire et tradition politique du pays abouré* (Abidjan: Imprimerie Nationale, 1978); Alfred Schwartz, *Tradition et changements dans la société guéré* (Paris: ORSTOM, 1971); Emmanuel Terray, *L'organisation sociale des dida de Côte d'Ivoire* (Abidjan: annales de l'Université d'Abidjan, Série F, Tome I, Fasc. 2, 1969); Jean Niangui

Niangui, *L'organisation sociale et politique des gwa de Côte d'Ivoire* (Abidjan: Université Nationale de Côte d'Ivoire, Institut d'Ethno-Sociologie, 1979); Harris Memel-Fotê, *Le Système politique de Lodjoukrou* (Abidjan-Dakar-Lomé: Nouvelles Editions Africaines; Paris: Présence Africaine, 1980); J. P. Chauveau and J. Richard, *Organisation soci-économique gban et économie de plantation* (Abidjan: ORSTOM, Centre Petit-Bassam, 1975); Alexander Alland, Jr., *La Danse de l'araignée*, translated by Didier Pemerle (Paris: Terre Humain-Plon, 1984); Jean-Marc Gastellu, *Une Economie du trésor: les grands planteurs du Moronou* (Abidjan: ORSTOM, Centre Petit-Bassam, 1981), vol. 2; P. Knops, *Le anciens senufo* (Berg en Dal, Netherlands: Afrika Museum, 1980); Jean-Pierre Chauveau, *Notes sur l'histoire économique et sociale de la région de Kokumbo (Baoulé-sud, Côte d'Ivoire*) (Abidjan, Centre Petit-Bassam: ORSTOM, 1979); Jean-Claude Thoret, *Les djimini: Elements d'organisation sociale* (Abidjan: Institut d'ethno-sociologie, Université d'Abidjan, 1969); Ariane Deluz, *Organisation sociale et tradition orale: Les guro de Côte d'Ivoire* (Paris, La Haye: Mouton et Co., 1970); Albert de Surgy, *Les pêcheurs de Côte d'Ivoire*, vol. 2: *Les pêcheurs lagunaires* (Paris: Abidjan: Centre Nationale de Recherche Scientifique, Centre National de Documentation de Côte d'Ivoire, 1964); Jack Goody, *The Social Organization of the Lo Wiili* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); Denise Paulme, "Les Classes d'âge dans le sud-est de la Côte d'Ivoire," in *Classes et associations d'âge en Afrique de l'Ouest*, edited by Denise Paulme (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1971); *Atlas de la Côte d'Ivoire*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Editions Jeune Afrique, 1983), pp. 24–27; Philip Leonard Ravenhill, "The Social Organization of the Wan: A Patrilineal People of Ivory Coast (Ph.D. diss., New School for Social Research, 1976).

40. The terms "sedentary" and "pastoralist," which frequently cross over one another in varying degrees, are discussed in Gavin Kitching, *Class and Economic Change in Kenya: The Making of an African Petite Bourgeoisie 1905–1970* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980), chapter 8.

41. Marvin Miracle, "Capitalism, Capital Markets, and Competition in West African Trade," in *The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa*, edited by Claude Meillassoux (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 406–410.

42. Fieldhouse, *Colonialism 1870–1945*, p. 243; Robert Launay, *Traders Without Trade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 80–84.

43. Traditional forms of land tenure have persisted in northern parts of the country, though even here they are gradually disappearing.

44. See Claude Meillassoux, *Anthropologie économique des Gouro de Côte d'Ivoire* (Paris: Mouton, 1964), pp. 336–337; Robert M. Hecht, "Immigration, Land Transfer and Tenure Changes in Divo, Ivory Coast, 1940–80," *Africa* 55, no. 3 (1985): 319–336.

45. Chauveau and Richard, *Organisation soci-économique gban*. See also Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, "French Economic Policy in Tropical Africa," in *Colonialism in Africa 1870–1960*, vol. 4, edited by Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 139.

46. Suret-Canale, *Afrique noire*, vol. 3, p. 199.

47. Delavignette, *Freedom and Authority*, pp. 37–38.

48. Fieldhouse, *Colonialism 1870–1945*, p. 243; Cangah and Ekanza, *La Côte d'Ivoire par les textes*, p. 154; Thompson and Adloff, *French West Africa*, p. 168; Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Road to Independence* (Paris: Mouton & Co., 1964), pp. 142–143; Schwartz, *Tradition et changements dans la société guéré*, pp. 239–240; Crowder, *West Africa Under Colonial Rule*.

49. Fieldhouse, *Colonialism 1870–1945*, p. 243; Wallerstein, *The Road to Independence*, p. 150.
50. Meillassoux, *Anthropologie économique des Gouro*, p. 339.
51. Morgenthau, *Political Parties*, p. 29; Prey, *L'Histoire des ivoiriens*, pp. 183–188; *Mémorial de la Côte d'Ivoire*, vol. 2, pp. 61–62; Terray, *L'Organisation sociale des dida*, p. 334; Wallerstein, *The Road to Independence*, pp. 138–142; Nyong'o, "The Articulation of Modes of Production," p. 188; Brigitte Masquet, "Côte d'Ivoire: pouvoir présidentiel, palabre et démocratie," *Afrique contemporaine* 114 (March–April 1981): 10.
52. Cangah and Ekanza, *La Côte d'Ivoire par les textes*, pp. 154–155; Bohumil Holàs, *Les Toura: Esquisse d'une civilisation montagnarde de Côte d'Ivoire* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), p. 29.
53. The best-known exponents of this view are Samir Amin and Bonnie Campbell; the ground-setting work is Amin's *Le Développement du capitalisme en Côte d'Ivoire* (Paris: Editions du Minuit, 1967).
54. Nyong'o, "The Articulation of Modes of Production," p. 195.
55. "A. N.," quoted in Wallerstein, *The Road to Independence*, p. 150.
56. Delavignette, *Freedom and Authority*, pp. 81–82.
57. Hubert Deschamps, "France in Black Africa and Madagascar Between 1920 and 1945," in *Colonialism in Africa 1870–1960*, vol. 2, edited by Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 238; Fréchou, *Les Planteurs européens*, p. 23; M. Dupire, "Planteurs autochtones et étrangers en Basse-Côte d'Ivoire orientale," *Etudes éburnéennes* 8 (1960): 48–49; Segla, *Immigration étrangère et économie de plantation*, pp. 20–30.
58. Morgenthau, *Political Parties*, p. 173; Nyong'o, "The Articulation of Modes of Production," pp. 82, 176; Peter Lionel Wickins, *Africa 1880–1980: An Economic History* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 78; Dupire, "Planteurs autochtones et étrangers," pp. 102–104. See also Meillassoux, *Anthropologie économique des Gouro*, p. 317, and Nyong'o, "The Articulation of Modes of Production," pp. 177–178 for explanations for the prominence of migrant laborers among the planter bourgeoisie.
59. Morgenthau, *Political Parties*, p. 171; *Mémorial de la Côte d'Ivoire*, vol. 2, p. 243.
60. *Mémorial de la Côte d'Ivoire*, vol. 2, p. 190.
61. Paul-Henri Siriex, *Houphouët-Boigny ou la sagesse africaine* (Paris: Editions Nathan, and Abidjan: Nouvelles Editions Africaines, 1986), p. 27.
62. Morgenthau, *Political Parties*, p. 12; cf. the argument made by E. A. Brett with reference to the East African context in "State Power and Economic Inefficiency: Explaining Political Failure in Africa" (Manchester: Political Science Association Conference, 1985).
63. Dupire, "Planteurs autochtones et étrangers," pp. 102–104.
64. Surgy, *Les Pêcheurs de Côte d'Ivoire*, vol. 2, p. 114.
65. See Ablé, *Histoire et tradition politique du pays Abouré.*
66. Y.-A. Fauré and J.-F. Médard, "Classe dominante ou classe dirigeante," in *Etat et bourgeoisie en Côte d'Ivoire* (Paris: Editions Karthala, 1982), p. 133.
67. Meillassoux, *Anthropologie économique des Gouro*, pp. 336–337.
68. Groff, "The Development of Capitalism," pp. 394–395.
69. Morgenthau, *Political Parties*, p. 168. Most plantations, European as well as Ivoirien, were located in southeast Côte d'Ivoire (cf. Tirefort, "Le Bon temps," p. 172, with *Mémorial de la Côte d'Ivoire*, vol. 2, p. 173).
70. See Prey, *L'Histoire des ivoiriens*, p. 172, for an example from the

Agboville region; see also Segla, *Immigration étrangère et économie de plantation*, which discusses the experiences of the Abés.

71. The period of most rapid expansion in the settler economy was the mid-1920s. A few years later the class stabilized in numbers, but the planter population began to grow again after 1931, the most rapid expansion being in 1934–1935 (*Mémorial de la Côte d'Ivoire*, vol. 2, p. 224).

72. Segla, *Immigration étrangère et économie de plantation*, pp. 20–30.

73. Prey, *L'Histoire des ivioriens*, p. 74.

74. Cangah and Ekanza, *La Côte d'Ivoire par les textes*, pp. 140–141.

75. Thompson and Adloff, "French Economic Policy," p. 143.

76. Tirefort, "Le Bon temps," pp. 289–290.

77. *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967). See also *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970).

78. Köbben, "Le Planteur noir," pp. 60–63.

79. Jean-Marc Gastellu and Affou Yapi, "Où situer les grands planteurs villageois?" *Cahiers ivoiriens de recherche économique et sociale* 30 (Sept. 1981): 44.

80. For an example of a rich planter's investment portfolio, see the case of Kwasi bi Yuza, a Gouro planter, in Meillassoux, *Anthropologie économique des Gouro*, pp. 328–330. Most of his surplus went not into his farm but into real estate and a machine shelling unit that he rented out to neighboring farmers.

81. Wickins, *Africa 1880–1980*, pp. 168–169.

82. Dupire, "Planteurs autochtones et étrangers," pp. 102–103.

83. Köbben, "Le Planteur noir," pp. 82–86.

84. Dupire, "Planteurs autochtones et étrangers," pp. 100–101.

85. Ablé, *Histoire et tradition politique du pays Abouré*, pp. 105–107.

86. On the early Ekra family history, see Ablé, *Histoire et tradition politique du pays Abouré*, p. 108n.

87. The distinction between growth and development is now broadly accepted in development studies. What is more contentious is the tendency among development theorists to assume that social and economic development are intertwined. While economists make a strong argument that social development follows from economic development (because the use of advanced production technology requires a skilled labor force, resulting in higher wages and greater access to education), and some dependency theorists argue that social development promotes economic development (because a higher wage market produces demand for new goods), it is not necessarily obvious that one follows the other.

88. Fieldhouse, *Colonialism 1870–1945*, p. 100.

89. Cangah and Ekanza, *La Côte d'Ivoire par les textes*, pp. 134–136.

90. Amin, *Le Développement du capitalisme en Côte d'Ivoire*.

91. Henrik Secher Marcussen and Jens Erik Torp, *The Internationalization of Capital: Prospects for the Third World* (London: Zed Press, 1982), p. 128. Not all of these 20,000 planters were full-fledged capitalists. Many continued to rely heavily on household labor, and/or had limited urban interests. Nonetheless, they were at least partially capitalist, and the very richest among them were probably entirely capitalist. In speaking of the class as a whole, therefore, it is appropriate to refer to it as a nascent or emergent bourgeoisie.

3

The Political Triumph of the Ivoirien Bourgeoisie

The mere existence of a capitalist class in Côte d'Ivoire did not in itself denote a capitalist system or mode of production. Elsewhere in the world capitalist classes had coexisted with noncapitalist systems for centuries; in Africa, some have even survived regimes seemingly devoted to their destruction.

In Côte d'Ivoire colonialism brought an end to the old regime, but capitalism did not immediately replace it. Capitalist trading firms began to engage in large-scale exchange with African producers, but what emerged was an economy based on peasant production, not capitalism. Settlers established plantations and spawned a local class of indigenous planters, many of whom went on to become capitalists with urban interests. Still, they were all capitalists operating within the context of a peasant economy. In a nutshell, capitalism existed in Côte d'Ivoire, but the economic system in place in Côte d'Ivoire was not capitalism.

Not only capitalists and peasants emerged to occupy the vacuum left by the collapse of Africa's *ancien régimes*. Other classes arose from the colonial experience, each holding its own blueprints of how a postcolonial Africa should look. Capitalism did not always figure prominently in these blueprints. Some associated colonial oppression with capitalism and sought to create a social, political, and economic system that was more firmly rooted in African history than in the alien values of the conqueror. Some of Africa's leaders looked back to Africa's collectivist traditions and produced a unique hybrid of European socialism and African communalism known as African socialism. Others went further than this and adopted the Leninist idea of the overthrow of capitalist imperialism and the institution of state socialism.

For as long as Côte d'Ivoire was administered by the French colonial regime there was no question whether capitalist production would be tolerated (though there were disputes over whether *African* capitalism would be

tolerated). However, colonial rule could never be eternal. The day might arrive when a regime frowning upon capitalism came to power.

In Côte d'Ivoire, this was not to be. Forced by the hostility of the settlers to organize politically in order to defend their interests, the Ivoirien bourgeoisie ended up leading the independence movement and subsequently captured state power in 1960. Its blueprint for Côte d'Ivoire obviously gave capitalism pride of place.

#

In addition to influencing the formation of the Ivoirien bourgeoisie, the settlers had another profound—and again unintended—effect on the Ivoirien capitalists. By trying to weaken their economic rivals, they in fact strengthened them by provoking them into organizing themselves. Otherwise, the Ivoirien bourgeoisie might well have been content to remain politically passive.

The settlers were a powerful group, but also a small one. Excluding their families, the number of settlers in Côte d'Ivoire probably never surpassed 300. On the other hand, political power was effectively concentrated in the hands of the relatively tiny European population, giving it a vastly disproportionate amount of power. But even within European society the settlers were in a minority, rarely accounting for more than 15 percent of the territory's European population.[1] How, then, did they come to exercise the influence they wielded over the colonial regime?

Essentially, what happened is that the European population in the territory split into two political camps. On one side were the colonial administrators, who tended to be educated, comparatively liberal, and more than likely to take into account the interests and well-being of the native population, if only because they understood the delicate balancing act they faced in governing them.

On the other side were those who had come to the colony for economic reasons, the settlers and the traders. Although their economic concerns differed somewhat, the settlers and traders shared an ideological affinity: they were racist, reactionary, and firmly wedded to their colonial privileges. Most came from humble backgrounds and had little formal education, the typical settler being a *déclassé* who left France in order to strike it rich in the colonies.[2] They also came to gain power, for in the colonies they became members of a ruling class overnight. Mindful of their inferiority back home in France, they took every available opportunity to remind themselves and the Africans of their superiority. Aware that their future prosperity depended entirely on the colony, they defended even the slightest attack on the privileges they had obtained by moving there.

Though in colonialism's early days administrators outnumbered settlers and traders, by World War II the ratio had been reversed, with administrators

being outnumbered two to one.[3] In alliance with the traders, therefore, the settlers became a powerful group the colonial government could ill afford to ignore, especially as a number of them had contacts with powerful interests in France.[4] Administrators soon came to tire of the settlers' incessant complaints about how little was being done for them despite the many privileges given them by the regime. The settlers, for their part, considered it their virtual birthright to receive preferential treatment from the French governors, and to acquire wealth before any African did.[5]

The racism of the settlers was reinforced by a sort of siege mentality that led them to form a variety of exclusive clubs and associations. The first such club was formed in Grand-Bassam in 1904, and by World War II 114 such clubs existed in the territory, almost all of which restricted membership to Europeans, expressly excluding Africans or members of the fast-growing Lebanese community.[6]

Not surprisingly, therefore, when the planter class started to emerge as a significant group in the colony, the settlers reacted with hostility. Not only were the planters serious economic competitors, but the leaders among them tended also to be better educated[7] and more sophisticated than the settlers, thereby threatening to belie all the myths of racial superiority so dear to them. Towards the end of World War II, the fear felt by the settlers and other economic colonists developed into a virtual hysteria.

In the early days, however, before the planters appeared menacing, there was a subtle cooperation between the two groups. The planters were basically apolitical, their only concerns being to further their economic well-being. To this end they joined the Syndicat Agricole de la Côte-d'Ivoire, an economic interest group that lobbied on behalf of the settlers. Had the settlers—who ran the organization—continued to tolerate the planters, the Ivoirien bourgeoisie might well have lapsed into complacency and remained a politically inactive and disorganized class: though some attempts at independent organization had been made in the 1920s and 1930s, little came of them.[8]

Soon, however, the marriage of convenience fell to pieces. When World War II broke out, the increasing prosperity of the planters and the labor shortage brought on by the war led the settlers to see themselves as being on a collision course with the planters. As there were now not enough workers to go around, a ruthless competitiveness emerged.

Although the colonial administration had always favored the settlers, the planters had been content to look the other way for as long as labor remained cheap, since even without subsidies they could remain competitive. But the wartime labor shortage drove up wages, and the subsidy of forced labor suddenly became a critical advantage. After France fell to the Nazis in 1940 and the Vichy regime was installed, French West Africa opted—unlike French Equatorial Africa—to support the Vichy regime. As a result, a

reactionary administration took over in Côte d'Ivoire. This meshed perfectly with the desires of the settlers, who were only too happy to put behind them the memories of the Popular Front government and its comparatively favourable attitude toward the planters.[9]

Responding to the settlers' demands, the territorial administration implemented a series of measures that favoured the European farmers. Most important among them was the revocation of the planters' right to an equal share of forced labor. The result was swift: African planters' labor costs rose sixfold.[10]

The planters were suddenly confronted with the very real possibility of extinction. Now, this group of disparate individuals who had previously shared little common cause developed a consciousness of its shared lot; communication among planters expanded, reaching out as well to the African traders, who were also suffering from unfair competition with their European counterparts.[11] A number of African planters and businessmen also entered the ranks of the colony's Gaullist resistance.[12]

Then in 1943—two years after the discriminatory measures were put in place—the planters were thrown a lifeline. In that year French West Africa turned to the Gaullist cause. A new governor, André Latrille, was appointed to Côte d'Ivoire. The settlers, nostalgic for the golden days of the Vichy regime, despised him from the moment he took office. With Europe still at war, the Gaullists knew that their hold on the colony was tenuous. It was imperative that they strengthen their control over it, but the traditional support base for the colonial government, the settlers / traders, refused to have anything to do with Latrille. Even if they agreed to cooperate with the government, they could not be trusted not to try to undermine the Gaullists. Latrille had to find a new support base in the territory, one that would enable him to gain control over Côte d'Ivoire for the Free French side while at the same time counterbalancing the menacing weight of the settlers, and he had to find it soon. The planters seemed the only choice.[13]

Latrille therefore began to cultivate relationships with the Ivoirien capitalists, associating with leading members among them such as Félix Houphouët-Boigny. "Hobnobbing" with Africans, something the social conventions of settler/trader society forbade, only served further to fan the flames of rage. The whisper "he's a communist, death to the communists" began to be heard in settler circles.[14]

Needless to say, the settler/trader repudiation of Latrille only intensified his dependence on the Ivoirien bourgeoisie, and in 1944 he took the step that signaled the beginning of the end for settler/trader dominance: he approved the formation of the Syndicat Agricole Africain (SAA) by the African planters. This ruptured the Syndicat Agricole de la Côte d'Ivoire, which had until then been then the colony's most powerful association.[15]

#

On July 10, 1944, Georges Kassi, one of Côte d'Ivoire's wealthiest men, invited six others of the colony's richest planters—Joseph Anoma, Amadou Lamine Touré, Djibril Diaby, Gabriel Dadié, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, and Fulgence Brou—to his house in Treichville, which is today a part of Abidjan.[16] There they founded the SAA to represent the interests of the African planters. They enlisted representatives, who were usually also leading planters, in order to recruit members at lower levels of society.[17] Thus originated the Ivoirien bourgeoisie's first significant political organization.

The SAA was not a radical organization. Its main concern was to preserve the planters' interests. The planters wanted to regain access to forced labor, but knew that the abolition of forced labor would be politically a much more marketable policy. Besides, the planters were confident that they could continue to recruit labor without recourse to the deeply unpopular colonial institution.[18]

Taking advantage of its rural roots in order to organize the territory's predominantly agricultural population, the SAA grew rapidly. By the end of the year it had 8,548 members; a year later, the figure attained 20,000.[19] This quick ascent resulted from the fact that the SAA, though led by big planters, appealed successfully to almost all the classes, ethnic groups, and regions of Côte d'Ivoire.[20]

Originally a lobby, the SAA soon ventured into the field of electoral politics. In the autumn of 1945 it supported the candidacy of Houphouët-Boigny in his campaign for election to the French Constituent Assembly. This was the assembly that would draft a new constitution for postwar France, and voices from the colonies had concerns that they were anxious to have heard. Houphouët-Boigny won the election, and his victory would prove to be one of the most important milestones in the history of the Ivoirien bourgeoisie.

Shortly after his arrival in Paris, Houphouët-Boigny sponsored a bill that called for the abolition of forced labor. The French government had been prepared to abolish the institution, which was seen to have outlived its usefulness, and the bill passed with little fanfare or objection. Back in the colonies, though, people saw matters differently. Africans had bitter memories of the stern resistance by the settlers and their Vichyist allies in the administration to any type of reform; surely, they believed, the French would fight to their dying breaths to preserve this despised institution. That Houphouët-Boigny had obtained passage of the bill so quickly, against so little opposition, made him nothing less than a superman, an African champion who stared down the French and made them quake in their boots. Overnight he became a hero of legendary status throughout French West Africa. The Ivoirien bourgeoisie had its general, a leader *sans pareil*.

Emboldened, the Ivoirien capitalists went on to form their own political party. In April 1946, Houphouët-Boigny's supporters created the Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI). The PDCI emerged from the SAA, and was always intimitely connected to it. Like its forerunner, the PDCI also successfully broadened its appeal well beyond the small Ivoirien bourgeoisie, yet even when it opened its doors to candidates from all different class backgrounds, it remained a thoroughly bourgeois organization in both its leadership and policy. On the PDCI's first provisional board, chosen at its inception, almost two-fifths of the members came from leading capitalist families.[21] It has most often been said that these men were not capitalists but planters, and at the time indeed they were. But if one takes the time perspective, and considers these men not only as what they were then but as what they later became, the fact is that these planters were in the process of becoming industrial capitalists.

The PDCI began to position itself and seek strategic allies. On October 18, 1946, it led anticolonialist parties in other French West African territories in creating the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA).[22] Led by Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the RDA forged an alliance with, of all groups, the French Communist Party (PCF). Needless to say this provided the settlers—who had regained the political upper hand with the departure of Governor Latrille—with all the evidence they needed to convince the administration that the planters were closet communists. They succeeded in persuading the regime to try and stamp out the PDCI-RDA.

Houphouët-Boigny took great pains to emphasize that the alliance was not an ideological one, and he did his best to proclaim his love of capitalism by pointing to the great wealth his plantations were generating for him.[23] The fact is that in addition to allies in the other territories, the PDCI-RDA needed allies in France itself to offset the growing influence of the settlers in Abidjan, and the PCF was the only French party that was seriously interested in allying itself to anticolonial movements. This left the RDA few other choices.[24] Still, his protestations made little impact. In 1949-1950 the territorial government, wary of the PDCI-RDA's growing strength, instituted a campaign of repression against the party and arrested many of its leaders. In 1950, seeing little future in the alliance since the PCF had its own agenda for the colonies—to play their part at the assigned time in the world communist revolution—Houphouët-Boigny broke off the relationship.

Besides, he could do without repression now, because the leaders of the PDCI-RDA had cleverly manipulated the government crackdown to further their interests. Over the previous few years, the PDCI-RDA's leading members had been offering positions of influence within the organization to potential rivals in order to co-opt them. In so doing they risked being submerged in a new movement whose direction would more accurately reflect

its broad base of support, for even left-wing intellectuals were being persuaded that the party was the best agent to lead the anticolonial struggle. When the crackdown came along, the party's capitalist organizers took the opportunity to purge the leadership of its new elements, while still retaining the supporters these men had brought to the organization. For to the joy of the bourgeoisie, who may well have conspired with the regime, all those arrested were either intellectuals or administrators. This allowed the capitalist members within the PDCI-RDA leadership to protest government repression of their colleagues, while at the same time filling the vacant ranks with fellow businessmen.[25] The tactic worked splendidly. The bourgeoisie began to reverse its declining position in the PDCI-RDA's leadership and by 1959 almost two-thirds of the party's politburo came from capitalist families.[26]

In its policy the PDCI-RDA spoke the language of national liberation but practiced economic conservatism.[27] The anti-imperialist struggle took a back seat to the party's proclamation of the "sacred value" of private property and its repudiation of "atheistic communism."[28] In a 1954 speech Houphouët-Boigny made the famous declaration which set him apart from some of the region's other nationalist leaders, the essence of which has never been better expressed than by Aristide Zolberg:

> To Kwame Nkrumah's dictum, "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all things else shall be added unto you," Houphouet-Boigny [sic] might have opposed the advice he gave his own Baoulé countrymen in one of his first tours of the country after launching the policy of union: "If you don't want to vegetate in bamboo huts, concentrate your efforts on growing good cocoa and good coffee. They will fetch a good price, and you will become rich."[29]

Potential rivals to the PDCI-RDA were weak, and when they emerged the party typically succeeded in either undermining or absorbing them. None of the parties formed in the decade after World War II—some of them sponsored by the colonial regime in an effort to weaken the PDCI-RDA—were able to match the PDCI-RDA's success in becoming a cross-ethnic movement. The advantage of the PDCI-RDA in this regard was that the Ivoirien bourgeoisie was itself cross-ethnic, and thus had little difficulty in sinking roots in all of the colony's groups. With five dozen ethnic groups in Côte d'Ivoire, none predominant, a party restricted to one or even a few groups had little chance of success. Only the PDCI-RDA rose above this limitation.

In the course of the 1950s, the party integrated most of these weaker opponents into its fold through a combination of clientelism and patronage.[30] By the 1956 and 1957 elections, the only serious opposition left to the PDCI-RDA was silent discontent. By about that time the party had gained almost absolute control of the territory: selection to the

Territorial Assembly was made entirely through the party, the PDCI-RDA was the sole means of recruitment to public office, and Houphouët-Boigny appointed and deposed the colony's chiefs "at will with the aid of strong-arm squads."[31]

Shortly before independence, the ruling PDCI-RDA created an electoral system which allowed only itself to run for office and passed a series of laws restraining expression by opposition groups or individuals. Whatever opposition was left abandoned the open struggle and took its grudges underground, realizing that activism was now not only futile but also dangerous: the Ivoirien bourgeoisie did not have the most tolerant attitude toward political debate. Even the unions, which in Guinea were leading a radical independence movement, ended up being absorbed.[32]

And so, when France commenced the negotiations leading to independence toward the end of the 1950s, it was the bourgeoisie that spoke for Côte d'Ivoire. In 1958 President de Gaulle of France drew up a referendum which asked each of French West Africa's territories to choose between becoming a department of the Republic, a member of a new French West African federation, or remaining a colony. A "no" vote to all of these, declared de Gaulle in no uncertain terms, would entail secession and thus cuts in official aid and preferential policies from France.[33] Only Guinea, led by the radical and defiant Sékou Touré, threw the threat back in de Gaulle's face by voting "no."

Houphouët-Boigny, on the other hand, had his eyes on all that money. In reference to Sékou Touré's statement that "he preferred freedom and a plate of manioc to buttered bread to be eaten in bondage," the Ivoirien leader replied that if increasing prosperity were slavery, "then he was willing to remain in bondage all his life."[34] Côte d'Ivoire and the six remaining territories all voted for the federation; within two years this arrangement crumbled, and in 1960 Côte d'Ivoire proclaimed its independence—without losing the benefit of French aid.

The territory's constituent assembly, packed with PDCI-RDA delegates, approved with very little debate a constitution proposed by Houphouët-Boigny and his lieutenants.[35] Shortly after independence, one-party rule was institutionalized in the young country. Consequently, the bourgeois party filled the state with its people: of the nineteen ministers in the country's first cabinet, nine—almost half the total—came from among the country's leading capitalist families.[36]

Thus the colonial era came to a close. The Ivoirien bourgeoisie had much to celebrate as it inaugurated a new era in its development, for the future of the country rested in its hands. Although it was a young class in the early and tentative years of its growth, as it savored its victory it could scarcely look forward to a brighter future.

THE IVOIRIEN CAPITALIST STATE

The political history of postcolonial Africa has been unstable. With the exception of the Portuguese colonies, whose rulers held out to the very end and literally had to be forced to leave, most African countries won their independence around 1960. In the three decades since then only a handful of regimes have emerged unscathed; in a number of African countries, coups, revolutions, and civil wars have overthrown governments, and in a few places these events have recurred with disturbing regularity.

This may be colonialism's bitterest legacy. In some colonies, like Mozambique or the Belgian Congo (Zaire), Europeans had so thoroughly monopolized political power that there was no one with administrative experience around to fill the void when the colonial governors beat hasty retreats. In the case of the Belgian Congo, it has been estimated that there were fewer than 20 African university graduates at the time the Belgians left, none of whom had serious administrative experience.[37] In such cases, Africans were simply not equipped to take over the European state structures.

In other colonies, there was a significant number of educated Africans but almost all of them were civil servants or liberal professionals. There, the colonial regimes had so effectively reserved the business sector to Europeans by way of legal monopolies that Africans had no hope for upward mobility except by earning an education and taking on lucrative state jobs. State jobs not only offered good salaries, but also provided the possibility for illegal accumulation;[38] being a tax collector, for example, allowed one to pocket surplus revenues, while being a marketing board director allowed one to siphon off part of the annual crop for private sale.

To many educated Africans, therefore, the state was everything. It might have been their only avenue to prosperity.[39] Political power was the most sought-after goal, and once obtained was jealously guarded. Whereas in a capitalist system the competitive struggle for wealth occurs in the marketplace, in many African countries it occurs in the state. This may help to account for coups, as the struggle for enrichment is played out on the political stage.

Capitalists, however, hate political instability. There is no temptation for a businessperson to invest if a factory or warehouse risks being destroyed in a civil outbreak, or if after a good quarter a state official drops by to say that it might be wise to make some kind of gift lest the police get "lazy" in protecting the property. In fact, most foreign businesses in Côte d'Ivoire cite not the liberal business environment but the political stability as their reason for investment in Côte d'Ivoire.[40]

Therefore, the Ivoirien ruling class has had a very keen interest in preserving political stability. As they were businessmen before becoming administrators, they do not need the state to get rich, but they do need it to avoid becoming impoverished. It is more useful to them to let a colleague

govern than to try and overthrow that colleague and risk thereby overthrowing the whole system. As to corruption, the Ivoirien ruling class certainly lines its pockets. However, its members have been careful not to push the corruption to the point that it threatens economic or political stability. In places like Nigeria or Ghana, marketing board officials have in the past tried to squeeze so much money out of the peasantry that farmers have retreated from cash crop production or smuggled their crops over the border; either eventuality reduces gross domestic product. Furthermore, Côte d'Ivoire's rulers have been less inclined to place the pilfered money in Swiss bank accounts or Belgian real estate, as Zaire's President Mobutu—to cite the most notorious example—is so fond of doing. Rather, they have tended to reinvest the money in their local operations. Though morally reprehensible, there is a parallel here to the role corruption played in the development of capitalism in places like Britain.

In the final analysis, Ivoirien capitalists see their avenue to prosperity not in the state but in the private sector. A state position can be a very useful tool in assisting capital accumulation, but it is not the be-all and end-all. Though the bourgeoisie as a class has fought jealously to preserve every bit of its political power, individual ministers and officials have come and gone with considerable regularity (the president being the notable exception to this rule). Coups are not needed to force them from their positions.

Indeed the bourgeoisie has strengthened its hold on the state. The degree of interpenetration between the country's economic and political elites approximates that of advanced capitalist countries, a remarkable feat in a country whose capitalist class may not account for much more than 1 percent of the total population. Capitalists not only direct the PDCI-RDA, they also direct the state controlled by that party.

Particularly noteworthy is the extent of capitalist representation among the country's ministers and mayors. These are Côte d'Ivoire's most powerful politicians, the mayors being the principal agents of local administration. Although both ministers and mayors often delegate much of their work to civil servants, power is exercised in their name and policies will not contravene their interests as capitalists.

Over the last few years, between 25 percent and 40 percent of the ministers in the national cabinet have been either prominent capitalists, or have come from prominent capitalist families.[41] These figures, moreover, do not include ministers who are shareholders but not corporate directors. Capitalist control over mayoralties is equally impressive. Until 1980 as much as a third of the country's mayoralties were in the hands of individuals from prominent capitalist families.[42] In that year there was a reorganization of the system and the number of mayoralties was greatly expanded, from 38 to 136. A lot of smaller towns which were previously administered from larger centers now received their own mayors. The effect was to reduce the

Table 3.1: Mayors from Capitalist Families, 1990

Mayoralty	Business Interests
Mayors with Personal Interests	
Antoine Adou Kouao (Bétié)	services (drilling)
Hortense Aka Anghui (Port-Bouët)	various manufacturing interests, trade
Victor Amagou (Marcory)	various manufacturing interests, services
Jean-Baptiste Améthier (Bonoua)	banking, services, food production
Thomas Assi Kaudjhis (Adzopé)	various business interests
Arsène Assouan Usher (Cocody)	trade, manufacturing
Pierre Billon (Dabakala)	trade, agroindustry, manufacturing
Joseph Bombo (Grand-Lahou)	banking
Edmond Bouazo Zegbehi (Issia)	hotels
Denis Bra Kanon (Daloa)	various; family in banking and manufacturing
François Dacoury-Tabley (Gagnoa)	trade
Auguste Daubrey (Sassandra)	banking
Charles Donwahi (Soubre)	trade, agroindustry, services
Lamine Fadiga (Touba)	various manufacturing interests, services
Ossey Denis Gnansou (Agboville)	services, various other interests
Amara Karamoko (Mankono)	trade, various other interests
Félicien Kodja Konan (Divo)	manufacturing, trade, plantations
Sourou Kone (Kolia)	trade
Moussa Konet (Kani)	services
Pierre Koffi N'Guessan (San Pedro)	various industrial interests
Philippe Yacé (Jacqueville)	real estate
Mayors Whose Families Have Business Interests	
Mayoralty	**Family and Its Interests**
Noël N'Goran Koffi (Didiévi)	Aoussou Koffi: services
Berthe Sawadogo (Fresco)	Affot Lattier: linked to several prominent capitalist families
Marthe Achy-Brou (Grand-Bassam)	Achy-Brou: manufacturing
Mayor of Akoupé	Achy-Brou: manufacturing
Daouda Coulibaly (Korhogo)	Coulibaly: wide range of interests
Lenissogui Coulibaly (Boundiali)	Coulibaly: wide range of interests
Philippe Kouassi Cowppli Bony (Bouaké)	Cowppli Bony: trade
Gervais Kadio Morokro (Niablé)	Kadio Morokro: manufacturing
Dembélé Yaya (Kouto)	Kone: trade, services
Ernest Mobio N'Koumo (Abidjan)	Mobio N'Koumo: manufacturing

Sources: Teya, *Côte d'Ivoire*, pp. 16–20; *Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens*, Dec. 29, 1972, p. 3871; Jacques Gautrand, "Tanti est arrivé," *Jeune Afrique Economie*, June 1982, 58–59; Centre d'Affaire International, *Annuaire statistique*, pp. 24–26; Adompo Pascal Koki, Interview, Jan. 26, 1990 (Adzopé); Côte d'Ivoire, Office National des Télécommunications, *Annuaire officiel*; Basil Yapi, Interview, Jan. 30, 1990 (Abidjan); Isidore Yapi, Interview, Jan. 30, 1990 (Abidjan); PDCI-RDA, *Annuaire 1985–1990*, pp. 11–180; *Fraternité Hebdo*, 1986, p. 211; Côte d'Ivoire, Ministère du Plan et de l'Industrie, *Répertoire des industries*; Chambre d'Agriculture, Chambre de Commerce, Chambre d'Industrie, *Annuaire*; *Le Grand dictionnaire encyclopédique de la Côte d'Ivoire*; "Côte d'Ivoire: 30 hommes pour gérer la crise," pp. 46–59; Daingui, Interview, May 2, 1990.

proportion of capitalist mayoralties: big capitalist families tend to move to the larger urban centers, so the mayors of smaller farming communities were less likely to be industrial capitalists. Nonetheless, in 1990 at least a quarter of the country's mayors came from leading capitalist families (see Table 3.1); some had comparatively modest business interests (for example, owning one firm), while others were among the country's richest capitalists, like the Coulibalys, Aka Anghuis, Donwahis, Améthiers, Amagous, and Fadigas. If one included mayors holding shares, the figure would almost certainly be quite a bit higher.

Bourgeois political power is magnified by the geographic distribution of mayoralties, illustrated in Map 3.1. Members of the capitalist class are politically strong in, or even control, the country's major cities and economic centers, notably Abidjan and Bouaké. In 1990, over one-third of Abidjan's mayoralties were in capitalist hands. In addition, the capitalist mayoralties are frequently in a given department's principal city and administrative center, giving a greater influence over outlying regions: overall, capitalist mayors are less likely to be found in smaller towns, and more likely so in larger, more important cities.

Not surprisingly, the class is especially strong in the prosperous southern region where capitalism is more advanced; capitalist mayors control virtually all the major coastal towns and cities. In the far north, capitalist power reflects to a substantial degree the political strength of the Coulibaly family: of the four northernmost cities governed by capitalist mayors, three (Boundiali, Korhogo, Kouto) are governed by members of the Coulibaly family network.

The bourgeoisie is equally well represented in the National Assembly, the country's legislative body. In 1990, of 174 deputies, 29 were themselves capitalists while another 12 were not businesspeople but did come from capitalist families (see Table 3.2). Once again this made for about a quarter of the total, and once more the complete figures were almost certainly higher. If one counts all people with business interests, it is conceivable that as much as half of the legislators in the National Assembly come from capitalist families.

This overrepresentation of the bourgeoisie in the state is made more remarkable when compared with the situation in advanced capitalist countries, where it is virtually taken for granted that corporate elites exercise disproportionate control in political offices. In 1984, roughly a third of the members of the U.S. Congress came from the business world; Ralph Miliband has made similar findings for Britain; Wallace Clement's work on Canada cites figures between 16 percent and 70 percent of political positions held by prominent capitalists, depending on the position in question.[43] These figures do not differ greatly from those cited for Côte d'Ivoire, even though there are a lot more capitalists to choose from in an advanced capitalist liberal

Map 3.1 Geographic Location of Capitalist Mayoralities



○ Cities governed by capitalist mayors

Departments whose principal city and administrative center is governed by capitalist mayor

Department whose prefect is capitalist

Table 3.2: National Assembly Deputies from Capitalist Families, 1990

Deputies with Personal Interests	
Mayoralty	Business Interests
Frédéric Ablé	manufacturing, trade, real estate
Antoine Adou Kouao	services (drilling)
Paul Akoto Yao	services, real estate
Hortense Aka Anghui	various manufacturing interests, trade
Victor Amagou	various manufacturing interests, services
Lookensy Amangoua	transportation
Léon Amon	manufacturing, services
Eugène Desnoces Anvo Guetat	manufacturing, transportation, plantations
Arsène Assouan Usher	trade, manufacturing
Pierre Atse	services
Edmond Bouazo Zegbehi	hotels
Gustave Brou	services, plantations
Lanciné Cisse	transportation, various other interests
Gbon Coulibaly	wide range of interests
François Dacoury-Tabley	trade
Charles Donwahi	trade, agroindustry, services
Zemogo Fofana	services; family in trade, other interests
Patrice Gnahoui	agroindustry
Ossey Denis Gnansou	services, various other interests
Gomi Bi Zaouli	various interests
Amara Karamoko	trade, various other interests
Bengali Kone	services
Moussa Konet	services
Agnissan Kouassi	services
Gilles Vally Laubhouet	agroindustry, various other interests
Gaoussou Dramane Ouattara	various interests
Kouamé Théodore Quashie	manufacturing, various other interests
Assana Sangare	trade
Joseph Yalé	trade

(continues)

democracy. In a Third World country with a comparatively tiny bourgeoisie, such a penetration of the state reflects a tremendous tenacity in holding onto the power won at independence.

Tenacity is a term that suitably describes this well-organized class. Bourgeois power in the state does not reflect the activities of a few entrepreneurs; in the class as a whole there is an ongoing effort to cultivate and preserve public-private linkages. In a survey of 110 of the country's largest industrial firms in which Ivoiriens held significant interests, 43 had a principal owner or administrator who was a senior politician or came from a senior political family (see Appendix 1). In other words, almost 40 percent of the country's major Ivoirien-owned corporations had some form of direct access to the upper echelons of the state. In a one-party state which does its best not to tolerate democracy, that can hardly be said for the population as a whole.

Table 3.2 (continued)

Deputies Whose Families Have Business Interests	
Deputy	Family and Its Interests
Marthe Achy-Brou	Achy-Brou: manufacturing
Etienne Digbeu Tapé	Bra Kanon: banking, manufacturing, various
Lacina Gon Coulibaly	Coulibaly: wide range of interests
Sinaly Coulibaly	Coulibaly: wide range of interests
Metogama Kone	Kone: trade, services
Pierre Mobio N'Koumo	Mobio N'Koumo: manufacturing
Noël N'Goran Koffi	Aoussou Koffi: services
Bernard Ehui Koutoua	Kassi family network, and Amon Tanoh: wide range of interests
Berthe Sawadogo	Affot Lattier: linked to several prominent capitalist families
Grah Bialé	Affot Lattier
Zobo Gnawa	Affot Lattier
Jules Koré Gobli	Donwahi: trade, agroindustry, services

Sources: Teya, *Côte d'Ivoire*, pp. 16–20; *Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens*, Dec. 29, 1972, p. 3871; Jacques Gautrand, "Tanti est arrivé," *Jeune Afrique Economie*, June 1982, 58–59; Centre d'Affaire International, *Annuaire statistique*, pp. 24–26; Adompo Pascal Koki, Interview, Jan. 26 (Adzopé); Côte d'Ivoire, Office National des Télécommunications, *Annuaire officiel*; Basil Yapi, Interview, Jan. 30, 1990 (Abidjan); Isidore Yapi, Interview, Jan. 30, 1990 (Abidjan); PDCI-RDA, *Annuaire 1985–1990*, pp. 11–180; *Fraternité Hebdo*, 1986, p. 211; Côte d'Ivoire, Ministère du Plan et de l'Industrie, *Répertoire des industries*; Chambre d'Agriculture, Chambre de Commerce, Chambre d'Industrie, *Annuaire; Le Grand dictionnaire encylopédique de la Côte d'Ivoire*; "Côte d'Ivoire: 30 hommes pour gérer la crise," pp. 46–59; Daingui, Interview, May 2, 1990.

FIGHTING OFF THE CHALLENGE TO CAPITALIST DOMINATION

The political structures that the bourgeoisie put in place at different times since 1960 reflect the changing nature of the class as it matured. At first, its relative insecurity caused the class to collect as much power as possible into its hands and to suppress all opposition. The class could ill afford to be liberal if it sought to retain power: in spite of all the state's repressive measures, in the first decade of independence there was still one coup attempt and a large ethnic rebellion that the regime put down brutally. Power was heavily concentrated in the hands of one man, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, because he was the one man who could rally the entire class, retain the support of the peasantry and be counted on to promote the bourgeoisie's interests. The regime tolerated only publications of the government or the PDCI-RDA and practiced a sort of corporatism in linking as many autonomous organizations (e.g., unions, voluntary organizations) as possible to the state. Philippe Yacé, one of the country's most prominent politicians,

once summed up the role of the average citizen in the political system by saying that political participation consisted of "active acquiescence in the policies of government."[44]

When citizens wanted to go beyond active acquiescence, the government would step in to put an end to their activities. But prosperity also enabled the government to be relatively generous to its people, and for two decades the government and its president apparently retained a broad base of support within the population.

By 1980, however, things were changing. The cry for increased political participation became louder, and the government responded by allowing competitive elections to the National Assembly and mayoralties, though only candidates of the PDCI-RDA were permitted nomination. For a while this system worked, because there was a broad perception that the elections were more competitive than the one-party rubric indicated: many nominees clearly joined the PDCI-RDA only at election time as a legal formality. Thus the party was no longer seen to be filling positions by diktat. Nonetheless, the party could still ensure that anticapitalist candidates did not win nomination.

Within the decade, however, this arrangement ceased to function. As a result, in 1990 the Ivoirien ruling class faced what many believe was the greatest challenge ever to its hold on power. In the early part of the year, strikes and riots began to spread through the country, first in ripples and then in waves. The call for a change of government reverberated throughout the nation, along with demands for an end to the old guard and the elimination of one-party rule in favor of a competitive party democracy. To many observers on the street the country seemed to be teetering on the brink of a revolution. Nervous expatriates made preparations for hasty departures in the event the country suddenly descended into a civil war, their minds filled with vivid images of the carnage then unfolding next door in Liberia. The government appeared to be losing control of the situation, and the strongarm tactics of the police and army seemed to be losing effect.

Despite the bourgeoisie's stranglehold on political power, there has been an opposition movement in Côte d'Ivoire since the day the country declared its independence. Although not necessarily anticapitalist, this opposition is not bourgeois, in that its leaders are generally what one might call urban petty bourgeois (e.g., teachers and university professors);[45] in that sense it represents a threat to bourgeois political power. In the 1970s and 1980s this opposition crystallized around Laurent Gbagbo, a history professor at the national university and an outspoken critic of the regime that forced him to spend many years in exile. From about 1980, the core of this opposition lay in the teachers' and students' movements, but their activities were quiet and clandestine.

That changed in the autumn of 1989. Discontent with the regime had

deepened over the previous few years because of the economic hardships of the 1980s. Although the "cocoa crisis" had begun by 1980, it was only in the late 1980s that it struck ordinary Ivoiriens with especial force. What had happened is that a glut in the world markets for coffee and cocoa—which in the late 1970s accounted for most of the country's export revenue—had brought about a severe deterioration in the country's terms of trade. By then, the Ivoirien government had amassed a substantial debt, because it had borrowed money on anticipated future earnings in order to invest in a number of state enterprises (many of these investments were carelessly made and will probably never be recovered). The government continued to borrow heavily in the early 1980s in order to sustain its spending programs, thereby sheltering the population from the severest effects of the crisis. By 1987 the government could no longer sustain its spending; a liquidity crisis emerged in the economy. Two years later, having declared that it could no longer pay back the money it had borrowed from the country's cocoa and coffee stabilization fund, the government was forced to cut drastically the price it paid coffee and cocoa producers. The crisis had now come home to every village in the country.[46]

The government began implementing severe austerity programs. Unwittingly, it thereby focused attention on the corruption of its members: *détournements* that had aroused little suspicion in the days of prosperity became shocking abuses in a time when families were being driven deeper and deeper into poverty; the amassed wealth of the small ruling class was an affront to the dignity of the hundreds of thousands of Abidjan's poor who lived in the working-class quarters of Adjamé, Treichville, and Marcory.

Quiet discontent now found a voice. The cowed opposition movement was emboldened by the dramatic events unfolding in Eastern Europe, where deeply ensconced tyrannical regimes were overthrown virtually overnight. It began to comprehend the possibilities and potential of rapid mobilization.

It began with the students, who were prodded on by SYNARES, the national union of teachers of higher education. SYNARES had always been a thorn in the side of the government because it was the one union in the country which had steadfastly and successfully resisted assimilation into the state. Unlike all the other unions, its leaders were not government cronies but defiant dissidents. Its sympathies lay with the opposition, and in particular with Laurent Gbagbo's Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI).

The students organized stay-away strikes, which soon escalated into riots. The student organizers, however, appear to have been more inclined to a passive approach, and at least some of the riots were incited by government agents in order to give the police a pretext for arresting leaders and organizers.[47] It was an underhanded but clever tactic: the students started with considerable sympathy from the population, but once the violence broke out there seemed to be a growing sense that things were going too far, or as

some people put it, the students were not doing things the "Ivoirien way." Eventually the government closed the country's schools in order to demobilize the students; the popular radio drama "Parole du maquis" then staged discussions about students whose opportunity for an education had been removed from them by a handful of uncaring *agents provocateurs* who, the government always claimed, were not even students, or Ivoiriens for that matter. The official newspaper, *Fraternité Matin*, continued to present articles that made the same argument.

By then the opposition, through the underground activities of SYNARES, had succeeded in infiltrating the union movement. What followed was a series of dramatic strikes that severely hindered the government's ability to operate and caused at least minor headaches to the bourgeoisie. First were the employees of financial corporations; the leadership of the union declared a two-day strike to begin on a Monday, but over the weekend the union's president, a government appointee, went on national television to announce that the strike was off because all union demands had been satisified. It was a lie. Days later, the union leadership—minus the president—held a secret, late-night meeting in which it declared the union president a traitor and fired her, then proceeded to call for the strike to resume the next day. It was completely secretive and took everyone by surprise, not least the government, whose newspaper was still gloating about the defeat of the strikers. Once again the union president went on national television to declare the strike illegal, but this time almost no one heeded her call to return to work.

An attempt was made to get the civil service to go out on strike, but it was quashed when the government threatened to fire every employee who stayed home. Instead, the union of transporters went out; since no buses were running, employees could not make it in to work anyway. Other unions went out on short strikes, Abidjan's electricity supply was not-so-mysteriously sabotaged when the government announced deep salary cuts to the power company, and at one point even the army recruits joined in, taking over the airport and closing it down for a day. FPI tracts had been circulating among the military and were receiving a warm reception, though the officer corps seemed reluctant to get involved in anything approximating a coup.

In the midst of all this the French paratroopers stationed in Côte d'Ivoire left their base by the airport and rolled into the center of Abidjan to surround the presidency. The secrecy of the operation left a lot to guesswork, but it may well have been that Houphouët-Boigny was starting to distrust his own soldiers and was falling back on favours from his old friend, François Mitterand (the two first met when Houphouët-Boigny was elected to the French Fourth Republic's Constituent Assembly).

It probably did not buoy the president's confidence when one of his children began using money from his business to fund the FPI.[48] At the

same time, it became apparent that some cabinet ministers were also funding the FPI; Houphouët-Boigny promptly sacked them.[49] The government's position looked even worse when the Roman Catholic Church appeared to side with the protesters. The Church had been anxious not to get involved in the melée, but was forced to do so when a number of students fleeing the police took sanctuary in Abidjan's cathedral. The country's archbishop, Cardinal Yago, issued a declaration that called for a political solution that exempted the poor from hardship, an implicit denunciation of the government's impending austerity package. At the same time the archbishop was said to be quietly communicating with the Vatican and trying to dissuade the pope from coming to consecrate Houphouët-Boigny's beloved new basilica in Yamoussoukro, a project with which the cardinal had long refused to be associated. It would have been a tremendous blow to the president's prestige, as well as to his self-proclaimed reputation as a devout Catholic.

However the president's prestige had already been dealt a blow when a demonstration in his support fizzled; only a few thousand of the planned hundred thousand supporters turned up, and when organizers sent buses into the countryside to round up marchers to supplement their ranks, some of the vehicles were allegedly hijacked and set afire. When the demonstration got going through Abidjan, a huge crowd surrounded it and began pelting the marchers—some of whom were cabinet ministers—with stones, whereupon the banners were dropped and everyone fled, the soldiers moving in to fight it out with the crowd.

Outside Abidjan things were just as bad. Serious riots broke out in Gagnoa and Daloa; in one case the prefect fled to Abidjan to tell the president that he had lost control of the city and that the soldiers would have to take over. All in all, the government, which until recently seemed to have the country firmly in its grip, appeared now to be watching it all explode from its hold. At the end of April 1990, after repeatedly saying liberal democracy would ruin Côte d'Ivoire and was years away, the government suddenly caved in and announced that free elections would be held and that a prime minister would be appointed—thus granting one of the opposition's recurrent demands.

Beneath the surface, things were not as bad for the government as they perhaps appeared. The institution of a multiparty democracy took much of the wind out of the opposition's sails, since this demand had been a broad rallying cry that had garnered public sympathy. However, the opportunity to express themselves freely in elections did not mean that Ivoiriens were on the verge of overthrowing the capitalist regime, for that part of the opposition agenda was not so roundly welcomed. There was a strong mood among many Ivoiriens that perhaps the president should go or at least make an apparent break with power by naming a prime minister, but few of the strike mandates called for a revolutionary overthrow of the system or a sweeping away of the

PDCI-RDA. Though opposition leaders might have liked the idea, the average Ivoirien seemed content merely to have competitors or watchdogs to the PDCI-RDA. Despite the president's apparent reluctance, the PDCI-RDA was ready to accommodate this concession, for by now the bourgeoisie was well entrenched in the state. It was also very rich: prominent capitalists could count on that immense asset if they were compelled to contest free elections.

The government continued to harass the newly legalized opposition, but the PDCI-RDA's new rivals suffered from some more profound weaknesses. After a half century of existence the bourgeoisie was well organized into a single, highly developed, and wealthy party. The opposition, on the other hand, had splintered into almost two dozen groups; the regime had actually nurtured this process by sponsoring certain small opposition parties that could draw support away from the more prominent FPI. The fractured nature of the opposition, when combined with a first-past-the-post electoral system, condemned the opposition to an almost inevitable nonrepresentation.

Moreover, being mainly liberal professionals with limited access to state positions, opposition leaders simply could not match the PDCI-RDA in resources: the PDCI-RDA was richer, as were its cabinet ministers, mayors, and deputies, and it had an extensive media network as well as over four decades of organization behind it. In the country's villages, there are thousands and thousands of local notables who are clients of leading members of the politico-economic elite.[50]

The outcome was that when elections were held in 1990–1991, the PDCI-RDA swept most of the positions. In part this resulted from its intimidation of the opposition, but the more important factor was the huge advantage in resources and organization which it possessed.[51] The opposition had essentially failed to channel popular discontent into a mobilized vote: in some constituencies, less than 20 percent of the eligible population turned out to cast ballots. The president's supporters indulged in extensive vote rigging during the presidential election, but even had they not done so it appears that Laurent Gbagbo would not have won enough votes to unseat Houphouët-Boigny.[52]

The Ivoirien capitalist class can allow for some of its members to be shuffled out of office because, unlike their counterparts in other African countries, these individuals can continue to enrich themselves without holding political power. Besides, the bourgeoisie has evolved such an elaborate network of interrelationships that no leading capitalist is ever very far from the corridors of power. As long as the state remains in the hands of the class as a whole, which appears likely for the near future at any rate, Ivoirien businesspeople's interests are not severely challenged. Besides, although the National Assembly has more autonomy than it did in the first years of independence, and although mayors possess more authority, policy

still originates in the president's office, and the president's primary contacts are with other capitalists, be they in or out of office.[53] For the time being, it is inconceivable that a president could rule who did not enjoy the consent of the PDCI-RDA.

In the end the prodemocracy agitation appears to have been almost as much a squabble within the Ivoirien bourgeoisie as it has been a struggle between the bourgeoisie and rival classes. A number of prominent capitalists and politicians patronized the new parties, in particular the FPI, a fact that indicates that they considered the party fairly receptive to their interests. The younger generation does not approve of the old guard's tactics and has pushed for reform in the PDCI-RDA.[54] Looking at these changes of outlook within the class one realizes that the Ivoirien prodemocracy movement has not been an assault on bourgeois power; instead, the changing nature of the capitalist class is leading to demands for—or at least a willingness to accommodate—new political structures. Satisfied with the direction of reforms, many of the discontented capitalists have returned to the PDCI-RDA fold, whereas the opposition continues to suffer from its divisions.

Though hampered and harassed, the Ivoirien opposition is more powerful than it has ever been. However, the Ivoirien bourgeoisie is also more politically powerful than it has ever been, and the state which it captured at the end of the 1950s has been turned into a veritable capitalist stronghold.

NOTES

1. Alain Tirefort, "Le Bon temps: approche de la société coloniale: étude de cas: la communauté français en Basse Côte d'Ivoire pendant l'Entre-Deux-Guerres (1920–1940)" (Thèse de 3e cycle, EHESS, Paris, 1979), pp. 117–119.
2. Ibid., p. 64
3. See *Mémorial de la Côte d'Ivoire* (Abidjan: Edition Ami, 1987), vol. 2, p. 233.
4. On this subject see Thomas Adrian Schweitzer, "The French Colonialist Lobby in the 1930s: The Economic Foundations of Imperialism" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1971).
5. See Tirefort, "Le Bon temps," and Raymond Gauthereau, *Journal d'un colonialiste* (Paris: Seuil, 1986).
6. Tirefort, "Le Bon temps," pp. 188–252.
7. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Road to Independence* (Paris: Mouton & Co., 1964), pp. 138–139; Henrik Secher Marcussen and Jens Erik Torp, *The Internationalization of Capital: Prospects for the Third World* (London: Zed Press, 1982), p. 128. The planters' leading political organizers, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, Georges Auguste Denise, and Mathieu Ekra were colleagues at the William Ponty school in Dakar, which the French had established to train colonial officials.
8. Anyang' Nyong'o, "The Articulation of Modes of Production: the Political Economy of Coffee in the Ivory Coast, 1840–1975," (Ph.D. diss., University of

Chicago, 1977), p. 156; see also Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 170; Wallerstein, *The Road to Independence*, p. 44.

9. See Tirefort, "Le Bon temps," pp. 330–332; *Mémorial de la Côte d'Ivoire*, vol. 3, pp. 266–167.

10. Morgenthau, *Political Parties*, pp. 169–170; Laurent Gbagbo, *La Côte d'Ivoire: économie et société à la veille de l'indépendance (1970–1960)* (Paris: Editions l'Harmattan, 1982), pp. 16–23.

11. Aristide Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 26, 61; Morgenthau, *Political Parties*, p. 174.

12. See, for example, *Mémorial de la Côte d'Ivoire*, vol. 2, pp. 272–273.

13. There may also have been an economic aspect to Latrille's alliance with the planters, since he was anxious to stimulate increased production in order to fuel the Free French war effort. On the economic motives of Latrille's politics, see Nancy Lawler, "Reform and Repression Under the Free French: Economic and Political Transformation in the Côte d'Ivoire, 1942–45," *Africa* 60, no. 1 (1990): 88–110.

14. *Mémorial de la Côte d'Ivoire*, vol. 2, p. 291.

15. *Mémorial de la Côte d'Ivoire*, vol. 2, p. 294; Y.-A. Fauré and J.-F. Médard, "Classe dominante ou classe dirigeante," in *Etat et bourgeoisie en Côte d'Ivoire* (Paris: Editions Karthala, 1982), p. 127.

16. The Anoma, Dadié, Houphouët-Boigny, and Brou families later figured among the country's leading industrialist families (see Chapter 6).

17. Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast*, pp. 66–67.

18. Gbagbo, *La Côte d'Ivoire*, p. 30

19. Morgenthau, *Political Parties*, p. 179; Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast*, p. 67; Brigitte Masquet, "Côte d'Ivoire: pouvoir présidentiel, palabre et démocratie," *Afrique contemporaine* 114 (March–April 1981): 10.

20. The Agnis were the only ethnic group notable for their exclusion within the SAA; however, in general "the Agni remained outside the mainstream of African organizational life" in the 1940s (Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast*, p. 67; see also Fauré and Médard, "Class dominante ou classe dirigeante," p. 128).

21. These were Houphouët-Boigny, Jean Delafosse, Germain Coffi Gadeau, Gabriel Dadié, Joseph Anoma, Antoine Konan Kanga, Georges Auguste Denise, and Denis Coffi Bilé. See PDCI-RDA, *Annuaire 1985–1990* (Abidjan: Editions Fraternité-Hebdo, 1987), p. 289; see Chapter 6 for details of their business interests.

22. The importance of the PDCI in the formation of the RDA is made evident by the fact that while the RDA was dissolved in 1958, the official name of the Ivoirien party remains to this day the PDCI-RDA.

23. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *French West Africa* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), p. 82.

24. John D. Hargreaves, *The End of Colonial Rule in West Africa* (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 82.

25. See Gbagbo, *La Côte d'Ivoire*, pp. 91–102.

26. These men were Houphouët-Boigny, Philippe Yacé, Georges Auguste Denise, Germain Coffi Gadeau, Koffi Aoussou, Antoine Konan Kanga, Denis Coffi Bilé, Mathieu Ekra, and Alcide Kacou (PDCI-RDA, *Annuaire 1985–1990*, pp. 401–402; see Chapter 6 for details of their business interests).

27. See Gbagbo, *La Côte d'Ivoire*, pp. 79–90, for the example of the party's response to the 1947 railway and dock workers strike.
28. Masquet, "Côte d'Ivoire," p. 13.
29. Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast*, p. 151.
30. See Masquet, "Côte d'Ivoire," p. 12.
31. Thompson and Adloff, *French West Africa*, p. 126; see also Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast*, pp. 188–215.
32. See Masquet, "Côte d'Ivoire," p. 17.
33. See Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast*, chapter 7.
34. Ibid., p. 236.
35. Ibid., chapter 7.
36. These were Houphouët-Boigny, Jean-Baptiste Mockey, Georges Auguste Denise, Jean Delafosse, Alphonse Boni, Alcide Kacou, Antoine Konan Kanga, Koffi Aoussou, and Charles Donwahi (PDCI-RDA, *Annuaire 1985–1990*, p. 526; see Chapter 6 for details of their business interests).
37. Basil Davidson, *Africa in History* (New York: Collier, 1974), p. 288.
38. See E. A. Brett, "State Power and Economic Inefficiency: Explaining Political Failure in Africa" (Manchester: Political Science Association Conference, 1985).
39. In French West Africa, according to Professor Morgenthau, only in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire did educated people see possibilities for advancement in the private sector (Morgenthau, *Political Parties*, p. 12).
40. In a 1982 report, the Midland Bank referred to Côte d'Ivoire's political stability in describing it as one of Africa's best trade and investment markets (*Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens*, July 30, 1982, p. 2145.)
41. In the 1989–1990 cabinet, for example, Félix Houphouët-Boigny was the president and Auguste Denise, Mathieu Ekra, Hortense Aka Anghui, and Jean-Claude Delafosse were all ministers. In addition the following ministers came from capitalist families: Alain Gauze (family of Denis Bra Kanon), Vincent Tioko Djédjé (family network of Etienne Affot Lattier, which includes the Houphouët-Boigny, Yacé, Coffi Gadeau, Daubrey, and Assouan Usher families), and Balla Keita (Coulibaly family). This made for a total of over one quarter of the cabinet. See Chapter 6 for details on the business interests of these families.
42. In 1980, for instance, the following mayors (with mayoralties in parentheses) all had significant business interests: Victor Amagou (Marcory), Léon Amon (Dimbokro), E. Desnoces Anvo Guetat (Abengourou), Félicien Kodja Konan (Divo), Emmanuel Dioulo (Abidjan), Arsène Assouan Usher (Cocody), Jean-Baptiste Mockey (Grand-Bassam), Jean-Baptiste Améthier (Bonoua), Denis Bra Kanon (Daloa), Léon Amon (Dimbokro), Philippe Yacé (Jacqueville), and Lanciné Gon Coulibaly (Korhogo). See Chapter 6 for details of their business interests.
43. See figures cited in Edward S. Greenberg, *The American Political System*, 4th ed. (Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1986), p. 137; Wallace Clement, *Class, Power and Property* (Toronto: Methuen, 1983), p. 91; Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969).
44. Bonnie Campbell, "The Ivory Coast," in *West African States: Failure and Promise*, edited by John Dunn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 87–88.
45. Moreover, at least some of the opposition parties employ anticapitalist rhetoric in their manifestos.

46. On the onset of the crisis, see Neil B. Ridler, "Comparative Advantage as a Development Model: The Ivory Coast," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 23, no. 3 (Sept. 1985): 407–417, and Bernard Contamin and Yves-A. Fauré, *La bataille des entreprises publiques en Côte d'Ivoire* (Paris: Editions Karthala, Editions de l'ORSTOM, 1990). Contamin and Fauré make the intriguing argument that much of what is attributed to the crisis, namely the closure, rationalization, or privatization of state corporations, has in fact been unrelated to it.

47. "Confession d'un casseur," *Politique Africaine* (Dec. 1990): 101–102.

48. The child in question was Kobena Anaky, Houphouët-Boigny's adopted son and an Abidjan businessman. Houphouët-Boigny had loaned him 100 million CFAF to upgrade his import-export business, but Anaky is reputed to have used at least some of this money to support Gbagbo.

49. The ministers in question are alleged to have made their contributions through Anaky (*New African*, July 1990, p. 19).

50. One can identify the connections between leading Ivoirien politicians and local notables by reading marriage and death announcements in *Fraternité Matin*: all prominent members of the family are written into the announcement, and one finds that prominent Ivoirien politicians usually retain networks of clients in their families' villages of origin (and often expand these networks well beyond those villages). Thus, Y.-A. Fauré asserts that when Emmanuel Dioulo and Lanciné Gon Coulibaly—who had patronized opposition parties—returned to the PDCI-RDA, they brought large numbers of voters with them. See "L'Economie politique d'une démocratisation: Elements d'analyse à propos de l'expérience récente de la Côte d'Ivoire," *Politique Africaine* 43 (Oct. 1991): 38.

51. In addition, the fact that foreigners are allowed to vote in Côte d'Ivoire benefited the PDCI-RDA, as the foreign vote is strongly pro-PDCI-RDA (Fauré, "L'Economie politique d'une démocratisation," p. 39).

52. Foreign estimates put the highest vote percentage in favor of Gbagbo at 40 percent, which is still well behind Houphouët-Boigny's total. See Gerald Bourke, "A New Broom," *Africa Report* (Jan.–Feb. 1991), p. 16.

53. J.-F. Médard, "La Régulation socio-politique," in *Etat et bourgeoisie en Côte d'Ivoire*, edited by Y.-A. Fauré and J.-F. Médard (Paris: Editions Karthala, 1982).

54. Bourke, "A New Broom," p. 15; Fauré, "L'Economie politique d'une démocratisation," p. 39.

4

The Ivoirien State: Motor of Capitalist Development

Not too long after Côte d'Ivoire obtained its independence, President Félix Houphouët-Boigny made the following curious declaration in the course of a speech before the young republic's National Assembly:

> What Côte d'Ivoire will not experience, and is not in its interests to experience, is Ivoirien capitalism. The only capitalism we should build, is that of the Ivoirien state.[1]

That one of Côte d'Ivoire's most prominent capitalists should make such a statement seemed highly ironical. Some accounted for his peculiar attitude by pointing out that Houphouët-Boigny was primarily an agrarian capitalist, his statement thus fulfilling dependency theory's prophecy of a planter class stifling the development of indigenous capitalism.

But the president's remark concealed his motives. The Ivoirien regime was about to embark on a massive program of economic intervention in order to hasten the process of capital accumulation. Huge amounts of capital would be mobilized in order to build up Ivoirien capitalism, stimulate industrial development, and expand the production of industrial inputs.

However, a class party which had just come to power on the basis of its reputation as the mouthpiece of ordinary Ivoiriens could not suddenly turn around and take money out of the hands of the people and place it in those of a small number of wealthy entrepreneurs. Such behavior would shatter the legitimacy of its rule, showing there to be little difference between the Ivoirien government and the settlers who took their money from Ivoiriens in the form of forced labor.

The state, however, offered a convenient cloak for the process of building up Ivoirien capitalism. If, instead of being placed into a few private hands, the money was being channeled into state corporations, then it could be said that the money was not being taken from the people but was still theirs. What could be more democratic?

Behind the scenes, these corporations were in fact assisting the Ivoirien bourgeoisie. Later, as well, a number of them would be transferred directly into the hands of Ivoirien capitalists. Thus, in a speech opening a trade fair in Abidjan in 1985, the president would make the following statement, revealing what had all along been the true intention of the Ivoirien state:

> The state, as I said at the Eighth Congress, is not the best industrial manager, and our ambition has always been to turn this task over to the private sector, which is better prepared and better equipped for this task than is the state administration.[2]

In fact the president had been making similar comments from as early as 1965,[3] and in 1975 the director-general of SONAFI, the government's principal share-purchasing agency, pointed out that state capitalism had never been intended as an end in itself but was merely a means towards an end: the creation of large corporations, which would then be sold off to the private domestic sector.[4]

Although it appeared in the 1960s that the state was playing into the hands of foreign capital, in hindsight the policy adopted by the Ivoirien bourgeoisie was a very logical approach for it to take. When the Ivoirien bourgeoisie finished its independence celebrations, it had to sit down and look at the hard realities confronting it. It was still a small class; despite the prosperity of both the class and the economy as a whole, there was still a relative dearth of national savings; the country possessed only a small trained workforce, and it lacked a sizeable managerial elite with expertise in large-scale business management; Ivoirien capitalists had not yet ventured very far into the secondary sector, and the country was still endowed with but a very limited industrial base.[5] So while the Ivoirien bourgeoisie wanted to build a thriving capitalist economy in the country it now ruled, the resources necessary to modern industrial capital investment were well beyond its scope. Had the class begun to tax the national economy in order to raise this capital, it would have had to do so to such an extent that economic growth would have been restrained.

There were, however, two ways by which the Ivoirien bourgeoisie could bypass this dilemma. The first was to rely on foreign capital to provide investment capital and expertise, both of which foreign investors could acquire in large quantities.[6] The second was to use the state to stimulate economic growth and mobilize national savings, an industrialization strategy used successfully by other Third World countries.[7] In the end the bourgeoisie decided to do both, putting in place a two-phase development plan that would have a delayed, but greatly enhanced, impact on the growth and development of Ivoirien capitalism.

Development plans, however, are nothing more than printed documents filled with glowing projections and page upon page of figures. In Africa,

many of them get little further away from the printshop than the nearby archives, where Western researchers can use them to pore over what was said that was not done. In a number of African countries, states lack the administrative capacity to implement their plans fully. In Côte d'Ivoire, this was not to be the case. The administrative machinery put in place by the Ivoirien bourgeoisie was up to the challenge of implementing the policies it drafted, for a couple of reasons.

One recalls that when the Ivoirien bourgeoisie came to power, it did more than capture Abidjan. In some other African countries the independence movements emerged and were based in the capital city, only later sinking shallow roots in the countryside. In Côte d'Ivoire, by contrast, the process was reversed: the bourgeoisie began in the countryside and Abidjan became the final prize for all its labors. Thus, the implementation of orders issued by a minister in Abidjan could be supervised by his or her family members and close colleagues who controlled the mayoralties or prefectures in the cities and towns throughout the country.

However, the Ivoirien bourgeoisie did another thing that was unorthodox, even heretical, in the Africa of that time: to overcome the problem of the shortage of bureaucratic expertise, it filled the state with French administrators. Whereas Europeans left other African countries at the end of the colonial period, in Côte d'Ivoire they flocked in; there were far more Frenchmen living in the country after 1960 than there had ever been before. Right until 1965 the country even retained a French finance minister, and in other ministries it was not uncommon to find up to fifteen French advisors performing the bulk of the minister's administrative work.[8] Two decades would pass before the French would begin slowly returning to France, their positions to be filled by young Ivoirien university graduates (or sometimes just phased out as a result of budget cutbacks).

Despite what some considered the cravenness of the Ivoirien ruling class faced with their former colonial masters, the strategy used by the Ivoirien bourgeoisie did nonetheless create a state with a relatively high degree of administrative capacity. Today, the Ivoirien state elite is quite technocratic. Civil servants are well trained for their positions, and in recent years there has been an increasing tendency for ministers to be drawn from among the senior civil service. The loyalties of public officials are increasingly organizational and less personal.[9] In the final analysis, bourgeois rule in Côte d'Ivoire is not just a matter of capitalists using the state as an instrument. Capitalists supervise administration and delimit bureaucratic choices, but the bureaucracy develops and implements policies.

As a result of all this, Côte d'Ivoire is one of the few states in Africa of which it can be said that plans and policies are effectively put into practice. Thus the Ivoirien development strategy was one that, to a substantial degree, became reality.

PHASE I: IMPORT SUBSTITUTION INDUSTRIALIZATION

In the first decade of independence the Ivoirien state sought to create an industrial base for the economy by using the strategy known as import substitution industrialization (ISI), whereby local products are developed to substitute for imported goods. Typically the strategy relies on import barriers like tariffs to shelter industries from competition while they start out. Given its protection from foreign competition, the quality of local production is often inferior, so the strategy is usually most effective if used only temporarily in order to build up an industrial base, after which the economy can be opened up to international competition and specialization in export production. Otherwise a country can find itself in the syndrome of producing a very wide variety of low-quality and overpriced goods, few of which are able to compete on international markets. However, ISI has a proven track record and has been used successfully by many of the world's capitalist countries in the early stages of their development.

The Ivoirien state went out of its way to be accommodating to foreign capital in the early postcolonial period. In 1959 it adopted a liberal investment policy that allowed for generous capital repatriation, a sore point for many Third World governments which bristle at the sight of foreigners getting rich in their country and then shipping their share of the national wealth abroad. The Ivoirien government's rhetoric warmed to foreign investors; the government even retained the French flag for a full year on the assumption that foreign investors would swarm to the *tricolore* sooner than they would to new and unfamiliar African colors.[10]

This reliance on foreign capital had the desired effect, for in the first years of independence foreign money came flowing into the country, most of the industrial investment capital during this period coming from foreign sources.[11] Between 1960 and 1967, Ivoirien GDP grew by 68 percent in real terms; the secondary sector grew even faster, going from 14.1 percent to 19.1 percent of GDP; the manufacturing sector grew faster yet, going from 7.1 percent to 12.2 percent of GDP.[12] In effect, the size of the manufacturing sector tripled in those few years.

The state also began to involve itself in the economy at this time. Through the Crédit de la Côte d'Ivoire, which had been created in 1955, it assisted the development of small and medium enterprises. It had an eye fixed on Europe and the United States when it drew up this policy, for government planners considered the success of those economies to be based largely on the thick layer of smaller enterprises they possessed. By 1975, the Crédit had financed 312 small and medium Ivoirien enterprises to the tune of 1.7 billion CFAF.[13]

In 1965, the government took a major step in founding the Banque Ivoirienne de Développement Industriel (BIDI), inviting both Ivoirien and

foreign investors to take minority shares in the corporation. BIDI's express purpose was to foster industrial development, and by the early 1980s it had loaned out over 30 billion CFAF to more than half of the industrial enterprises established in Côte d'Ivoire, all of which had to have at least some Ivoirien shareholders.[14]

The government also began slowly to transfer money directly to the Ivoirien bourgeoisie. In 1962 and 1963 it created the Fonds National d'Investissements and the Société Nationale de Financement (SONAFI) in order to assist the development of local enterprises. SONAFI's purpose was to draw Ivoirien investors towards involvement in industry and away from their traditional favored spheres of real estate and agriculture. A key means of doing this was to buy shares in companies operating in Côte d'Ivoire with the intention of ultimately selling them off to private Ivoirien shareholders. The government endowed the corporation with a capital of 100 million CFAF to fulfill this mandate. In 1968, the government increased SONAFI's capital to 300 million CFAF, and again to 800 million in 1972; its last increase brought its total capital up to 1.3 billion CFAF. In addition to buying shares, SONAFI was allowed to provide loans and credit guarantees, actually create companies, or buy initial shares in the form of limited partnerships.[15]

Meanwhile, the state was presiding over dramatic increases of production in the agricultural sector. More and more peasant families were being lured out of subsistence agriculture and enticed into cash-crop production by the attractive prices they could earn selling their output to the state marketing board. Between 1960 and 1968 the volume of coffee production increased by 50 percent, while the volume of cocoa and banana production more than doubled; pineapple output did even better, more than quadrupling. These were the country's main export crops, and improving production increased the flow of foreign revenue into the country, much of which found its way into government coffers. In 1968, the amount of national revenue from the sale of these crops was double what it had been eight years before.[16] As a result, the state was increasingly able to acquire the resources necessary for large-scale capital accumulation.

Towards the end of the 1960s the Ivoirien industrial base was stronger and larger, but an equally important change was taking place in society. Those planter capitalists with urban tertiary interests who had taken power in 1960 were now having their ranks supplemented by young entrepreneurs who were involving themselves exclusively in the urban industrial sector. These were filling the upper ranks of the PDCI-RDA, giving it a new "coloration." They were also becoming more assertive in the organizations that had been created to serve their needs. Almost from the moment it was created the Ivoirien Chamber of Industry began speaking out on the behalf of this young, industrial faction of the Ivoirien bourgeoisie. The Chamber called for a greater Ivoirization of both industrial capital and its personnel, a call which

the president himself acknowledged and lent his support to in 1965.[17] Three years later a group of Ivoirien entrepreneurs got together and formed the Association for the Promotion of Small and Medium-sized Businesses in Côte d'Ivoire, an organization linked to the Chamber of Industry that also called for increasing Ivoirization of industry. Once again, their pleas received sympathetic hearings from senior politicians.[18]

The stage was set for the emergence of Ivoirien capital in the industrial sector. Having taken time to develop the economy and build up the industrial base, the government had put in place the prerequisites to this emergence. Now Ivoirien capitalists, who perhaps had lacked confidence in 1960, were calling for it. In an interview with *Fraternité-Matin* on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of independence, President Houphouët-Boigny announced that the 1970s would be the decade of Ivoirization: the time had come, he said, for Ivoiriens to take command of the economy. In a speech before the nation a few days later, he reaffirmed his statement.[19]

PHASE II: IVOIRIEN CAPITAL ASCENDANT

The year 1968 marked the turning point in the Ivoirien government's development approach. At that time the ISI strategy was pushed into the background, a new export-oriented one taking its place. The purpose of this policy was not to satisfy demand in the local market, but instead to target certain industries—those in which Côte d'Ivoire held a competitive advantage—for development into exporters. Prominent among these was agroindustry, which could feed European markets; however, other industries that could supply neighboring African countries also grew out of this period.

In addition, the reliance on foreign capital for resource mobilization was reduced, and the emphasis now was on cultivating the industrial ascendance of Ivoirien capital. The cultivation of Ivoirien capital would be achieved in two ways: in the short term, through direct assistance to Ivoirien entrepreneurs; and over the long term, by state involvement in the economy with the ultimate goal of divesting holdings to private Ivoirien capital.

It might appear that Côte d'Ivoire's shift to export-oriented industrialization was prompted by external forces, namely the decisions of the Lomé Convention to assign various African countries specialization in the production of certain industrial goods for sale in the European Community. But this agreement was only concluded in 1975, several years after the Ivoirien state had initiated its policy turnabout. Moreover, the Lomé Convention assigned textiles specialization to Côte d'Ivoire, something in which foreign capital involved itself—with poor results—to a greater extent than did Ivoirien capital. By the time of the Lomé Convention, however, Ivoirien capital had already shown an interest in specializing in other industries, especially the new

field of agroindustry. It was, therefore, domestic capitalism, and not foreign capitalism, that generated the shift to the new policy.

At first the state took direction of the economy in a way it had never before done. It eclipsed foreign capital as the industrial economy's main shareholder, going from owning 10 percent of total industrial capital in 1967 to 53 percent in 1980.[20] Much of this investment went into the new agroindustrial sector, which the state was eager to develop. In addition, the state established large plantations to feed the new industries, and made use of a number of state corporations to stimulate the development of industrial crops throughout the country. These corporations developed better crop varieties and contracted their production out to small farmers, who could obtain these new varieties provided they grew them according to specified requirements and submitted themselves to supervision by experts from the state corporations. At the same time, the government continued to increase its exports of coffee and cocoa, and a number of other commodities as well, in order to acquire hard currency for investment. All things considered, in the first half of the 1970s the Ivoirien government spent almost 49 billion CFAF expanding agricultural production, with most of this money earmarked for the development of the industrial crops that would feed the new agroindustrial operations.[21]

Agricultural production moved ahead in leaps and bounds, though at a slower pace than in the 1960s. However, palm oil cultivation was introduced in order to feed the new factories, and its production rocketed.[22] At the same time the world prices for coffee and cocoa, Côte d'Ivoire's chief exports, leapt to record highs. This enabled the state to skim off immense surpluses from the sale of these commodities via its marketing board, in one year raking in about U.S. $1 billion. Much of this would be channelled into industrial investment.[23]

The state also spent several hundred billion CFAF on infrastructural development over the next two decades, some of which came from government revenues and some of which was borrowed from the World Bank. With this investment the government built one of sub-Saharan Africa's finest transportation networks. The government was expanding the production of industrial crops in the north in order to feed factories in the south, and so it needed to build good roads between the farms and the plants. Better roads also enabled it to get more cocoa and coffee, and other commodities, to the coastal ports, and to get them there more quickly.

In the 1971–1975 development plan, the government set aside 14 billion CFAF for the purpose of share purchases in industrial enterprises; at the same time it adopted a policy of transferring public assets to private Ivoirien capital, so at least officially these state acquisitions were intended to be only temporary.[24] In the 1976–1980 plan, it raised this amount to 53.3 billion CFAF, and established an additional fund of four billion CFAF for the

specific purpose of buying shares in existing foreign corporations. The government also planned to invest an additional 75 billion CFAF in agroindustry. The plan specified that government purchases of equity could later be resold to Ivoirien nationals.[25]

The government also made it easier for Ivoirien nationals to move into position to take advantage of these new opportunities. The 1976–1980 plan set up provisions for tax exemptions, the creation of a stock market to encourage portfolio investment, and guarantees of minimum returns on certain investments that the government was eager to promote.[26] Moreover, at this time the civil service statute was amended to encourage public-sector employees to become private entrepreneurs/investors, for example by making leaves of absence more accessible to those who wanted to set up companies.[27]

Having put in place a number of preconditions for large-scale capital accumulation by Ivoiriens, the government then responded to the clamor of voices coming from Ivoirien entrepreneurs who still lacked sufficient capital for large investments and sought government assistance in this regard. Between 1968 and 1980 a number of agencies whose express purpose was to assist the growth and diversification of Ivoirien capital came into existence.

The first of these was the Fonds de Garantie des Crédits Accordés aux Entreprises Ivoiriennes (FGCEI), which began operations in 1968. Its task was to provide credit guarantees on loans made by private banks to majority-owned Ivoirien industrial firms. Its mandate enabled it to endorse a total of loans worth up to five times its current budget; in 1978, for example, its budget of 400 million CFAF permitted it to provide guarantees on up to two billion CFAF worth of private loans. On any given project, it could guarantee up to 80 percent of the principal, interest, and taxes incurred by the investor, although on average it endorsed 58 percent of the total credit. Either way, though, FGCEI guarantees made projects pretty safe investments for prospective lenders.[28]

Next to follow the FGCEI in the government's strategy for the development of Ivoirien capitalism was the Fonds Spécial pour les Petites et Moyennes Entreprises (FSPME), which first saw the light of day in 1970. Placed under the administration of SONAFI and endowed with a capital of just under 70 million CFAF, the fund's goal was to support small and medium enterprises—that supporting layer of the economy the economic planners were anxious to promote. If the prospective enterprise creator was able to put up 10 percent of the business start-up capital, the FSPME was allowed to contribute an additional 15 percent. These contributions took the form of nonrepayable grants. The FSPME, though, lasted only a few years: it funded only 43 projects whose total capital investments came to a mere 426 million CFAF. In its granting practices it was accused of favoritism, so the government wasted little time in winding down the enterprise.[29]

However, SONAFI itself was performing more respectably. By 1975 it had participated in over 60 different companies whose combined asset value amounted to 6.4 billion CFAF. In 1971 it experimented with a public offering of some shares it owned in SITAB (Appendix 1 provides the full names, with other information, of firms referred to only by acronym); it was so encouraged by the response of Ivoirien investors, who snapped up 150 million CFAF worth of shares in just ten days, that it proceeded to make further share sales; it also helped to create the Abidjan stock exchange in 1976 to assist itself in this endeavour.[30]

Finally the state created the Office de Promotion de l'Entreprise Ivoirienne (OPEI), the role of which was to use subsidies in order to foster the development of Ivoirien capital. Between 1970 and 1977 the state granted it 1.287 billion CFAF for this purpose. In addition, OPEI consultants offered advice to Ivoirien businesspeople, and took a particular interest in entrepreneurs who were just starting out with small operations. Ivoirien entrepreneurs responded with considerable enthusiasm, and foreign businesspeople contacted the office with the intention of divesting themselves of assets by way of sale to Ivoirien capitalists. Between 1968 and 1976, OPEI participated in the creation of 246 private Ivoirien companies, which taken together invested more than three billion CFAF in the economy. In 1982, OPEI was replaced by the Centre d'Assistance et de Promotion de l'Entreprise Nationale (CAPEN).[31]

By that time, the FGCEI had enabled 160 Ivoirien-owned enterprises—one-third of them manufacturing operations—to accumulate a total bank credit of 3.4 billion CFAF. In 1981 the Nouveau Fonds, Département de la Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement replaced the FGCEI. However the fund's day passed; the cash flow problems brought on by the 1980s recession caused banks to be wary of making loans whose guarantees held far less strength than they did in the days when the FGCEI could easily repay defaulted debts.[32] As for SONAFI, it was dissolved in 1980, and the Ministry of Economy and Finance took over its portfolio. In June of that year, the Ivoirien state began the lengthy process of withdrawing from a number of the corporations in which it had participated in the 1970s, selling off its shares to Ivoirien investors. The recession eventually forced the government to back out of all but seven of the enterprises that it owned (wholly or majority); the remaining firms were either privatized, liquidated, or attached to the civil service.

On the whole the activities of SONAFI, OPEI, and FGCEI did not overlap. When, for instance, SONAFI participated in a corporation, the FGCEI did not give that corporation loan guarantees; in any event, SONAFI participation improved a company's creditworthiness on its own.[33] Thus in the course of the 1970s these state agencies together contributed to the development of corporations with Ivoirien ownership—often majority

ownership—whose investments for the period totaled almost 13 billion CFAF, an amount supplemented by the FSPME's modest contribution to the smaller enterprise sector. The Ivoirien state therefore had a hand in much of Ivoirien capitalism's boom during this decade, and probably helped many Ivoirien entrepreneurs cross the threshold into being modern industrialists.

#

It has often been said that Ivoirien capitalism is not true capitalism because the bourgeoisie has been utterly dependent on the state for its development. Some scholars prefer to call capitalism in Côte d'Ivoire state capitalism, and they say that if a bourgeoisie exists at all it is only a state or administrative one. To support this claim they point to the overriding state share of industrial assets, the fact that so many private entrepreneurs once received assistance from the government, and also the fact that a good number of them were co-opted and continue to be co-opted into the state one way or another when they achieve a relative degree of success.[34] Other observers suggest that an essential managerial strategy among Ivoirien corporate directors is to foster close links with the state because of an alleged relationship of dependence.[35]

Co-optation does occur, but it is important to bear in mind that it is not simply a state, but a capitalist state, that co-opts entrepreneurs. This process can equally be seen as just a continuation of the tendency of Ivoirien capitalists to penetrate the state they took over in the late colonial period. Since capitalists captured this state at that time, it only follows that they would welcome their own into its structures as a way to further solidify their rule.

That these capitalists should then use this state to further their development should come as no surprise. And while it is true that the state involved itself deeply in the development of Ivoirien capitalism, this is not sufficient reason to dismiss Ivoirien capitalism as state capitalism. In point of fact, many of the world's advanced capitalist countries developed along very similar lines.

The classical notion of economic development, the bible of which is Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, holds that capitalism develops independently of the state, and that indeed there is an inherent contradiction between state involvement and capitalist development. In the United States and Great Britain, this belief was to some extent borne out, though even there the state played an important role in the process of capitalist development. Elsewhere, however, the state played more than an important role, and indeed for a time played almost the entire role.

France, the grandmother of Ivoirien capitalism, is a case in point. In the mid-nineteenth century, the French state prodded capitalism along in that country. Until Louis Bonaparte came to power, French capital had been

developing rather sluggishly and haltingly. What Bonaparte's regime did was to undertake an ambitious railway-building program that stimulated a boom in capital investment: private entrepreneurs were given concessions and dividend guarantees, had their losses underwritten, and drew loans from banks created by the state. The boom in railway building thus spurred an expansion in iron production, necessitating a shift from small factories to large-scale ones using coke-fired furnaces, thereby requiring an expansion of France's engineering industry.[36]

The improved transportation infrastructure and the rise in employment due to the demand for workers to build the railways and fill the factories led to a growing demand for consumer goods, benefiting French commerce and in turn leading to the growth of the textiles and chemicals industries. In the 1860s, the state went on to facilitate the creation of joint-stock companies by allowing them to be established without authorization, and provided state loans to individual enterprises to enable them to modernize. Because capital still tended to be invested in smaller-scale enterprises, the state created or assisted in the creation of the Crédit Foncier and the Crédit Mobilier to overcome this problem.[37]

So dominant was the French state in this process that Karl Marx, in writing of capitalist development, felt compelled to invent the term "bonapartism" to describe that type of capitalist development that appeared to be entirely the domain of the state. Marx did not, however, suggest that French capital was nonexistent or parasitic; there was never any doubt in his mind, at least, that French capitalism was not a state economy.[38]

The situation in Côte d'Ivoire a century later was not the same as that in France; the Ivoirien state is not a bonapartist regime, and its historical antecedents and experiences have been different. But the principle applies to Côte d'Ivoire as it applied to Germany, as it applied to Japan, and as it continues to apply to the newly industrializing countries of East Asia: an overarching role of the state in capitalist development does not necessarily negate private domestic capitalism, especially not when, as in Côte d'Ivoire, the state has behaved in the way it has because it came into the hands of capitalists, in this case capitalists who emerged in the colonial period not because of but largely in spite of the state.

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As everywhere else, the process of capitalist development in Côte d'Ivoire would be gradual. The political victory of the Ivoirien bourgeoisie did not establish a capitalist system. More than three decades after independence, the Ivoirien economy still was not primarily a capitalist one. However, capitalism has flourished in Côte d'Ivoire to an extent matched in few other African countries. Largely because of the actions of the capitalist state, Ivoirien capitalism was far stronger in 1990 than in 1960.

NOTES

1. Quoted in C. de Miras, "L'Entrepreneur ivoirien ou une bourgeoisie privée de son état," in *Etat et bourgeoisie en Côte d'Ivoire*, edited by Y.-A. Fauré and J.-F. Médard (Paris: Editions Karthala, 1982), p. 181. Translation J. Rapley.

2. *Côte d'Ivoire sélection*, Oct. 18, 1985, p. 6, and Nov. 29, 1985, p. 2; tr. J. Rapley.

3. See, for example, Jon Woronoff, *West African Wager* (Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1972), pp. 205–206.

4. Camille Konan, "La Société Nationale de Financement," *Structures et actions socio-économiques de la république de Côte d'Ivoire*, special no. of *Regards sur la France* (Jan. 1975): 99.

5. Didier Kouadio Koffi, *La Création des entreprises privées par les nationaux en Côte d'Ivoire* (Abidjan: CEDA, 1983), pp. 46–47; Alphonse Y. Kouman, "Une action dynamique de promotion industrielle: pourquoi et comment investir en Côte d'Ivoire?" *Structures et actions socio-économiques de la république de Côte d'Ivoire*, special no. of *Regards sur la France* (Jan. 1975): 59–64.

6. Côte d'Ivoire, Ministère du Plan, *La Côte d'Ivoire en chiffres 1976*, pp. 155–157.

7. In the cases of Taiwan and South Korea, local capital has only recently been able to make large-scale investments, and then only with considerable state aid. For the case of Korea see Clive Hamilton, "Capitalist Industrialization in East Asia's Four Little Tigers," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 13 (1983): 35–73. A similar state-led strategy has been used in Taiwan: see Robert Wade, "Dirigisme Taiwan-Style," *IDS Bulletin* 15 no. 2 (1984).

8. Rajen Harshe, *Pervasive Entente* (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1984), p. 141; Interview with Lyse Doucet, June 12, 1986 (Ottawa, Canada); *Africa Confidential*, vol. 17 no. 112, pp. 3–6.

9. Richard C. Crook , "State Capacity and Economic Development: The Case of Côte d'Ivoire," *IDS Bulletin* 19 no. 4 (Oct. 1988): 19–25.

10. Aristide Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), chapter 7.

11. Côte d'Ivoire, Ministère du Plan, *La Côte d'Ivoire en chiffres*, p. 41; Jean Masini et al., *Multinationals and Development in Black Africa* (England: Saxon House, 1979), p. 7.

12. Bastiaan A. den Tuinder, *Ivory Coast: The Challenge of Success* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), tables SA4, SA9, Statistical Appendix.

13. Côte d'Ivoire, Ministère du Plan, *La Côte d'Ivoire en chiffres*, p. 156; Koffi, *La Création des entreprises privées*, p. 116.

14. Koffi, *La Création des entreprises privées*, p. 117.

15. Bonnie Campbell, "Etat et développement du capitalisme en Côte-d'Ivoire," in *Entreprises et entrepreneurs en Afrique*, vol. 2, edited by Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch and Alain Forest (Paris: Editions l'Harmattan, 1983), pp. 306–307); Côte d'Ivoire, Ministère du Plan, *La Côte d'Ivoire en chiffres 1976*, p. 157; Konan, "La Société Nationale de Financement," p. 100; Koffi, *La Création des entreprises privées*, p. 96.

16. See Tuinder, *Ivory Coast*, pp. 342–343.

17. Woronoff, *West African Wager*, pp. 205–306.

18. See *Réalités ivoiriennes*, 71 (Jan. 1968), pp. 3–4.

19. *Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens* (Moreux), Aug. 1, 1970, pp. 2345–2346; Aug. 15, 1970, pp. 2454–2455.

20. Henrik Secher Marcussen and Jens Erik Torp, *The Internationalization of Capital: Prospects for the Third World* (London: Zed Press, 1982), p. 101. The massive degree of public investment is revealed by the fact that this eclipse of foreign capital occurred at a time of expansion in foreign assets: between 1975 and 1981 alone, foreign capital nearly doubled its capital assets in the Ivoirien economy. See Table 2.4 in Bernard Contamin and Yves-A. Fauré, *La bataille des entreprises publiques en Côte d'Ivoire* (Paris: Editions Karthala, Editions de l'ORSTOM, 1990).

21. Jean-Pierre Foirry and Denis Requier-Desjardins, *Planification et politique économique en Côte d'Ivoire, 1960–1985* (Abidjan: CEDA, 1986), p. 187; Côte d'Ivoire, Ministère du Plan, *Projet de loi—programme des investissements publics (1970–1971–1972)* (Abidjan: 1969), pp. 12–17.

22. Tuinder, *Ivory Coast*, pp. 342–343.

23. Eddy Lee, "Export-Led Rural Development: The Ivory Coast," *Development and Change* 11 (October 1980): 637; Robert M. Hecht, "The Ivory Coast Economic 'Miracle': What Benefits for Peasant Farmers?" *Journal of Modern African Studies* 21 no. 1 (March 1983): 30. The state skimmed surplus revenue partly in the form of direct revenue, and partly in the form of loans from the marketing board. The marketing board was a stabilization fund; in years when the world price for coffee and cocoa exceeded the marketing board's producer price, the surplus revenue would be deposited in the fund. Then, in years in which the world price dropped below the established producer price, the fund could be drawn upon to sustain payments to farmers. As the fund accumulated the government borrowed from it, but by 1989 it was no longer able to repay its debts and the fund effectively collapsed, leaving farmers at the mercy of the world market.

24. Foirry and Requier-Desjardins, *Planification et politique économique*, p. 187; *L'Industrie ivoirienne*, special no. of *Fraternité Matin*, July 1978, pp. 63, 80.

25. Côte d'Ivoire, Ministère du Plan, *Five-Year Plan for Economic, Social and Cultural Development, 1976–1980* (Abidjan: 1977–1978), vol. 1, p. 99; vol. 2, p. 32; vol. 3, pp. 546–547.

26. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 546–547.

27. *L'Economie ivoirienne*, 10th ed. (Paris: La documentation africaine [EDIAFRIC], 1982), p. 63.

28. André Koffi N'Guessan, "Le fonds de garantie des crédits aux entreprises ivoiriennes: un instrument privilégié pour la promotion de l'entreprise nationale," *Structures et actions socio-économiques de la république de Côte d'Ivoire*, special no. of *Regards sur la France* (Jan. 1975): 104–111; Koffi, *La Création des entreprises privées*, pp. 90–93.

29. Koffi, *La Création des entreprises privées*, pp. 96–97; Konan, "La Société Nationale de Financement," p. 101.

30. Konan, "La Société Nationale de Financement," pp. 100–102; Bonnie Campbell, "The State and Capitalist Development in the Ivory Coast," in *The African Bourgeoisie: Capitalist Development in Nigeria, Kenya, and the Ivory Coast*, edited by Paul M. Lubeck (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987), pp. 297, 302n; Koffi, *La Création des entreprises privées*, p. 20n.

31. Koffi, *La Création des entreprises privées*, pp. 85–89; Claude de Miras, *La Formation de capital productif privé ivoirien: le secteur menuiserie à Abidjan*

(Abidjan: ORSTOM, Centre Petit-Bassam, 1975 [Série sciences humaines]), p. 61; "l'Office national de promotion de l'Entreprise Ivoirienne O.P.E.I.," *Structures et actions socio-économiques de la république de Côte d'Ivoire*, special no. of *Regards sur la France* (Jan. 1975): 69.

32. Koffi, *La Création des entreprises privées*, pp. 20n, 90–93; Isidore Yapi, Interview, Jan. 30, 1990 (Abidjan).

33. N'Guessan, "Le fonds de garantie."

34. For examples of this perspective see Claude de Miras, "De la Bourgeoisie d'Etat à l'avènement d'un milieu d'entrepreneurs ivoiriens?" in *Entreprises et entrepreneurs en Afrique*, vol. 2, edited by Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch and Alain Forest (Paris: Editions l'Harmattan, 1983), and Y.-A. Fauré and J.-F. Médard, "Classe dominante ou classe dirigeante," in *Etat et bourgeoisie en Côte d'Ivoire*, edited by Y.-A. Fauré and J.-F. Medard (Paris: Editions Karthala, 1982).

35. See Contamin and Fauré, *La bataille des entreprises publiques*, pp. 72–73.

36. Tom Kemp, *Economic Forces in French History* (London: Dennis Dobson, 1971), p. 170.

37. See Roger Price, *An Economic History of Modern France, 1730–1914* (London: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 22–25, 148; Kemp, *Economic Forces in French History*, pp. 165–167, 181–182, 198; Guy P. Palmade, *French Capitalism in the Nineteenth Century*, translated by Graeme M. Holmes (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1972), chapter 3, part 3, p. 173.

38. See Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York: International Publishers, 1963).

5

The Development of Ivoirien Capitalism Since 1960

In the economic domain, the postcolonial Ivoirien state performed two related functions. The first was to preside over the expansion of capitalism. Within that context, it performed the second function of assisting the growth and development specifically of Ivoirien capitalism. In both regards it has achieved notable successes, but it is especially Ivoirien capitalism that has prospered, surpassing the accomplishments of both foreign and state capital in Côte d'Ivoire. Moreover, its expansion has been accompanied by increases in productivity and moves into new capabilities. Furthermore, Ivoirien capital is more integrated into the Ivoirien economy than is its foreign counterpart, such that its expansion creates more spin-off benefits for the national economy.

In the first two decades of independence the state presided over a remarkable expansion in the national economy. All sectors of the economy grew, dramatically so in some years. Crop production expanded at sometimes massive rates: in the first decade and a half of independence, the volume of production of coffee and bananas almost doubled, that of cocoa increased sixfold, while pineapple production increased by over 4,600 percent. Even pineapple production, however, could not compare to the increases in palm oil production. Processing of these crops—representing secondary development—expanded even more quickly.[1] By the early 1980s Côte d'Ivoire had become the world's largest producer of coconuts, its largest exporter of tinned pineapple, its third largest exporter of palm oil, and Africa's second largest producer of cotton.[2] No other West African country came close to duplicating this record.

Moreover, the Ivoirien economy was not only expanding, it was developing. The secondary sector was growing considerably more quickly than the economy as a whole (see Table 5.1), while manufactured exports were increasing too: by 1980, manufactured exports accounted for 35–40 percent of total manufactured output, representing the highest recorded value of manufactured exports in all of sub-Saharan Africa.[3]

But then around 1980 the economy entered a recession, to which the state responded but whose resolution remains in the future. However, although growth slowed, the extent of the slowdown was in part overstated by the massive contraction in the public sector. Other sectors continued to expand at surprisingly healthy rates, most notably the manufacturing sector. Imports were severely restricted, but export production continued to expand (see Table 5.1). It would still be difficult to overstate the impact of the recession on the average Ivoirien, particularly in the early 1990s. Per capita incomes dropped, and this caused problems for Ivoirien entrepreneurs in their search for investment capital. Moreover, unpaid government bills forced some companies that depended on state contracts into bankruptcy. Yet Ivoirien capitalism survived the crisis.

Critics have always maintained that the "Ivoirien miracle" reflected extensive agricultural growth and showed little in the way of actual economic development. They suggested that most secondary investment remained the domain of foreigners, whereas Ivoiriens preferred to stick with their traditional spheres—primary production, trade, and services—that were secure but offered an economy little in the way of development prospects. In other words, capitalism was booming in Côte d'Ivoire, but Ivoirien capitalism was not. When the recession began in the early 1980s, their dire warnings of imminent collapse seemed to have been realized.

However, the critics overlooked some important details. Although Ivoiriens still tended to prefer investments in agriculture and real estate during the 1960s, the number of entrepreneurs willing to venture into the new territory of industry[4] rapidly got bigger during the second decade of independence. Not only was the economy sailing along, so too was Ivoirien capitalism. The Ivoirien bourgeoisie's share of total industrial capital had gone from almost nil in 1960,[5] at which time foreign interests heavily dominated the tiny modern industrial sector, to between 11 percent and 13 percent in the late 1970s.

Table 5.1: Average Annual Growth Rates in the Postcolonial Period (Percent)

	1965–1980	1980–1989
GDP	6.8	1.2
Agriculture	3.3	2.3
Industry	10.4	–1.7
Manufacturing	9.1	8.2
Exports	5.5	3.1
Imports	7.6	–1.1

Source: World Bank, *World Development Report 1991*, pp. 206, 230.

Then its share seemed to stabilize, leading some observers to conclude that the class had, for whatever reasons, attained the limits of its growth potential. But a closer reading of the evidence reveals that, all along, Ivoirien capital has been anything but stagnant; rather, Ivoirien capitalism has been expanding at a rate that might well make it one of the world's fastest growing, in terms of its capital assets. The problem is that the initial criticisms of Ivoirien capitalism, which have also been the most lasting, were made from the vantage point of the 1960s, before its dynamism became apparent. In a survey done in the mid-1970s of 80 Ivoirien enterprises, a mere 6 percent of the total had been created before independence, while less than 20 percent had been created before 1968. After that the class took off and in the next six years it created more industrial companies than it had in the four decades since it first came into being; an official survey done in 1976 also found that over four-fifths of the Ivoirien enterprises in question were less than ten years old.[6] Before the late 1960s, therefore, Ivoiriens were creating few industrial enterprises; so, as late as 1968, the class appeared to be truly somnolent in the urban industrial sector, especially when contrasted with the influx of foreign capital occurring at the time.

The 1970s, when government Ivoirization programs took effect, would provide a striking contrast to the experiences of the 1960s. In 1971, the total value of private Ivoirien manufacturing capital stood at 1.12 billion CFAF.[7] However, from 1974 to 1978, private Ivoirien capital assets in the "modern" sector grew by 43 percent in current CFA francs, at a time of rapid expansion in the economy as well as violent swings in the successes of investors.[8] In the 1975–1977 period alone, the value of private Ivoirien manufacturing capital leapt from 4.421 billion CFAF to 10.423 CFAF; by the end of the decade it was up to 15 billion CFAF, and the following year (1980) it attained almost 20 billion CFAF.[9] Over the decade, therefore, the value of private Ivoirien capital's industrial assets grew at an average annual rate of 29.6 percent. Even in the latter part of the 1970s, when Ivoirien capital had begun to "stagnate" at around 11 percent of total industrial capital, the value of its assets in the manufacturing sector was expanding at an annual average rate of almost 35 percent.[10] These huge rates of expansion, however, were being masked by high rates for the economy as a whole: from 1968 to 1978, the total number of industrial enterprises in Côte d'Ivoire went up by 79 percent; investment by enterprises increased 579 percent; industrial exports went up by 713 percent.[11]

This expansion seems equally impressive when compared to the records of advanced capitalist countries. For example, one publication described 1987 as being the best year of the decade for Canadian economic growth, citing both a booming economy and soaring profits. An index of the economy's top performing 1,000 companies recorded an annual growth rate in assets of 12.7 percent,[12] a rate which presumably would have been considerably lower had

one taken into account all the economy's enterprises. Using this comparison, in its boom years Ivoirien capital grew several times faster than Canadian capital did in its own boom year, likely making Ivoirien capitalism one of the world's faster-growing varieties. Even during the world recession of the early 1980s, which hit Côte d'Ivoire especially hard, the Ivoirien economy still managed to grow more quickly than those of Spain, Ireland, Italy, Belgium, Austria, West Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and even France.[13] While it is true that growth rates always slow down as an economy's industrial base gets bigger, and thus that healthy First World economies will always have lower growth rates than healthy Third World economies, this should not detract from the fact that, clearly, Ivoirien capitalism has been very healthy.

The number of Ivoirien-owned enterprises expanded to match this record. In 1971 three-quarters of Ivoirien industrial capital was concentrated in but five firms.[14] Two decades later, well over a hundred large companies had significant Ivoirien shareholdings, many of them being majority-owned by Ivoiriens (see Appendix 1). From the vantage point of the 1970s, therefore, Ivoirien capitalism took on a wholly different appearance and was anything but somnolent. Moreover, it had abandoned its traditional preference for the tertiary sector of investment and was now involving itself primarily in the business of manufacturing: by 1980, almost two-thirds of Ivoirien industrial capital was located in the secondary sector.[15]

While Ivoirien capitalists were expanding their share of total assets, they were expanding their share of output even more quickly. The conventional wisdom that Ivoirien firms are less productive and profitable than foreign ones appears to be without foundation. Among the firms surveyed in Appendix 1, Ivoirien entrepreneurs' share of output is considerably higher than their share of capital. What this means is that, on the whole, Ivoiriens operate (or at least buy into) more productive firms than do their foreign counterparts.[16]

Although the economic contraction of the 1980s–1990s[17] has led some observers to proclaim the end of the Ivoirien miracle and to claim that Ivoirien capitalism had finally reached the limits of its expansion, the recession did not in fact put an end to the activities of Ivoirien capital: between 1980 and 1987, 5,400 industrial (secondary and tertiary) companies came into existence in Côte d'Ivoire, 58 percent of which were created by Ivoiriens.[18] Most of these were small operations, but in 1990, in the country's 110 largest industrial (secondary and tertiary) companies in which Ivoiriens held significant shares, private Ivoirien assets stood at almost 43 billion CFAF. Private Ivoirien assets in manufacturing alone accounted for over 25 billion CFAF (see Appendix 1). These figures do not take account of the welter of Ivoirien assets in small and medium enterprises, where Ivoirien entrepreneurs are very strong, nor of small (less than 10 percent) portfolio

investments in large firms. Had these figures been included, the total of Ivoirien capital assets would have been much larger. In sum, Ivoirien capital was behind much of the 1980s boom in manufacturing, and Ivoirien investors were certainly not confining themselves to small-scale businesses, especially not in the 1980s.

THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF IVOIRIEN CAPITAL

African capitalism is frequently seen in a rather negative light as lacking scale (measured by volume of assets) and dynamism (measured by growth in assets and a willingness to venture into new fields of operation), attributes that are considered the preserve of foreign capital. Domestic investors, it is believed, tend to invest in small enterprises, artisanal workshops, and modest family businesses while leaving the "commanding heights" of the economy—the large enterprises employing hundreds of employees, owning assets worth millions of dollars, possessing big factories or several outlets—in foreign hands, or more recently in those of the state. The big-profit-generating operations are alleged to be controlled by foreigners who repatriate the profits to their home countries. On occasion Africans may venture into large, sophisticated operations, but it is said that when they do so they will be little more than minority shareholders in foreign-owned firms, passive beneficiaries who exert no significant influence over the corporation. By these subtle means, resulting from domestic capital's alleged lack of dynamism, foreign capital preserves its control behind a facade of apparent nationalization, domestic capitalism being reduced to an appendage of an externally dominated mode of production.

At one time Ivoirien capital seemed to fit this description, and many doubted its potential to contribute to the economy's development. Foreign capital gave every indication of dominating the economy's commanding heights. In 1971 Ivoirien capital held interests in only a few dozen of the country's large firms, and most of these were minority participations in foreign corporations.[19] By the end of the 1970s not one of the country's top industrial firms was wholly owned by Ivoiriens; instead, there were a growing number of minority participations.[20] Only the state could match foreign capital in this sector of the economy.

This arrangement suited foreign capital well as it was able to raise over three-quarters of its investment capital locally[21] without risking loss of control over its companies. During the 1970s foreign companies began selling large blocks of shares to Ivoiriens in the knowledge that they lacked the organization or interest to convert their assets into control over the corporations. As a result, foreigners occupied many of the corporate sector's

administrative positions.[22] Consequently, the profile of Ivoirien capital seemed to be of a class of shareholders, a sort of rentier capital that invested for the sake of obtaining returns but not with the intention of getting involved. It seemed that Ivoirien capitalism existed merely to serve foreign capital by providing it with a ready source of investment capital and by developing the service sector. In effect it was a parasite that "raided" foreign capital in order to enrich itself;[23] fundamentally, though, the *locus in quo* of accumulation and income generation rested in foreign hands.

Things were always in flux, however. Just as the planter capitalists branched out from the agricultural sector as soon as the opportunities presented themselves, so too did they go beyond being passive investors, traders, or real estate owners when the right time came. In the 1960s and 1970s, many of the country's shareholders occupied comfortable civil service positions and thus had little incentive to devote their full energies to business; after all, capitalists had taken over the state. Their complacency ended in the 1970s and 1980s when government austerity programs began slashing public-sector positions and reducing salaries. Former civil servants thus became full-time businesspeople. By the same token, university graduates whose diplomas would at one time have been their tickets to employment now found that public careers offered little promise. In addition to those Ivoiriens who had always been capitalists first and politicians second, there now occurred a sudden influx of young Ivoiriens whose interests had been more evenly divided between politics and business.

They were not a passive lot. When they bought shares they did so with the intention of getting involved. A 1990 survey of corporations in which Ivoiriens owned interests produced results which suggest that today, when Ivoiriens buy the majority of a corporation's shares, they do not leave the administration to foreigners but take it over completely.[24] If the corporations are owned jointly with foreigners they are jointly run, and only in foreign-owned corporations do foreigners dominate the administration, though even here it is interesting to note that foreign firms are slightly more likely to use Ivoirien administrators than Ivoirien firms are to employ expatriates (see Table 5.2). In some of the head offices of Abidjan's largest firms one is hard-pressed to find a white face, and when one does it can turn out to be that of an Ivoirien citizen.

Not only were Ivoiriens becoming more assertive in the corporations they bought into, they also abandoned their penchant for minority participations and began taking over state or foreign firms, or more commonly, establishing new ones. What the studies done in the early 1970s failed to take into account is that although Ivoiriens were more likely than not to buy minority shares in foreign or state businesses, the size of their shares had increased over the last decade. This trend continued until Ivoiriens began acquiring majority ownership of most of the corporations they bought into.

Table 5.2: **Direction of Ivoirien Corporations, by Ownership (percent)**

	Ivoirien Majority	No Majority	Foreign Majority
Ivoirien	37 (74)	1 (17)	4 (8)
Joint Foreign-Ivoirien	10 (20)	2 (33)	14 (29)
Foreign	3 (6)	3 (50)	31 (63)

Source: Appendix 1.
Note: Percentages are of companies in that ownership category. No data for one company. The two majority-state firms and two combined state-private Ivoirien firms are not included.

During the colonial period the limited amount of Ivoirien investment in large industrial firms was restricted almost entirely to portfolio investment in foreign firms. This tendency continued, but was significantly weakened, during the 1960s. Then in the early 1970s came the turnaround: Ivoiriens began to buy majority shares more often than minority ones in the firms in which they participated (see Table 5.3). Since then this tendency has gotten stronger and stronger, particularly when one takes into account that seven of the firms that were created in the colonial or early postcolonial period became majority Ivoirien-owned in the 1970s or 1980s. By the 1980s, when Ivoiriens bought shares in new companies, they were far more likely than not to take a controlling interest.

At the same time, Ivoirien capitalists were abandoning their inclina tion toward involvement mainly in the service sector. Early in its history the capitalist class had begun the transition from being a strictly agricul tural class to being an increasingly urban bourgeoisie with interests in the tertiary sector. In the course of the 1960s it began the transition to being a fully modern and urban bourgeoisie, and has since been asserting itself increasingly in the modern industrial economy. One Ivoirien business man summed it up by saying that the older generation of capitalists comprised buyers of capital, whereas the younger one consists of creators of capital.[25] In retrospect, the position of minority shareholder in foreign or state corporations was not a permanent state, as it appeared for a time.

Today, Ivoirien representation in the service sector is no greater than that of foreign capital, in proportion to its total assets. It may come as a surprise to discover that in Côte d'Ivoire foreign capital is strongest not in manufacturing but in trade and shipping,[26] as if it were the one doing the "raiding." Roughly 57 percent of Côte d'Ivoire's locally owned enterprises are

Table 5.3: Nature of Companies Being Established Across Time: Minority vs. Majority Ownership by Ivoiriens (percent)

	Period in Which Company Established				
	Pre-1960	1960s	1970–1974	1975–1979	1980s
Minority	22[a]	17[b]	8	9	4
	(88)	(55)	(47)	(38)	(33)
Majority	3	14	9	15	8
	(12)	(45)	(53)	(62)	(67)

Source: Appendix 1

Notes: Percentages are of companies established in each period. For the purposes of this table, the four companies with 50 percent Ivoirien ownership were taken to be majority-owned. No data for one company.

a. Four of these companies became majority Ivoirien-owned in the 1970s or 1980s. Three were previously majority foreign-owned, and one had no majority owner until the state sold its small share to private Ivoirien investors.

b. Three of these corporations became majority Ivoirien-owned in the 1970s or 1980s. One was previously majority foreign-owned, and two were previously majority state-owned.

in the service sector, mainly in commerce.[27] In the larger companies in which Ivoiriens are involved, however, the figure is lower (see Table 5.8). Nonetheless it approximates the typical figure for advanced capitalist economies where service sectors typically account for over half of gross production (economies like that of Switzerland go further and rely extensively on their revenue from service industries). Moreover 41 percent of all French capital in Côte d'Ivoire is invested in trade alone,[28] a proportion similar to that of Ivoirien capital. The investment profile of Ivoirien capital is thus a lot more similar to that of foreign capital than many might suppose.

Not only had they moved beyond the agricultural and urban tertiary sectors, Ivoirien capitalists were also no longer cautious entrepreneurs who preferred to restrict their activities to the familiar field of small business. It is doubtful that they ever were, but by 1990 they certainly were not so, as the survey whose findings are listed in Appendix 1 testifies. This survey, done in 1990, studied those corporations in which Ivoiriens purchased shares. Only corporations with a minimum capital of 100 million CFAF were considered, and they had to have a minimun Ivoirien share ownership of 10 percent. The 100 million CFAF figure puts them above the upper threshold of what the government considers small and medium enterprises, so these firms are all in the upper echelons of the economy; the 10 percent figure ruled out the large number of corporations in which Ivoiriens own very minor interests. Given the undisputed presence of Ivoirien capital in the primary sector, the survey looked only at secondary and tertiary sector corporations.

Unlike the situation of two decades before, when Ivoiriens had interests in only a few dozen such corporations, today they own interests in well over 100. No fewer than 110 companies met the requirements to be included in the

survey group; in addition, as many as 200 more would have met the survey requirements but were excluded due to insufficient data. The increase in the number of large Ivoirien-owned industrial firms may therefore have been as high as nine- or tenfold over 1971.

In half of these firms, Ivoiriens own at least half the shares. Even at the "commanding heights" Ivoirien capitalists have displayed a notable aggressiveness. Almost one-third of the companies in which Ivoiriens own interests have a registered capital that exceeds 1 billion CFAF; in Côte d'Ivoire, a firm that size is among a relatively small group at the pinnacle of the economy. Almost one-tenth of the companies in the survey are majority Ivoirien-owned corporations with capital in excess of one billion CFAF; of the very largest companies (assets in excess of two billion CFAF), one-fifth are majority-owned by Ivoiriens (see Table 5.4).

Ivoiriens are, however, still more likely to be majority owners in the smaller firms in the survey than in the larger ones: as the firms increase in size, the likelihood that they are majority-owned by Ivoiriens declines. Foreign capitalists or the state still dominate the country's very largest corporations. But this is not a sign of feebleness on the part of Ivoirien capital. Over time Ivoirien capitalists have been consistently augmenting their assets, and the tendency has for a long time been toward an increasing presence at the top of the economy. In the long run Ivoirien capital may conceivably one day eclipse foreign capital in this sector of the economy. It would not be the first time that Ivoirien capitalists have outperformed their foreign counterparts.

At any rate, foreign majority ownership should not automatically be equated to foreign domination. Many of the prominent French capitalist families have been living in Côte d'Ivoire for some time, in some cases for generations. A mid-1970s study found that these French Ivoiriens, as they can be called, accounted for 23 percent of all the foreign capital invested in Côte d'Ivoire.[29] Their dual identity belies a simple foreign-domestic dichotomy, and they do not behave as do their compatriots back in France, being less likely to repatriate their profits or to divest during economic hard times, as foreign capitalists have recently done. In some respects, therefore, they are more like Ivoirien capitalists.

Not surprisingly, then, when Ivoirien entrepreneurs enter into joint ventures with foreign capitalists they are more likely to do it with these French Ivoiriens than with foreign corporations. The image of massive foreign multinationals submerging little Africans who have scrimped and saved in order to buy a few shares seldom applies: most French firms do not involve Ivoiriens at all but are wholly owned subsidiaries.[30]

Foreign control of the industrial economy appears less impressive still when one examines more closely the nature of foreign ownership. The view of the corporate head office in Paris, New York, or London that rules its empire around the globe by decree is a popular but not always accurate one.

Table 5.4: **Large Ivoirien Companies by Size and Ivoirien Ownership Capital (in millions CFAF)**

		100–249	250–499	500–999	1,000–1,999	2,000 + over	Totals
10–19%	Number	3	1	3	3	4	14
	%/Category	12%	5%	10%	17%	25%	%/Total
	% of Total	3%	1%	3%	3%	4%	13%
20–29%	Number	2	4	8	4	6	24
	%/Category	8%	19%	28%	22%	38%	%/Total
	% of Total	2%	4%	7%	4%	6%	22%
30–39%	Number	3	3	2	3	2	13
	%/Category	12%	14%	7%	17%	13%	%/Total
	% of Total	3%	3%	2%	3%	2%	12%
40–49%	Number	0	0	2	1	1	4
	%/Category	0%	0%	7%	6%	6%	%/Total
	% of Total	0%	0%	2%	1%	1%	4%
50% + over	Number	18	13	14	7	3	55
	%/Category	69%	62%	48%	39%	19%	%/Total
	% of Total	16%	12%	13%	6%	3%	50%
Totals	Number	26	21	29	18	16	110
	% of Total	24%	19%	26%	16%	15%	

Source: Appendix 1
Note: %/Category is the proportion of the size (capital) category. %/Total is the proportion of the total survey group (110 firms). Percentages are rounded, so figures do not always add up to 100 percent.

Nearly a quarter of the companies in Appendix 1 which are majority-owned by foreigners do not actually have a sole foreign owner; the proportion is even higher for firms with assets exceeding one billion CFAF. In point of fact, the foreign shares of these corporations' assets are divided among a number of shareholders who may not even share the same nationality. Whatever rivalries exist among these people or companies can negate the domineering effects of foreign control, and businesspeople are certainly renowned for their competitiveness, even within the same corporations.

As Ivoirien capital developed, it became more deeply invested in the country's richest firms. Any foreign monopoly that might have existed in this domain was being whittled down. In the 1974–1982 period, for instance, Ivoirien-owned enterprises placed well among the country's top corporations, measured in terms of volume of business and value added (see Table 5.5). In any given year, between 28 percent and 45 percent of Côte d'Ivoire's leading businesses had some degree of Ivoirien ownership. Given that Ivoirien capital accounted for around one-tenth of the country's total industrial capital during

Table 5.5: **Ivoirien Representation Among the Country's Leading Companies**

		1974	1976	1976–1977	1977–1978	1978–1979	1979–1980	1980–1981	1982
10–19%	Number	0	5	4	0	0	0	0	0
	%/Year	0%	26%	22%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
10–29%	Number	6	9	8	4	4	5	5	5
	%/Year	67%	47%	44%	57%	50%	56%	50%	45%
30–39%	Number	1	3	4	1	2	2	3	4
	%/Year	11%	16%	22%	14%	25%	22%	30%	36%
40–49%	Number	0	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
	%/Year	0%	5%	6%	14%	13%	11%	20%	9%
>50%	Number	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
	%/Year	22%	5%	6%	14%	13%	11%	0%	9%
	Totals	9	19	18	7	8	9	10	11
	%of Total	45%	38%	36%	28%	32%	36%	40%	44%

Sources: Appendix 1; *Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens*, 1976–1984; *Hommes et organisations d'Afrique noire*, 1974–1977.

Note: Percent of total refers to total of all leading companies in that year, not just those with Ivoirien ownership.

this period, it was very well represented among the ranks of the nation's top firms.

However, Ivoiriens were typically minority shareholders in these firms, most often owning between 20 percent and 29 percent of the corporation's assets, although year after year they were tending to increase their shares in these companies as well. Moreover, in all but one year one of the country's top companies was majority-owned by Ivoirien capitalists. In addition, given multiple foreign ownerships of one company's assets, as well as the presence of French Ivoirien investors in some of these companies, Ivoiriens who owned 30 percent or 40 percent of a corporation's assets were not necessarily passive stock buyers. So in this rich niche of the economy, as in others, Ivoirization of capital was proceeding throughout the 1970s.

But nowhere was the dynamism of Ivoirien capitalism more evident than in the sectoral preferences of Ivoirien capital. As was noted, at one time Ivoirien capitalists interested themselves primarily in the tertiary sector on those occasions when they ventured into the urban economy. But just as throughout the colonial period Ivoirien capital was moving out of the primary sector and into the urban economy, throughout the postcolonial period it has consistently been shifting its focus from the tertiary sector to the secondary one. To put it another way, in its early days Ivoirien capitalists

enriched themselves by exploiting the colony's rich natural resources. Later, they began playing a supporting role to other components of capital by investing in trade and services. But today, their increasing investment in the secondary economy makes an important contribution to the country's development, because this sector advances the economy's productive technology, increases the value added within the national economy, and does not simply exhaust natural wealth in order to generate revenue.

Latent throughout its history, Ivoirien capitalism's trend towards maturation into a secondary industrial variety became apparent only at the beginning of the 1970s. For the first few years Ivoiriens took minority interests in large corporations owned by the state or foreign capital. However, in this sector as well they increased their participation until, today, Ivoirien investors are more likely than not to be majority owners of the large manufacturing firms in which they are involved.

The first industry in which Ivoirien capitalists showed an interest was agroindustry, the finishing of agricultural production for export (e.g., canning pineapples or making juice). Given the class's roots in the agricultural economy, this was an apparently obvious progression for it to make. By 1971, well over one-third of Ivoirien assets in the secondary sector were located in agroindustrial operations.[31] Spurred on by Ivoirien investment, agroindustry went on to become one of the economy's fastest-growing industries and leading earners of export revenue. Agroindustry makes an especially important contribution to the country's economy in that it helps to keep money at home: when people in Parisian grocery stores buy cans of Ivoirien pineapple, they pay not only for the contents but for the cans and the processing. Previously, this work was done in European factories that simply imported the pineapples (or the coconuts, or the cocoa, or the coffee . . .). Ivoirien capital has been in the forefront of reclaiming some of the country's wealth in this manner, whereas European companies like Nestlé continue to prefer importing raw materials and processing them in European factories.

Other manufacturing industries in which Ivoirien capitalists established themselves around the beginning of the 1970s were textiles and clothing production; printing; and metals, mechanical, and electrical industries.[32] On the other hand they showed little interest in petroleum refining, rubber, leather, and shoe production. Toward the end of the decade they became involved in the construction materials industry and deepened their involvement in the production of food goods (see Table 5–6). By 1980, Ivoirien capitalism was well entrenched in cocoa and coffee production, textiles production, and especially printing, where it accounted for over two-thirds of the country's output.[33] Some of these industries were export-oriented; others sold their output on the domestic market. As time went by, though, Ivoirien capitalism looked more and more outward for markets for its products.

Today, Ivoirien capital continues to be strong in agroindustry, food

Table 5.6: Ivoirien Assets in Manufacturing Subsectors, 1975–1979 (all figures in millions CFAF, current terms)

Subsector	1975	1976–77	1979	
Food Goods and Agroindustry	13,324	27,967	44,424	Total Assets
	1,248	2,698	5,303	of which Ivoirien
	41%	42%	37%	% of exports
Textiles and Clothing	11,421	14,326	16,457	Total Assets
	1,059	2,176	2,326	of which Ivoirien
	38%	24%	32%	% of exports
Petroleum Refining, Finishing	1,115	1,170	8,421	Total Assets
	0	14	33	of which Ivoirien
	32%	31%	47%	% of exports
Chemicals	3,414	4,754	7,557	Total Assets
	363	590	932	of which Ivoirien
	25%	18%	13%	% of exports
Rubber	4,220[a]	4,365	5,314	Total Assets
	169	221	213	of which Ivoirien
	78%	78%	76%	% of exports
Construction Materials	1,190	1,520	3,869	Total Assets
	78	12	1,067	of which Ivoirien
	12%	8%	0%	% of exports
Metals, Mechanical, Electrical	5,285[b]	6,655	9,006	Total Assets
	785	529	1,133	of which Ivoirien
	25%	9%	5%	% of exports
Miscellaneous[c]	883	1,538	3,022	Total Assets
	192	323	788	of which Ivoirien
	40%	4%[d]	2%	% of exports
Leather and Shoes	445	688	924	Total Assets
	1	8	35	of which Ivoirien
	14%	9%	9%	% of exports

Sources: Côte d'Ivoire, Ministère du Plan, *La Côte d'Ivoire en chiffres*, pp. 181–213; 1978–1979, pp. 163–191, pp. 198–201; *L'industrie ivoirienne*, p. 66.

Notes: Figures for exports represent percentage of total for sector.

a. Mostly processing; some manufacturing

b. Mainly medium-sized enterprises

c. Mainly printing, largely Ivoirien-owned, low export ratio

d. Year-to-year drop in exports due to change in accounting procedures

production, fish processing, and the metals industries. Several new companies have emerged in these subsectors during the 1980s, some starting out with very sizeable capital bases. Ivoirien capitalists continue to eschew the petroleum industry, while during the decade they reduced their participation in the textiles and clothing industries, as well as in the wood

industry. This is a very significant finding in that these latter industries, which were entering a boom in the early 1970s, have since gone into a slump, a severe one in the case of the textiles industry. In other words, Ivoirien capitalists got in when the going was good, then began to leave the shop to foreigners when things turned sour. Although foreign capital predominates in the more advanced chemicals sector, which is to be expected, Ivoirien capitalists make a respectable showing there, owning assets in eleven corporations and dominating two of them (see Table 5.7).

The inclinations of Ivoirien capitalists are such that when they buy shares in large corporations, they are now more likely than not to buy into manufacturing operations. Moreover, when they are involved in manufacturing operations, they will tend to be majority owners. Of the 110 large corporations surveyed in Appendix 1, over half are manufacturing firms, and over half of these in turn are majority-owned by Ivoiriens. Majority Ivoirien-owned manufacturing companies comprise the largest single group in the survey, representing over one quarter of the total. The preference for tertiary investments is dwindling: not only are there fewer businesses in this sector, but the tendency toward minority Ivoirien ownership in this sector is now stronger than it is in manufacturing (see Table 5.8). In this regard, the Ivoirien bourgeoisie has reversed its position of two decades ago, when it was inclined to establish tertiary operations or buy minority shares in manufacturing ones.

Table 5.7: Distribution of Ivoirien Capital by Manufacturing Subsector, 1990

	Wholly Foreign	Foreign with Ivoirien Presence	Ivoirien Majority	Other
Agroindustry,[a] Fish Processing, and Food Production	4	22	21	2 state enterprises
Textiles and Clothing	4	5	2	2 state-foreign cos.
Paper Production	2	3	9	
Wood Finishing	8	3	2	
Petroleum and Derivatives	10	1	0	state owns share in Société Ivoirienne de Raffinage
Chemicals Industries	16	9	2	
Construction and Transport Materials Production		7	3	
Metals Refining and Finishing[b]	13	9	14	state share in 2 foreign

Source: Côte d'Ivoire Ministère du Plan et de l'Industrie. *Répertoire des industries.*

Notes: a. Includes rubber refining (The huge plantations used to supply these firms are run by Ivoirien-owned companies.)

b. Includes electronics production: two foreign, two Ivoirien, and two foreign with Ivoirien presence.

Table 5.8: Sector of Participation of Ivoirien-Owned Firms, 1990

Ivoirien Ownership		Sector of Participation: Manufacturing	Trade	Services	Mixed
10–19%	Number	8	3	3	0
	Sector Share	14%	12%	15%	0%
	Share/Total	7%	3%	3%	0%
20–29%	Number	11	9	4	0
	Sector Share	19%	35%	20%	0%
	Share/Total	10%	8%	4%	0%
30–39%	Number	4	1	4	4
	Sector Share	7%	4%	20%	57%
	Share/Total	4%	1%	4%	4%
40–49%	Number	4	0	0	0
	Sector Share	7%	0%	0%	0%
	Share/Total	4%	0%	0%	0%
50% and over	Number	30	13	9	3
	Sector Share	53%	50%	45%	43%
	Share/Total	27%	12%	8%	3%
Totals		57	26	20	7
		52%	24%	18%	6%
Average Ivoirien Share		53.7%	52.6%	47%	46%

Source: Appendix 1
Note: Percentages are rounded, so figures may not add up to 100%.

The general preference of Ivoirien capitalists is reflected at the economy's "commanding heights": agroindustrial operations and other food industries account for almost two-fifths of Côte d'Ivoire's largest Ivoirien-owned companies. Agroindustrial operations in which Ivoiriens own interests are highly likely to be majority-owned by them (see Appendix 1). Thus, not only are Ivoirien capitalists more interested in agroindustry than just about any other subsector of the economy, they are also more aggressive here than they are in any other part of the urban industrial economy. Large Ivoirien manufacturing firms are also involved in consumer goods production and industrial inputs production. With the exception of one firm that produces machinery, these industrial inputs are mainly packaging, containers, and processed inputs. A number of these inputs firms—in which Ivoiriens are more likely than not to be majority owners—produce fairly advanced technology, but only one firm, SEEE-CI, is developing high technology, in this case a solar energy program. An interesting footnote to that is that

SEEE-CI branched out into this activity only after Ivoiriens took majority ownership of it.

#

Ivoirien agroindustry, it was said earlier, helps to keep Ivoirien money at home. In fact this rule applies to Ivoirien capitalism in general. Given the Ivoirien economy's latecomer status, the capital goods subsector is immature and so Ivoirien manufacturing firms generally purchase their production machinery abroad. However, the remainder of their inputs tend to be purchased at home.

There is a positive relation between Ivoirien ownership and use of domestic inputs: in the manufacturing subsector as a whole, 58 percent of material inputs are imported.[34] However, of the Ivoirien-owned manufacturing firms surveyed in Appendix 1, less than half rely on imported inputs. When the firms are majority-owned by Ivoiriens, this figure drops to one-third. Majority foreign-owned firms, on the other hand, are much more strongly inclined to import their inputs.[35] Another important contrast is that while only 16 percent of the economy's total manufactured output is destined for further finishing (the remainder going to consumption),[36] the figure for the Ivoirien-owned firms surveyed in Appendix 1 appears to be significantly higher.[37] Therefore, the culprits of sectoral disarticulation, as the lack of integration into a local economy has been called,[38] are not Ivoirien firms but the majority-owned foreign ones.

The importance of linkages is that a firm that is well integrated into the local economy will "drag along" that economy as it expands, by increasing demand for locally-produced goods, and often by introducing the firms to which it is connected to new technologies. Multinationals, by contrast, frequently import most or in extreme cases all their inputs, and thus their expansion produces few ripple effects in the local economy; indeed, if they have raised their investment capital locally, they can inflict a net drain on the economy. Therefore, because Ivoirien capital is more closely integrated into the Ivoirien economy, it constitutes more of an engine of growth (relative to its size) than does foreign capital.

The weakness of Ivoirien capital in the capital goods sector need not represent a pernicious foreign domination of the economy. Though some might be tempted to say that Ivoirien capitalism is ultimately dependent on foreign capitalism for its well-being, since it relies on imported capital goods, the argument is a weak one. Such a relationship is inevitable and reflects cooperation more than domination. Especially for a latecomer to capitalism like Côte d'Ivoire, the creation of a large-scale capital goods sector is expensive.[39] In the First World, capital goods industries developed alongside the industries they were supplying, whereas in the Third World a sudden and dramatic technological leap must take place, one that requires a huge investment in

technological and intellectual capacities. Paul Bairoch suggests that the ratio of modern day start-up costs in capital goods production to those of the nineteenth century is two hundred fifty to one; as industry has grown in scale, the costs of building a state-of-the-art machinery factory have escalated beyond the resources of most of the world's new investors, and established companies now have the market largely to themselves.[40]

However, this oligopoly does not come without a price. Luc Soete argues that the costs to an innovating country of "staying ahead of the game" are so great that it can be better to be a technology buyer than a technology producer. He points out that Germany and Japan run large technology deficits during times of high growth, whereas the United States and the United Kingdom run large surpluses during sluggish periods.[41]

The fact is that it is often illogical both for a company and for a country to invest large sums of money developing new technology when it already exists and is available at a lower price than one would pay to develop it anew. For example, a prospective investor in Côte d'Ivoire's new SIALIM factory (which produces sweetened condensed milk) boasted that the plant was as advanced as any in the world, using the newest technology available—technology produced by the British firm which owns a share of the corporation. When asked what the possibilities were of substituting locally produced technology at some point in the future, he replied that there was little such likelihood: in a country of 10 million, with little in the way of prospective neighboring buyers, there simply was not the market to justify what would be a hugely expensive project. Attempting to duplicate the technology would be far costlier than buying what was readily available.[42] In sum, the dearth of an Ivoirien capital goods sector does not in itself represent a shortcoming on the part of Ivoirien capitalism.

Instead, the dynamism of Ivoirien capital is revealed by the fact that it does not hide behind tariff barriers to produce low-quality goods for the domestic market, leaving the more lucrative export industries—which also bring money into the national economy—in foreign hands. Ivoirien capital produces both for the home market and for foreign markets. Ivoirien strength in agroindustry, which exports most of its output and was the country's key growth industry in the 1970s, testifies to Ivoirien capital's increasing orientation towards exports. At present, the Ivoirien-owned manufacturing firms surveyed in Appendix 1 export 41 percent of their output.

Almost two-thirds of these firms list other African countries, very often neighboring ones, as their primary export markets, followed in descending order by Europe, the United States, and other markets; France, surprisingly, does not figure very strongly as a customer. This orientation toward African markets differs from that of the economy as a whole, for a majority of the economy's exports go to Europe, and especially to France. It also differs from that of the manufacturing sector as a whole, as Ivoirien-owned firms are

apparently more likely than other firms to export to neighboring African countries.[43]

Some see this as a sign of weakness, arguing that Third World markets simply lack the scale needed to provide substantial revenue to Third World exporters.[44] However, it is just as likely a sign of innovativeness on the part of Ivoirien capitalists. These markets are relatively new and less exploited than those of Western Europe, and offer greater prospects for penetration. Moreover, the success of marketing efforts to neighboring African countries almost certainly shows that Ivoirien firms are succeeding at producing goods that are more appropriate to Third World demand (itself evidence of innovation). Finally, the links to African markets also reflect a certain pan-African mentality on the part of Ivoirien entrepreneurs, who see their place in the international economy as being not so much an appendage to First World capitalism as a center for West African capitalism.

Another way in which Ivoirien capitalism helps to keep money at home is in its management of technology. Although it imports its production machinery, Ivoirien capitalists prefer to rely on local administrative and technical expertise, which is not only far less costly than imported personnel, but often more sensitive to local demand and supply conditions. Technology adaptation is the process whereby technology is altered to make it suitable to local conditions (e.g., by making use of local, rather than imported, inputs). Technology assimilation refers to the learning of technology management by indigenous personnel; it is manifested in such things as the use of local, rather than imported, technical experts and managers.

Africa and Côte d'Ivoire are dotted with huge factories using state-of-the art production technology but operating at a proportion of production capacity that is so low that they are losing money. Some of these technologies have been designed to use the sorts of inputs produced in Europe or North America; once they get to Africa, it turns out the local inputs are inappropriate, and it becomes necessary to import the inputs from Europe. This raises the bill for operating the factory, typically driving it into the red, frequently into bankruptcy.

To make matters worse, imported advisors or administrators are very expensive. Because of the unappealing stereotypes of African living which abound in Western societies, firms have to pay high salaries and offer a long list of generous benefits in order to attract Westerners to most Third World countries. This raises a firm's wage bill and thus reduces its profit margin. The problem is that once one has got into a cycle of using foreign machinery managed by foreign experts, it becomes difficult to break out and revolutionize production.

Finally, the use of imported management personnel reduces the likelihood of Africans assimilating imported production technology. If, on the other hand, firms are run by Ivoiriens, they will be better positioned to

take advantage of learning by doing, such that they improve the prospects of altering production technology to make it more suitable to local conditions.

Necessity has compelled Ivoirien-owned firms to avoid importing foreigners to work in their offices or factories. Some Ivoirien-owned firms have been particularly effective at downsizing in order to cope with the 1980s recession, and they cannot now afford the immense cost of importing technical expertise from abroad. Unlike their foreign rivals, they have no head offices in Europe or North America that can subsidize them through lean times in the hopes that the strategy of employing expatriates will pay off in the long run.

Foreign firms, on the other hand, have always preferred to hire their own when it comes to high-level positions and technical expertise. In the mid-1970s enterprises owned by foreigners imported almost half of their service inputs. At this time Ivoirien corporations had more money at their disposal and were newer, so they were more inclined to hire foreign employees to staff their operations than they were a decade or two later; even then, however, Ivoirien-owned corporations purchased only 6.1 percent of their service inputs from abroad.[45] In 1988, while Ivoiriens constituted only 51 percent of the senior personnel in industry,[46] they constituted over 80 percent of the senior personnel in those firms majority-owned by Ivoiriens (see Table 5–2).[47] When they are fairly mobile and have limited fixed capital investments at stake, foreign corporations seem more likely to uproot than to switch to African administration. In addition, as was noted above, foreign firms are more likely to use imported inputs than are Ivoirien ones.

With this general rule of thumb in mind—that Ivoiriens hire local talent and buy local inputs while foreign corporations rely on imported talent and inputs—it is interesting to observe which industries have performed the most poorly in the tasks of technology adaptation and assimilation. Lynn Mytelka's study of the Ivoirien textiles industry provides a textbook example of the damaging effects of poor technology adaptation and assimilation. Using foreign talent that has driven up the wage bill, Ivoirien textiles companies purchased machinery that is only profitable at huge levels of ouptut. Moreover, they relied on imported inputs, not the locally grown variety of cotton. Not surprisingly, they have failed to meet the standard of the new Southeast Asian competition, and the industry has descended into crisis. Similar findings were made in the case of the wood industry.[48]

Both of these industries are dominated by foreign capital. Ivoiriens are minority shareholders in the firms in Professor Mytelka's study, rarely owning more than 15 percent of the capital. All of these firms are either foreign-run or jointly run with some Ivoirien administrators, but with foreigners occupying the positions related to technology use. It may point to a repetition of what happened to the settlers in the colonial period: though they initiated the new industry, the African planters eventually surpassed

them in quality. Today, at least while they are in Côte d'Ivoire, Ivoiriens seem to be better businesspeople than are the foreigners.

Furthermore, there is evidence that Ivoirien capital is more efficient than its foreign counterpart. If one constructs a capital-output ratio by measuring firms' reported capital against their volume of business, Ivoirien capital (taken as a whole) shows a capital-output ratio of roughly one to twelve (that is, for every one CFAF in a firm's capital there is an output of 12 CFAF), while that for foreign capital is only one to nine. (State capital, incidentally, is a mere one to three.)[49] Though the data are not conclusive, they give reason to believe that Ivoirien entrepreneurs show more flexibility in their use of technology.

Professor Mytelka foresees a bleak future for the industries she studies, and generalizes her findings to apply to the industrial economy. In fact she is only partially correct: these industries face a bleak future and so far their administrators have not shown that they know how to break out of the logjam they are in. But Ivoirien-owned corporations, run by Ivoiriens, continue to develop new products and show respectable profit figures. A wave of bankruptcies has swept Abidjan in recent years, but the most prominent of these have been state enterprises whose managements had sunk into mediocrity during the 1970s. Meanwhile, foreign capitalists are divesting when they can, finding it difficult to make a profit. The experiences of the state and foreign capitalists have often been generalized to the economy as a whole, but Ivoirien capitalism, which is less studied by foreign observers, is alive and well.

#

Indeed, Ivoirien capitalism is alive and well, thriving and dynamic. One can almost be tempted to adopt the language of dependency theory and say that Ivoirien capitalism is beating back the frontiers of foreign penetration of the economy, and gradually turning the Ivoirien economy into a national one oriented towards domestic needs.

This view is misleading. Côte d'Ivoire's economy is not a battleground between domestic and foreign capitalism. Ivoirien capitalism has existed for several decades and has been gradually penetrating more and more of the economy. One of its features has been a receptiveness to foreign capital as a means to open up and expand the capitalist economy, but Ivoirien capitalists never sacrificed control of the state in this process nor have they struggled to resist foreign domination. Rather than see Ivoirien capital as dependent on foreign capital, it is more fruitful to see the two as interdependent, for each has benefited from the other's growth in a sort of symbiotic relationship.[50]

The relationship between foreign and Ivoirien capital has been cooperative as much as it has been conflictual; whatever tensions exist between an Ivoirien enterprise and a foreign one are those which inhere in

competitive capitalism. Rapid expansion of the economy enabled Ivoirien capital to grow in step, and since foreign capital helped to speed up this process of economic growth it presented a logical ally to domestic capital. Ivoirien capitalists have been more dynamic than foreign capitalists, but they are not trying to force the latter out of the country since this eventuality would slow down the economy and retard the growth of Ivoirien capitalism. Ivoirien capitalism would be a loser, especially in cases of firms owned jointly with foreign interests.[51]

Still, the foreign share of Côte d'Ivoire's industrial capital has been declining in recent years, whereas domestic capital's share has been increasing. This trend will probably continue well into the future, but it is wrong to write off foreign capital. It is still crucial to the well-being of Ivoirien capitalism, and accounts for more of the country's secondary and tertiary assets than does Ivoirien capital (the biggest stockholder being the state). But capitalism in Côte d'Ivoire is clearly Ivoirien, and not merely a foreign branch of European capitalism. The growth in Ivoirien capital's share of the industrial economy, and capitalists' search for new markets in Africa, will give Ivoirien capitalism more and more of an African orientation in coming years. So while Ivoirien capitalism emerged from foreign capitalism, it is anything but a carbon copy of it.

NOTES

1. For details see Bastiaan A. den Tuinder, *Ivory Coast: The Challenge of Success* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, for the World Bank, 1978), pp. 338–339 in combination with pp. 342–343.
2. Henrik Secher Marcussen and Jens Erik Torp, *The Internationalization of Capital: Prospects for the Third World* (London: Zed Press, 1982), p. 75.
3. Roger C. Riddell, "Côte d'Ivoire," in *Manufacturing Africa: Performance and Prospects of Seven Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa*, edited by Roger C. Riddell (London: James Currey and Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 1990), p. 152.
4. Throughout this chapter, the terms "industry" and "industrial capital" will refer not only to manufacturing, but to trade and services as well. Manufacturing activity will be identified separately as such, or be referred to as secondary industry.
5. Claude de Miras, "De la bourgeoisie d'Etat à l'avènement d'un milieu d'entrepreneurs ivoiriens?" in *Entreprises et entrepreneurs en Afrique*, vol. 2, edited by Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch and Alain Forest (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1983), p. 202; official reports support Miras's contention.
6. Didier Kouadio Koffi, *La création des entreprises privées par les nationaux en Côte d'Ivoire* (Abidjan: CEDA, 1983), pp. 45–47.
7. Jean Chevassu and Alain Valette, *Les industriels de la Côte d'Ivoire: qui et pourquoi?* (Abidjan: ORSTOM, Centre Petit-Bassam, 1975; Série sciences humaines), p. 15.
8. Miras, "De la bourgeoisie d'Etat," pp. 195, 189n.
9. *L'industrie ivoirienne* (Special no. of *Fraternité Matin*, July 1978); see

also *Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens* (Moreux), April 9, 1976, p. 953, and May 19, 1978, p. 1320; Marcussen and Torp, *The Internationalization of Capital*, p. 101; Chevassu and Valette, *Les industriels de la Côte d'Ivoire*, p. 5, Table 1; *L'Economie ivoirienne* (Paris: La documentation africaine [EDIAFRIC], 1982), 10th ed., pp. 190–191.

10. The actual figures for the expansion in capital assets (in millions of CFAF) were as follows:

	Total Industrial Capital	Secondary Capital
1975	12,944	4,400
1976	—	6,900
1977	18,185	10,400
1978	22,910	11,000
1979	30,550	14,900
1980	33,678	19,700

Source: *L'Economie ivoirienne*, 1982, pp. 57, 117.

11. Koffi, *La Création des entreprises privées*, pp. 76–77.
12. *Report on Business*, July 1988, p. 83.
13. World Bank, *World Development Report 1989*, pp. 166–167.
14. Chevassu and Valette, *Les industriels de la Côte d'Ivoire*, p. 15.
15. See figures cited in *L'Economie ivoirienne*, 1982, pp. 57, 117.
16. Of the 110 firms in the survey, data on volume of business were available for 63. Total capital assets for these firms totaled 72,212 million CFAF, of which Ivoirien capital accounted for 26,586 million CFAF (36.8 percent) and foreign capital for 36,063 million CFAF (50 percent), the remainder being held by the state, with a small proportion (1 percent) unaccounted for or held by others (e.g., foreign development agencies). Meanwhile, of a total output of 675,156 million CFAF, Ivoiriens accounted for 315,046 million CFAF (46.6 percent), while foreigners accounted for 329,288 million CFAF (48.8 percent). On volumes of output see Côte d'Ivoire, Ministère du Plan et de l'industrie, *Répertoire des industries et activités de Côte d'Ivoire* (Abidjan: 1990). While the survey group is rather small, because of the size of the firms involved it is probably a fairly representative sample of the modern economy.
17. In the late 1970s, world prices for coffee and cocoa—Côte d'Ivoire's two main export commodities—plummeted. The fall in revenue was exacerbated by a drought in the country. By borrowing money to sustain public expenditure, the Ivoirien government was able to mitigate the effects of the recession somewhat. Modest growth resumed in 1985, but then prices tumbled again, and the government was no longer able to borrow to meet its costs, leading to deep cuts in both public expenditure and the producer prices for coffee and cocoa. This intensified the recession, which became most severe after 1989.
18. *Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens*, May 5, 1989, p. 1215. French investors, by contrast, created only 4 percent of the total.
19. Chevassu and Valette, *Les industriels de la Côte d'Ivoire*, p. 15.
20. Lynn Krieger Mytelka, "Foreign Business and Economic Development," in *The Political Economy of Ivory Coast*, edited by I. William Zartman and Christopher Delgado (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 159–161.
21. See Samir Amin, *Le Développement du capitalisme en Côte d'Ivoire* (Paris:

Editions de Minuit, 1967), pp. 226–234, and Samir Amin, *Neo-Colonialism in West Africa* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p. 54.

22. See, for example, Marie-Claude Guerrini, "Le rôle du tertiaire supérieur dans la domination de l'économie ivoirienne," *Tiers-Monde* 16 (1975): 125–126.

23. Amin, *Le Développement du capitalisme en Côte d'Ivoire*, pp. 186–195.

24. Earlier research tends to confirm that Ivoirization of administration follows Ivoirization of assets (though there is some question as to exactly why this should happen). See, for example, Giorgio Barba Navaretti, *Joint Ventures and Autonomous Industrial Development: The Magic Medicine? The Case of the Ivory Coast* (Oxford: Ld'A-QEH Development Studies Working Paper no. 25, 1990).

25. Guy A. Camara, Interview, March 15, 1990 (Abidjan).

26. Côte d'Ivoire, Ministère du Plan et de l'Industrie, *Répertoire des industries.*

27. Koffi, *La Création des entreprises privées*, p. 54.

28. Christine Kerdellant, "Pourquoi les français s'en vont," *Jeune Afrique Plus*, Jan.–Feb. 1990: 91.

29. Chevassu and Valette, *Les Industriels de la Côte d'Ivoire*, p. 22.

30. Ibid., p. 17.

31. Ibid., p. 5, Table 2.

32. Ibid.

33. *L'Economie ivoirienne*, p. 118.

34. Riddell, "Côte d'Ivoire," p. 161.

35. Jean Chevassu and Alain Valette, *Les Relations intermédiaires dans le secteur industriel ivoirien* (Abidjan: ORSTOM, Centre Petit-Bassam, 1975 [Série études industrielles]), Table 6.

36. Riddell, "Côte d'Ivoire," p. 162.

37. Incomplete data make it impossible to provide an accurate figure, but it appears to be at least 25 percent.

38. See Alain de Janvry, *The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), chapter 1.

39. The development of new capital goods can be economically sensible when what is needed is technology for small units of production; indeed, in such cases, appropriate technology might not be available from First World suppliers. But many of the Ivoirien-owned firms surveyed in Appendix 1 are not in the market for such technologies, as they are involved in large-scale production.

40. Chevassu and Valette, *Les Relations intermédiaires*, p. 28.

41. See Soete, "Technological Dependency: A Critical View," in *Dependency Theory: A Critical Reassessment*, edited by Dudley Seers (London: Frances Pinter, 1981).

42. Jacques Huot, Interview, Feb. 8, 1990 (Abidjan).

43. In the manufacturing sector as a whole, only 42 percent of exports go to African counties, a figure which is apparently lower than that for the companies in Appendix 1. See Riddell, "Côte d'Ivoire," p. 160.

44. See, for example, Riddell, "Côte d'Ivoire," pp. 160–161.

45. Chevassu and Valette, *Les Relations intermédiaires*, Table 6.

46. Riddell, "Côte d'Ivoire," p. 164.

47. Cf. Navaretti, *Joint Ventures and Autonomous Industrial Development.*

48. Lynn Krieger Mytelka, "The Limits of Export-Led Development: the Ivory Coast's Experience with Manufactures," in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., *The Antinomies of Interdependence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983);

see also "Investissement étranger direct et choix technologique dans les industries ivoiriennes du textile et du bois," *Revue canadienne d'études du développement* 4 no. 1 (1983): 95–123. Cf. Bonnie Campbell, "Neocolonialism, Economic Dependence and Political Change: A Case Study of Cotton and Textile Production in the Ivory Coast 1960 to 1970," *Review of African Political Economy* 2 (1975): 36–53.

49. These calculations were based on the data presented in note 16. As such they deal with the class as a whole (based—one must add—on a sample thereof) and do not examine productivity at the firm level. They are not measurements of total factor productivity, an uncertain exercise at the best of times, especially in a Third World context. Thus, one must be wary of drawing too broad a conclusion from such findings. Nonetheless, they do run contrary to what is often expected (see, for instance, Howard Pack, *Productivity, Technology, and Industrial Development* [New York: Oxford University Press, for the World Bank, 1987]) and are thus very revealing.

50. Cf. Robin Murray, "The Internationalization of Capital and the Nation State," in *International Firms and Modern Imperialism*, edited by H. Radice (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975).

51. Miras, "De la bourgeoisie d'Etat," pp. 203–204; cf. Bjorn Beckman, "Imperialism and the 'National Bourgeoisie,'" *Review of African Political Economy* 22 (1981): 5–19, and also "Whose State? State and Capitalist Development in Nigeria," *Review of African Political Economy* 23 (1982): 37–51. Beckman points to the interests that foreign and domestic capital share, repudiating the view that they are somehow in conflict with one another.

6

The Modern Ivoirien Bourgeoisie

As Ivoirien capital expanded, so too did the Ivoirien bourgeoisie. New entrants swelled the ranks of the class, threatening to undermine the cohesion built up by the class during its period of colonial organization. On its own, the PDCI-RDA soon became insufficient to organize the country's African capitalists. The response was to create new organizations to maintain the class's cohesion and to integrate the class through extensive networks of kinship and professional linkages. The outcome is a level of organization that would be the envy of any ruling class.

The growth in numbers of entrepreneurs also placed new demands on the supply of capital. Given the banking sector's domination by foreign interests, Ivoirien entrepreneurs generally could not look to traditional sources for investment capital. In addition to their reliance on the state, they had to develop different means of capital mobilization. Their reponses frequently revealed the resourcefulness of Ivoirien entrepreneurs.

#

Ivoirien capitalism's boom since the end of the 1960s appears most remarkable when one recalls that there were only a few thousand planters at the end of the 1950s. Even taking into account the massive increases in cash crop production on their plantations in the first decade and a half of independence and the returns their urban investments were by then generating, it seems unlikely that they could have mobilized the investment capital necessary to such activity.

The truth is that it was not the original planter capitalists who were behind most of this expansion. They were still active and moving increasingly into the urban sector, but from about 1968 onward there was a rush of new entrants into the Ivoirien capitalist milieu. Few of these had agrarian roots, so the Ivoirien bourgeoisie entered a further stage of transformation into a class of urban entrepreneurs.

A connection between the state and capitalists pervaded this whole process in two ways. First, the state provided private investors with much of the investment capital they needed. Second, it was state employees, past and present, who were the backbone of this new class of capitalists. At first they were merely investors or shareholders; later they became full-time businesspeople. In this way the Ivoirien state helped to build up Ivoirien capitalism and then put it into private hands. What many people considered the absence of Ivoirien capitalism due to the dominant role of the state was merely a transitional phenomenon.

In the early 1970s the new investors were typically state employees, with civil servants outnumbering employees of state corporations. Usually what happened is that a private businessperson with limited capital would approach them with an idea; if they liked it, they would provide the entrepreneur with the capital necessary to begin the operation. Thus they often bought a majority of the new enterprise but did not actually involve themselves in it. Owner-operators—entrepreneurs who established businesses using their own money—were a smaller if rapidly growing group. Their numbers were yet limited because few of them were rich enough to set up industrial operations all on their own.

These state investors, however, were not just rich government employees with a few francs to spare and an eye on their pensions. Their feet were in two camps, for a good deal of their investment money came not from their public salaries but from the revenues on other investments they had made earlier. They were thus already a fairly sophisticated group of investors, not people who threw money at any new idea simply to fulfil family obligations. Indeed, in the large enterprises the investors generally did not have any particular family link to the entrepreneurs, as was the tendency in smaller, artisanal businesses.[1]

When the Ivoirien government opened a stock exchange in Abidjan in the mid-1970s, the goal of which was to encourage foreign companies to sell shares to Ivoiriens, once again it was public officials and employees who came forth to invest, together accounting for 60 percent of the buyers. A fifth of the buyers were private businesspeople, a figure slightly below that at the turn of the decade when roughly a third of the investors in new operations had been private businesspeople. Already within a couple of years of the exchange's opening, 6,000 Ivoiriens had purchased shares.[2]

The increase in the numbers of these urban investors caused the role of the planters in Ivoirien capitalism to decline in significance. By the early 1970s planters accounted for only 10 percent of the investment in new industrial corporations; a few years later, they bought only 5 percent of the shares being sold on the Abidjan stock exchange. When they did invest, they continued to prefer the service sector, not the newly blossoming industrial one into which their younger compatriots were buying.[3] By this time, of

course, most of the original planter capitalists had already transformed themselves into urban capitalists (even if they retained their plantations), and as a rule few urban capitalists make the journey back into agriculture. It is thus increasingly uncommon today to find major businessmen who also have interests in farming.

The number of capitalists also increased because the second generation came "on stream." The children—which in the African context includes nieces, nephews and other younger relatives who might even be adopted—of businesspeople tend themselves to go into business. Some of the country's leading business families (listed in Table 6.1) have built up modest empires by passing interests on to their progeny; in this regard, among the most prolific families figure the Coulibalys, Houphouët-Boignys, Anomas, Dioulos, Fofanas, and Kacous, though they are by no means exceptional.

The children of businesspeople tend also to be mainly interested only in their parents' urban interests, thereby further weakening the bond which once existed between plantation agriculture and Ivoirien capitalism. In addition, since the late 1970s and early 1980s university graduates who found their employment prospects in the public sector limited began turning to business as a way of earning their income. Where once such people had virtual guarantees of state employment, now they were on their own. The effect of this was that owner-operators began to replace simple investors in the Ivoirien bourgeoisie.

Because of this influx of young investors, by 1980 over half of Côte d'Ivoire's entrepreneurs—most of whom were male—were under the age of 30; barely a fifth were over the age of 40.[4] This highlights the fact that the dynamism and importance of Ivoirien capitalism, as measured by the number of Ivoirien entrepreneurs, could not have been readily apparent in the mid-1960s, when the rather disparaging view of Ivoirien capitalism was first formed.

Where were these entrepreneurs finding all this investment capital? The sums needed to stimulate industrial development were huge, particularly if one recalls the leaps in Ivoirien capital assets during the 1970s (see Chapter 5). Plantation earnings and public salaries generated a part of this capital, but these sources accounted for only a portion of the investment capital being mobilized during the postcolonial period. Families and friends have always presented some entrepreneurs with ready sources of investment capital. Share profits and returns on urban investments added to these sums.

Some have doubted that Ivoirien entrepreneurs would in fact reinvest their profits productively, but while many Ivoirien investors and businesspeople have spent their profits wastefully on such things as luxury purchases,[5] the performance of the class as a whole has not been as bad as has sometimes been supposed. After all, one does well to recall that every capitalist economy produces its share of "unproductive" businesspeople,

those who more often than not go out of business, so the presence of a number of such businesspeople in Côte d'Ivoire is not out of the ordinary. Nevertheless, there has always been a substantial core of Ivoirien capitalists who reinvested their profits productively, and younger Ivoirien businesspeople seem even more scornful of wasteful spending than their older counterparts.

To illustrate this propensity to invest rather than to spend: in the dozen years after 1973, the 74 largest firms in which Ivoiriens owned shares reinvested almost 21 billion CFAF in accumulated profits.[6] What is more remarkable, though, is that of the firms surveyed, those in which Ivoiriens owned majority shares accounted for a disproportionate amount of the reinvested profits.[7] In fact, profit reinvestment was the principal manner by which majority Ivoirien-owned firms expanded their capital, whereas majority foreign-owned firms were more likely to raise new capital by selling new shares than by reinvesting profits. One can draw one of two conclusions from these findings: either majority Ivoirien-owned firms were generating the bigger profits (in relative terms), or what is more likely, foreign-dominated firms remitted more of their profits in the form of dividends than did Ivoirien-dominated ones, which preferred to reinvest the money. Either way, Ivoirien entrepreneurs were using their profits to build up their capital assets.

Still, even taking into account the returns on investments, more money had to be found to produce Ivoirien capitalism's boom. In the early years after independence, external borrowing financed investment, but by 1974 internal borrowing supplied 98.2 percent of the country's investment capital. Private banks, however, provided a mere 1.6 percent of this total (though corporations with some foreign ownership could sometimes turn to foreign banks for loans).[8]

However, private banks did provide significant sums of capital for entrepreneurs who ventured into the wood industry or set up bakeries during the early 1970s.[9] This was about the deepest the country's few dozen banks ever involved themselves in Ivoirien capitalism. Most private banks are majority-owned by foreigners, and prefer to invest only in the established foreign companies. Blaise Kouadio Tanoh, the creator and director-general of SIALIM, once grumbled that "not a centime" of capital was provided by the banks for his firm's start-up costs of almost 2 billion CFAF.[10]

Ivoiriens creating new enterprises have thus always had to turn elsewhere for money, particularly in the 1980s. This has led to the creation of companies like La Financière, a mutual fund established by a number of Ivoirien businessmen precisely for the purpose of circumventing this obstacle.[11] Family sources also have taken up some of the role banks normally play in capitalist development, since the existence of a layer of wealthy capitalists has given certain people opportunities to mobilize investment capital.

However, the main player to have filled the space vacated by the banks has been the state. Especially in the first two decades of independence huge amounts of capital came into the hands of the state by way of taxation, contributions to the national employment insurance fund (the Caisse Nationale de Prévoyance Sociale, which provided workers with certain health insurance benefits) and most importantly, surpluses extracted from the primary sector by CAISTAB, the country's marketing board. During the best years of the 1970s boom, surpluses of over 120 billion CFAF—at the time about U.S.$ 1 billion—were flowing into CAISTAB's coffers, but most of this was not being reinvested in the agricultural sector. Instead, the government used this money to provide investment capital to urban secondary operations.[12] Ivoirien capitalists benefited considerably from this: among the Ivoirien-owned firms surveyed in Appendix 1 there was a very strong tendency to have at one time or another borrowed from state agencies or banks. Official international agencies such as USAID, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the European Investment Bank have also at times contributed loans to Ivoirien investment, though only to larger corporations.

Several billion CFAF have been raised over the years on the Abidjan stock exchange, over 2 billion CFAF in 1977 alone, its second year of operation.[13] Contrary to some stereotypes, Third World stock exchanges can be very successful at mobilizing capital: at the end of the 1980s, for example, the world's highest-performing exchanges were located in Third World countries.[14] In some respects, however, the contribution of the Abidjan stock exchange to the development of Ivoirien capitalism has been limited. Undoubtedly Ivoirien businesspeople who have made shrewd investments earn good returns that they can use to bankroll their own enterprises. However, all of the capital raised on the exchange has gone into the accounts of foreign firms. The Ivoirien government created the exchange with the intention of promoting the Ivoirization of capital, and a couple dozen corporations have stepped forward to sell shares (and occasionally bonds), but none has shown much interest in putting majority control into the hands of Ivoiriens.[15] Meanwhile, Ivoirien-owned firms continue to sell large blocks of shares without the intervention of the stock exchange.

CLASS-IN-ITSELF TO CLASS-FOR-ITSELF: THE ORGANIZATION OF THE IVOIRIEN BOURGEOISIE

The heavy influx of all these new entrants into the Ivoirien capitalist class might well be expected to have had a destabilizing impact on it. By the end of the colonial period, and through much of the 1960s, the Ivoirien

bourgeoisie was a cozy coterie of likeminded people, many of whom knew one another. In the course of the 1970s and 1980s, the arrival of a new generation of capitalists who oftentimes carried with them different attitudes to business management might have threatened to undermine the old bourgeoisie's political organizations. Moreover, the increase in the class's size made the maintenance of its internal cohesion a bigger challenge.

However, the Ivoirien bourgeoisie rose to the challenge by integrating these newcomers into its ranks rather than allowing them to disperse freely in a manner that might begin to atomize the class, thereby opening up opportunities for rival classes to find new recruits. It did this in three ways. First, and most obvious, it opened the doors of its established organizations and political institutions to the newcomers, rather than trying to retain a stranglehold on power and maintain its clique. Second, it cultivated professional and kinship ties with these people, marrying off sons and daughters in order to build strategic alliances. Third, given the class's increasing size and the difficulty of keeping it organized entirely under the aegis of the PDCI-RDA, it expanded the number of organizations that serve to rally the capitalists together, instead of letting them wander about as individual businesspeople who would see themselves as being in constant conflict with one another.

Today, the upper ranks of the PDCI-RDA and the state are not reserved to the original members of the planter bourgeoisie. The ruling elite has displayed considerable accommodation in this regard, and prominent capitalists who have come onto the scene only since 1960, men like Paul Akoto Yao, Victor Amagou, Denis Bra Kanon, François Dacoury-Tabley, Emmanuel Dioulo, and Eugène Anvo Guetat, to name but a few, have been brought into the upper ranks of both the party and the state. Therefore, in spite of the bourgeoisie's tenacious clinging to power, the membership of the ruling elite has been quite fluid, allowing for a considerable flow backwards and forwards within the class.

The integration of new members and the maintenance of group cohesion by way of professional and kinship linkages has been a method used extensively by the Ivoirien bourgeoisie all through its history.[16] The effect is that the governing and corporate elites take on the appearance of a series of interconnected family compacts. One can also see these family networks as a series of pyramids, at the top of which stand the country's most powerful families, both in economic and political terms.

There are several dozen families who top the list of the country's most powerful business families; their extensive industrial holdings place them among the country's wealthiest. The term "business family" is actually quite appropriate since in many, possibly most, of them not only one individual is a businessperson; rather, several family members are involved in different branches of the family's business interests.

At the top of the country's corporate elite, then, one would find the following families: those of Frédéric Ablé, Lambert Aka, Paul Akoto Yao, Victor Amagou, Jean-Baptiste Améthier, Léon Amon, Eugène Anvo Guetat, Koffi Aoussou, Arsène Assouan Usher, Jean-Baptiste Babo Zobo, Pierre Billon, Germain Coffi Gadeau, Lanciné Cisse, Lamine Fadiga, Alcide Kacou, Lambert Konan Kouassi, Marcel Zadi Kessi, Lancina Konate, Louis Kouassi Kouadio, Pierre Koffi N'Guessan, Kouamé Théodore Quashie, Madeleine Tchicaya, Madatali Sidi, the Aka Anghui family, the Amon Tanoh family, the Anomas, the Bra Kanons, the Brous, Coulibalys (of Gon, or Gbon, Coulibaly), Dadiés, Delafosses, Dioulos, Diabatés, Djibos, Fofanas, Donwahis, Ekras, Kodja Konans, Konés (of Dossongui Koné), Laubhouets, Mockeys, Zinzous, Diallos, and, of course, the Houphouët-Boignys (see Table 6.1). They make up the elite of the country's corporate elite.

Of all these families, only the Dioulos, Sidis, Zinzous, Diallos, and Zadi Kessis do not have a family member in a senior party or state office (although the Zadi Kessis appear to be on the ascent in the PDCI-RDA). Of the remainder, those who—through one or more family members—occupy or have occupied among the country's most powerful political positions, namely ministerships, mayoralties, or top party offices, include the Akoto Yaos, Aka Anghuis, Amagous, Améthiers, Amons, Amon Tanohs, Anomas, Anvo Guetats, Aoussous, Assouan Ushers, Billons, Bra Kanons, Coffi Gadeaus, Coulibalys, Dadiés, Delafosses, Diabatés, Djibos, Donwahis, Ekras, Fadigas, Kacous, Kodja Konans, Konés, Laubhouets, Mockeys, N'Guessans, and Houphouët-Boignys. Emmanuel Dioulo would have once figured in this list, but a corruption scandal in the early 1980s forced him to flee the country temporarily, and though he maintains his political contacts, he is essentially barred from political office now. At any rate these families' economic and political power place them at the pinnacle of the ruling elite, with the Coulibalys having the most extensive combination of business interests and political offices.

That is only part of the story. The ruling capitalists cement their hold on power not only by trying to attain political office, but by linking themselves with others who do. In this way they can leave office but still keep an ear in the state or the party. More importantly, this seals the bonds that keep the class together. The Zinzous, for instance, who have no family members in positions of political power, are still among the country's most powerful families because they have married one of their sons to a daughter of Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Marcel Zadi Kessi goes further: related to the Donwahi family, he also shares interests in SETAO with Victor Amagou, in SODECI with Aoussou Koffi, and in SADEM with the son of Houphouët-Boigny. Madatali Sidi does the same but on a more modest scale, sharing business interests with the Achy Brou family, a lesser family in the country's political-economic elite.

Table 6.1: Côte d'Ivoire's Leading Capitalist Families

Family	Business Interests
Ablé	real estate, construction materials production, retail trade, clothing manufacturing, other interests
Achy-Brou	packaging production
Aka (Lambert)	agroindustry, sawmills, retail trade, engineering consulting, household productions manufacturing, electrical installation
Akoto Yao	bakeries, real estate, other interests
Aka Anghui	manufacturing of soaps and edible oil products, packaging production, retail trade, sawmill, cosmetics production, industrial engineering, other interests
Amagou	industrial metal production, flour milling, construction and public works, truck and bus production, other interests
Améthier	banking, fish farming, engineering consulting, other interests
Amon	tobacco production, insurance, air conditioning, industrial electrical installation
Amon Tanoh	retail trade, other interests
Anoma	fertilizer manufacturing, plantations, other interests
Anvo Guetat	transportation, sawmill, plantations, other interests
Aoussou	water provision, other interests
Assouan Usher	retail trade, sawmill
Babo Zobo	insurance
Billon	export trade, agroindustry, packaging production, other interests
Boni	real estate, plantations
Bra Kanon	diverse interests, relatives in banking and packaging production
Brou	bakeries, plantations, other interests
Cisse	transportation, other interests
Coffi Gadeau	wholesale and retail trade, public works, fish importing and freezing
Coulibaly (Gbon)	agroindustry, retail trade, banking, insurance, bakeries, shipping, transportation, other interests
Dacoury-Tabley	retail trade, import trade
Dadié	wood processing, vinyl input manufacturing, manufacturing of metal products
Daubrey	banking
Delafosse	banking, hotels, other interests
Denise	retail trade
Diabaté	agroindustry, other interests
Diallo	retail, wholesale and import-export trade
Dioulo	banking, truck and bus production, agroindustry, other interests
Djibo	textiles manufacturing, insurance, real estate, wholesale trade, other interests
Donwahi	import-export trade, retail trade, agroindustry, computer consulting, other interests
Ekra	agroindustry, construction materials manufacturing, plantations
Fadiga	plastics manufacturing, other manufacturing, transportation, other interests
Fofana	import-export trade, computer consulting, other interests
Houphouët-Boigny	agroindustry, manufacturing of paper goods, water bottling, insurance, retail trade, restaurants, transportation, electronics and telecommunications, other interests
Kacou	manufacturing of metal and electrical goods, construction materials manufacturing, resorts, other interests
Karamoko (Amara)	wholesale trade, other interests

(*continues*)

Table 6.1 (continued)

Kodja Konan	soap and toothpaste manufacturing, trade, plantations, other interests
Konan Kouassi	banking, manufacturing of cotton products, agroindustry, other interests
Konate	banking, other interests
Koné	import-export trade, other interests
Kouassi Kouadio	agroindustry, manufacturing of electrical goods, other interests
Laubhouet	agroindustry, other interests
Mockey	retail trade, private medical clinics
N'Guessan	various industrial interests
Quashie	metals production, other interests
Sidi	steel manufacturing, packaging production, other interests
Tchicaya	agroindustry, manufacturing of soaps and edible oils, other interests
Yacé	real estate
Zadi Kessi	construction and public works, water provision, water bottling, other interests
Zinzou	shipping, other interests

Sources: Teya, *Côte d'Ivoire*, pp. 16–20; *Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens,* Dec. 29, 1972, p. 3871; Jacques Gautrand, "Tanti est arrivé," *Jeune Afrique Economie,* June 1982, 58–59; Centre d'Affaire International, *Annuaire statistique,* pp. 24–26; Adompo Pascal Koki, Interview, Jan. 26, 1990 (Adzopé); Côte d'Ivoire, Office National des Télécommunications, *Annuaire officiel*; Basil Yapi, Interview, Jan. 30, 1990 (Abidjan); Isidore Yapi, Interview, Jan. 30, 1990 (Abidjan); PDCI-RDA, *Annuaire 1985–1990*, pp. 11–180; *Fraternité Hebdo*, 1986, p. 211; Côte d'Ivoire, Ministère du Plan et de l'Industrie, *Répertoire des industries*; Chambre d'Agriculture, Chambre de Commerce, Chambre d'Industrie, *Annuaire*; *Le Grand dictionnaire encyclopédique de la Côte d'Ivoire*; "Côte d'Ivoire: 30 hommes pour gérer la crise," pp. 46–59; Daingui, Interview, May 2, 1990.

Some families have built up an extensive network of kinship and professional linkages, and sometimes both at the same time. The Aka Anghui family, which is involved in a wide range of industrial concerns (Joseph Aka Anghui started out in the early 1960s as a business associate of the Blohorn family, one of the country's original industrialist families), is related to both the Anoma and Brou families, while Hortense Aka Anghui is herself the daughter of Gabriel Dadié (Dadié had been one of the country's first planters, and at one time in the colonial period was reputed to be the country's second-richest African farmer). The Dadiés and Aka Anghuis also share business interests, with Raphaël Dadié working in GIB alongside his brother-in-law, Joseph Aka Anghui. Madeleine Tchicaya is brought into this network by her close working relationship with Joseph Aka Anghui on the administrations of several of the companies in the Blohorn group. So too is Berté Siaka, an early PDCI-RDA leader, who shares interests with the Aka Anghuis in TRITURAF, a company in the Blohorn group.

The Houphouët-Boigny family, whose patriarch created his first plantation in the mid-1920s, and which went on to acquire interests in

agroindustry and other food industries, insurance, retail trade, electronics and telecommunications, transportation, and still other concerns, stands at the center of a large family circle of the political-economic elite. Another daughter of Félix Houphouët-Boigny married into the Amon Tanoh family, which has various business interests, while Lambert Amon Tanoh in turn is brother-in-law to Philippe Yacé, a major real estate owner and developer who is also one of the country's most powerful politicians. Houphouët-Boigny's family is also related to that of his childhood friend, the late Marcel Laubhouet, as it is to the Anoma family (Joseph Anoma began planting at around the same time as Houphouët-Boigny and went on to acquire a number of industrial interests by the time of his death in 1983). The Laubhouets also share interests in JAG with the Houphouët-Boignys, as do Madeleine Tchicaya and Lambert Aka. Houphouët-Boigny's niece married into the family of Amadou Thiam, a real estate developer of lesser rank in the Ivoirien political elite. Lambert Aka, with interests in sawmills, trade, engineering, agroindustry, and other manufacturing firms, and the Zinzou family, which is involved primarily in shipping but also in computers, are also related to Houphouët-Boigny. In addition, the president's "traditional" wife is a sister-in-law of Mathieu Ekra, another prominent member of the country's political-economic elite (Ekra and Houphouët-Boigny are longtime close associates, having worked together in the creation of the PDCI-RDA and cooperated closely in politics ever since).

The components of the Houphouët-Boigny family network continue from there. Koffi Aoussou, who owns a variety of interests, happens to be the nephew of the president, and through the family of the late André Kouadio N'Guessan, who once sat on the administration of a transportation firm, is related in turn to the family of Léon Konan Koffi, former minister of the interior, and to the family of the mayor of Didiévi, Noël N'Goran Koffi, who is also a deputy. In the Aoussou family circle, finally, is found Désiré Boni, an Abidjan businessman of lesser scale. Jean-Baptiste Babo Zobo, who is related to the Bra Kanon family, which has extensive business interests, also sits on the administration of La Sécurité Ivoirienne with Dia Houphouët-Boigny, the president's nephew. Denis Bra Kanon, for his part, has among his relatives the subprefect of Divo (Pierre Emile Gnoléba, who is also related to Babo Zobo through Maurice Seri Gnoléba)—a relationship that brings him close to Félicien Kodja Konan, the mayor of Divo, who also comes from a business family, and to a deputy from Daloa (Etienne Digbeu Tapé). Through the Lorougnon family, Bra Kanon is also linked to the Djédjé family (which includes the ministers of public health and population, and of post and telecommunications) and to Jean-Pierre Kipré, who is a director at BANAFRIQUE.

Emmanuel Dioulo would have at one time been placed in the Houphouët-Boigny network, because of his deepening business ties with

Thérèse Houphouët-Boigny, the president's wife. But his fall from grace led to a break of sorts with Houphouët-Boigny (indeed, some suggest the president had engineered his downfall precisely because Dioulo was getting *too* close to his wife). All in all, the profile of the Houphouët-Boigny family and its system of linkages looks like an African version of a European royal dynasty.

It is not the only such one. The Améthiers and Ekras, longtime political and economic allies who are closely related to one another, have built up a similar if more modest network. The Améthiers, who are involved especially in banking and engineering, and the Ekras, who have extensive interests in agroindustry and construction materials production, are both related to the family of Adiko Niamké, another lesser but significant member of the political-economic elite. Niamké, in turn, comes from the same family as Alcide Kacou, one of the country's leading industrialists. This extended family's business history dates from 1920, when the princes Albéric Kacou Niamké and Alexandre Ayomou Ollô introduced coffee cultivation to Bonoua; 45 years later, Ekra, one of their descendants, introduced pineapple cultivation to Bonoua. Today, Alcide Kacou and Jean-Baptiste Améthier together share the administration of SOCOTEC, while Améthier also works alongside Pierre Koffi N'Guessan, a leading member of the political-economic elite, at SOGB. Through Bernard Dadié, a mutual family member, the Améthiers, Ekras, and Niamkés are all related to the Dadié family, and thereby to the Aka Anghui family. The Améthier-Ekra-Niamké family network is then linked to the Delafosse family by way of Alcide Kacou, who shares interests in the Ivoire Golf Club with the Delafosses. Particularly involved in hotels and banking, being one of the country's oldest political families, the Delafosses are themselves well placed. By marriage, they are related to the Mockey family, which has interests in pharmacies and private clinics. Through the family "doyen," Jean-Claude, they are also related to the Houphouët-Boigny family.

The family of Georges Kassi (which itself has some business interests), one of the founders of the SAA, provides a link among several of the families of the Ivoirien political-economic elite. Through marriage and other relationships, the Kassis bring together the Houphouët-Boigny family (Julienne Kassi is married into the family), the Anoma family, the Dadié family, and the Brou family, as well as the family of Bernard Ehui Koutoua, a deputy. Bernard Ehui Koutoua, one should also note, is related to Lambert Amon Tanoh.

The family circle of Etienne Affot Lattier, who was himself at one time a member of the Economic and Social Council, performs a function similar to that of the Kassi family. Kinship ties to the Lattier family bring together Félix Houphouët-Boigny and Philippe Yacé; added to them are Germain Coffi Gadeau, who has interests in public works and trade, Vincent Akadjé, who is

involved in plastics manufacturing, Auguste Daubrey, who has interests in banking, and Arsène Assouan Usher, who is involved in trade and has interests in a sawmill. With the exception of Vincent Akadjé, all of these people hold senior places in the country's political elite. Added to them, in this extended family, are one-time minister Vincent Tiéko Djédjé and the deputies Grah Bialé, Zobo Gnawa, and Berthe Sawadogo (the last also mayor of Fresco).

A more modest and regionally based family network is that of Charles Donwahi, a powerful politician who has considerable interests in textiles manufacturing, real estate, insurance, and other activities. He has relatives in the PDCI-RDA direction committee (Patrice Guédé Mabo) as well as in the National Assembly (Jules Koré Gobli). The secretary-general of the Soubré section of the PDCI-RDA, Célestin Kosséré Otrou, is also a relative, as is the secretary-general of the Abidjan-Plateau section of the PDCI-RDA, Pierre Kipré. The Soubré region, in effect, appears to be Donwahi's "fiefdom" and power base. Tied into this family circle, in turn, is Marcel Zadi Kessi, the leading industrialist, who is linked by shared interests to the Houphouët-Boigny network.

Perhaps the one family in Côte d'Ivoire which can rival the Houphouët-Boignys in the extent of their political-economic power base is the Coulibalys, who have descended from the northern chief Gbon Coulibaly (some family members spell "Gbon" "Gon"). Gbon Coulibaly, invoking his traditional rights to land and labor, was one of the *ancien régime*'s chiefs who did go on to establish plantations. Since then, his children have gone on to acquire in at least a dozen different firms in all subsectors of the tertiary and secondary economy, not to mention the plethora of more moderate business interests to which they lay claim. Many members of this family also hold leading positions in both the party and the state. In addition they are related to other leading Ivoirien political figures such as Balla Keita, Laurent Dona-Fologo, and Sékou Diaby (the last a senior administrator at the Ministry of Interior Security). Through Seydou Coulibaly, the Coulibalys are also related to Issa Diakité, prefect of the department of Bouaflé, and to the family of the late Sadjo Coulibaly, who was himself at one time a prefect. The family is also closely related to the Koné family, which holds both business interests and some senior political positions; and through Kassam Coulibaly, it is tied to Sounkalo Djibo, one of the country's senior capitalists, who holds central positions of political power. Djibo, in turn, shares interests in CNA, an insurance company, with Léon Amon, and in Prépal with Lamine Fadiga.

The Coulibalys complement their kinship ties with a list of professional links that bring them close to many of the country's leading business and political families. They share interests in SGBCI (a bank) with the Delafosses and Lancina Konaté; prior to his death in 1989, Tiémoko Yadé Coulibaly sat on SGBCI's administration with Jacques-André Delafosse and

Lancina Konaté. Seydou Coulibaly sits on the administration of Ivoire Systèmes with Joseph Anoma; the other administration member is Simplice Zinzou, of the same family that is linked by marriage to the Houphouët-Boigny family. A Coulibaly family member also works at GMA (a flour milling firm) with Kouadio Kouassi, a prominent industrialist who at one time sat on the Economic and Social Council, a government advisory body.

One should also note that there is a long history of cooperation between the Houphouët-Boignys and the Coulibalys. In his early days, Félix Houphouët-Boigny used to travel frequently to Bamako to sell some of the products of his plantations (in particular, cola nuts). He got into the habit of stopping in regularly to visit Gbon Coulibaly, whom he came to refer to as his spiritual father. But it was not just spiritual advice that Houphouët-Boigny came calling for; Chief Coulibaly also provided Houphouët-Boigny with plantation workers.[17] This economic common cause helped to cement a political alliance that has lasted to this day.

When all these networks are placed side by side, what emerges is one large network resulting from linkages among networks. But this large network, illustrated in Figure 6.1, is not restricted to the few dozen families at the pinnacle of economic and political power in Côte d'Ivoire. Third World governing elites are sometimes supposed to be in the hands of a few families, and this assumption has been applied to Côte d'Ivoire,[18] but incorrectly so. Such patterns of linkages permeate all of the capitalist class and extend pyramids from the highest on down through the ranks of capitalists. Martin Lodugnon, for example, a businessman of middling scale who has interests in SICTA, a transportation firm, has a family member who is adjunct to the mayor of Sassandra; this provides him with a bridge to the powerful Auguste Daubrey. He also shares this interest with Lambert Atté Aka, who is related to the prefect of Sinfra. The list of such connections goes on.

In fact the tendency to form professional ties within the corporate elite is found throughout the Ivoirien business community. The membership of the mutual fund La Financière, for example, is composed of directors of some of the country's largest corporations. When the company was established, however, all of these people were already associates, and the creation of the group of 200 was done by way of an informal process of verbal contact.[19]

All this interconnection leads to the creation of a veritable Ivoirien business society or culture. Members of the corporate and political elites are drawn together by society events, like the openings to art exhibits, cocktail parties, company anniversaries, and other such happenings. One can even follow the comings and goings of this society by reading a weekly Abidjan entertainment review called *Le Guido*, which has a society section akin to that seen in Britain's *Tatler*. One finds therein photographs of these occasions, and the names and faces of leading Ivoirien businesspeople and political figures crop up regularly.

Figure 6.1 A Network of Linkages Within the Ivoirien Political-Economic Elite



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In 1960 a small number of business organizations existed in Côte d'Ivoire, most of them legacies of the settlers and traders. Prominent among them were the Chamber of Agriculture and the Chamber of Commerce, founded in 1907, and the Syndicat des Entrepreneurs et des Industriels de Côte d'Ivoire (SEICI), formed in 1934. All three of these organizations were incorporated into the state at the time of independence, the chambers of agriculture and commerce directly and the SEICI indirectly through its connection to the newly formed Chamber of Industry. At the same time, the organizations took on a more Ivoirien representation, and today several of the positions on their boards of directors are occupied by leading members of the country's political-economic elite.

The dearth of business organizations, the fact that those that did exist operated under state patronage, and the satisfaction of many Ivoirien capitalists with organization through the agency of the PDCI-RDA led some observers to conclude that the Ivoirien bourgeoisie was state-dependent and lacked a collective will.[20] In other words, all that Côte d'Ivoire's capitalism consisted of was a lot of individual capitalists, but not a bourgeoisie as such. That argument is now open to challenge. It always failed to take account of the actual activities of the state-connected groups. But more significantly, a large number of new class organizations—many of them autonomous—came into existence as the class expanded during the postcolonial period.

Once taken under the state's wing, the mandate of the Chamber of Commerce was to act as a sort of bridge between member corporations and the government. It thus represented the government to member businesses, but at the same time the government consulted the Chamber with regard to the formulation of economic policy. The Chamber has also assisted the growth of Ivoirien capitalism by running a school to train young Ivoiriens in business management, and by holding its own courses for managers. It provides technical assistance to small entrepreneurs and supervises the operation of a number of professional organizations.[21] In a number of respects, therefore, the Ivoirien Chamber of Commerce has in fact been an instrument of state policy, but these have been policies which have been drafted with the interests of Ivoirien capital in mind. The Chamber is itself supplemented by a number of small chambers of commerce located in cities and towns throughout the country, as well as by several jeunes chambres économiques, which are organizations for young entrepreneurs. Taken together, these have helped to create a conducive environment for Ivoirien business.

In addition to the Chamber of Commerce, the closely connected Chamber of Industry was created by the government in 1965. Like the Chamber of Commerce, it was designed to provided a conduit between the government and capital—both foreign and domestic—and to provide the gov-

ernment with advice regarding economic policy.[22] But the Chamber of Industry has been more than a simple state agency; it has been one of the venues through which Ivoirien capitalists have expressed themselves most vigorously, doing so not in response to government directives but as a result of the changes occurring "from below" in Ivoirien capitalism. The new generation of Ivoirien entrepreneurs also used the Chamber to express its views: in 1967, it launched a "Buy Ivoirien" campaign and in 1970 drew attention to the still inadequate participation of Ivoirien entrepreneurs in industry, a situation that it said led to too much profit remittance out of the country.[23] Along with the Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber of Industry has also been useful to Ivoirien corporate directors as a source of information.[24]

In the early years after independence, both the Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber of Industry were patronized largely by state employees who had private business interests. But in keeping with the move of such people into the economy full-time during the 1970s and 1980s, the chambers' clienteles were increasingly drawn from the private sector.[25]

Since the 1960s a number of additional groups have been created to accommodate the burgeoning number of Ivoirien entrepreneurs. Many of these were autonomous, while others, formally under state control, were effectively so. Among these groups are the Union Patronale de Côte d'Ivoire (UPACI, formerly the Association Interprofessionelle de la Côte d'Ivoire, AICI), Comité des Assureurs de Côte d'Ivoire, Association Professionelle des Banques et Etablissements Financiers de Côte d'Ivoire (APBFCI), Fédération Maritime de Côte d'Ivoire (FEDERMAR), Syndicat des Importateurs de Bétails et de Volailles de Côte d'Ivoire, Groupement Interprofessionel de l'Automobile (GIPA), Syndicat des Commerçants Importateurs et Exportateurs (SCIMPEX), Union des Employeurs de Côte d'Ivoire (UEAFCI), Syndicat des Exportateurs et Négociants en Bois de Côte d'Ivoire, Syndicat des Industriels de Côte d'Ivoire, Syndicat des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises, Syndicat des Producteurs Industriels de Bois, Syndicat National des Transports de Marchandises et Voyageurs, Club des Hommes d'Affaires Franco-Ivoiriens (CHAFI), Fédération Ivoirienne des Industries du Textile et de l'Habillement (FITEXHA), and the Groupement Interprofessionel des Entrepreneurs de Côte d'Ivoire (GIECI).[26]

A good many of these groups are autonomous organizations in that they were created not by the state but by Ivoirien and/or foreign businesspeople. Many are industry-specific groups that serve as meeting places for companies involved in the same subsector of the economy. Some have come and gone, often to be superseded by a new organization. Most are open to both Ivoirien and foreign businesspeople, though a few have been directed exclusively to Ivoirien entrepreneurs. One such group was the now-defunct APPMECI, created in 1967 by a group of Ivoirien businessmen with the purpose of lobbying the government for more assistance to emerging Ivoirien entrepre-

neurs. However, all have assisted Ivoirien businesspeople in circulating among themselves, exchanging ideas, and obtaining information. In fact, some corporate executives consider their industry-specific interest groups to be their most valuable sources of information.[27]

In addition to these groups, the last decade has witnessed the emergence of a new phenomenon in Ivoirien capitalism, the investment clubs (e.g., La Financière). Given the retrenchment of the banks in the 1980s due to the recession, investment capital for Ivoirien entrepreneurs has dried up among the conventional sources. Many Ivoirien businesspeople have avoided this problem by establishing mutual associations in which they pool their funds so as to target them to profitable investments. These clubs can draw their memberships from a broad cross-section of Ivoirien capital, so in effect these mutual funds serve as business interest groups, as they help to bring entrepreneurs together for the purpose of priority determination.

Ivoirien entrepreneurs have also involved themselves increasingly in supranational organizations so as to broaden their contacts with foreign businesspeople. CHAFI, which is jointly run by the Ivoirien government and the French embassy, brings together Ivoirien and French businesspeople. The World Trade Center Club, administered by government officials, imports high-profile speakers to give talks on economic matters to association members. The American Chamber of Commerce is popular with the expatriate business community, and so Ivoiriens involved or seeking to be involved with foreign businesses frequent its meetings. As well, in 1990 the African Development Bank established the Round Table of African businessmen, whose goal was to broaden contacts among businesspeople from various African countries. Of the five vice-presidents on the Round Table's executive committee, one, Charles Donwahi, is an Ivoirien.

Finally, but perhaps most important of all, there exist what one might call informal business associations, clubs, or groups. Especially significant among these are the service clubs, such as the Lions Club and Rotary Club. It has been said that virtually all PDGs (president and director-general, the equivalent to a chief executive officer) belong to one or another of these organizations, making them possibly the most common forums for intraclass communication. Business matters always arise, and personal contacts are always made, at the meetings of these associations.[28]

Compared to the situation a few decades ago, therefore, there is no shortage of groups in which Ivoirien businesspeople may involve themselves. Even those that come under the aegis of the state exercise more independence than do the professional associations or union groups from other segments of society. A number, in addition, are autonomous, and have not had to struggle against the regime in order to preserve this autonomy; the Lions or Rotary clubs, not to mention the industry-specific groups, have not waged an ongoing war with the government as SYNARES, the country's

sole autonomous union, has been forced to do. This further goes to show that it is the bourgeoisie that controls the state, and not the state that controls the bourgeoisie; the bourgeoisie has used the state to assist the formation of its groups, but it has not depended on the state for them.

The one way in which the Ivoirien bourgeoisie displays a low level of development, though, is in its use (or lack thereof) of the media. It may seem odd to speak of the media as an interest group or class organization, but in advanced capitalist countries business publications—magazines and newspapers written by and for businesspeople and filled with advertisements and announcements of relevance to the business community—abound. Magazines such as *Forbes* and *Fortune* not only are useful sources of information, they also help a class to express an ideology for itself, give it a mouthpiece by which to articulate its concerns, and in their own way provide a gathering place for businesspeople who, though separated by distances, nonetheless sit down together to read the same articles and study the same ideas.

Given the vibrancy of Ivoirien capitalism, therefore, it may come as something of a surprise to discover that there is almost nothing in the way of an indigenous business press. Aside from a few professional magazines, there is no magazine or newspaper devoted specifically to business. The country's daily newspaper, *Fraternité-Matin*, offers a mediocre business section that is probably not terribly useful to most Ivoirien businessmen. In the back pages one finds columns that advertise foreign corporations that are looking for Ivoirien partners, local companies soliciting investment capital (especially through share sales), real estate owners offering space for businesses to let, and business owners seeking to sell either all their interests or concessions/franchises thereof. Companies also use the business section to publish their year-end or periodic reports. In all of the other national publications, though, business news is virtually absent, and national television devotes only 10 minutes a week to a stock market report. When they want to read a business publication, Ivoirien entrepreneurs most often turn to foreign publications like *Jeune Afrique Economie*.

Given that Ivoirien capitalists are so active in other spheres it seems odd that they should not have taken the initiative in writing for one another. Their inactivity could result from the fact that the still relatively small size of the class, in terms of numbers, may make for a market too narrow for a single-interest publication to be profitable. One corporate executive also accounted for it by the lack of necessity, suggesting that the amount of financial information provided through government publications (e.g., reports of the Chambers of Industry and Commerce, or publications by the Ministry of Economy and Finance) was more than sufficient for the needs of most businessmen.[29]

Perhaps that is changing now. In the spring of 1990 one entrepreneur

launched, on his own initiative, a weekly newspaper devoted entirely to the real estate industry. It may have been a sign of things to come, though it is a high-risk venture: investors anxious to make a good return still have many proven opportunities elsewhere.

THE NATIONAL IDENTITY OF IVOIRIEN CAPITAL

Where capitalist classes exist in the Third World, they often differ from First World counterparts in their lack of national identity. Despite regional differences in all economies, one can still speak of an American capitalist class, a British one, a French one, and so forth. Moreover, these classes organize themselves into national bodies that bring together their disparate memberships, institutions like the British Confederation of Business and Industry or the Canadian Business Council on National Issues.

In the Third World, things are not always the same. In India, for example, there is not one Indian capitalist class but several, since class and caste intersect. Certain castes predominate in the bourgeoisie, while class identity does not replace caste identity but supplements it. Thus there are not Indian capitalists but Kamma, Marwari, and Chettiar capitalists, to cite a few examples. As a result one finds that in any sizeable Indian city there is not one chamber of commerce to bring together entrepreneurs but several, each serving to unite entrepreneurs from a given caste. This makes it difficult for the class to articulate a unified ideology and set of concerns, and it also inhibits effective political action, as the rather fractured political history of the class attests. The divisions within the Indian bourgeoisie have thus prevented it from developing a coherent class project; individual capitalists and companies can obtain access to the halls of power without too much difficulty, but they speak for themselves, and not for Indian capitalism as such.[30] Similar problems have developed in African countries as well. In Kenya, for example, ethnic division has hampered the bourgeoisie's development as a class.

The history of Ivoirien capitalism, however, has led the Ivoirien bourgeoisie to develop a dual nature. On the one hand Ivoirien capitalism is heavily concentrated in the southern region of the country. Virtually all the country's big capitalists will at one point or another establish a base for themselves in Abidjan, because this is the industrial center of the country; Bouaké is a very distant second, and even then Bouaké companies will usually have Abidjan offices; no other city comes close behind Bouaké. "All roads lead to Abidjan," and it is primarily in Abidjan that the class comes together, establishes relationships, and, of course, asserts its political power.

On the other hand, the important role that migrants played in the emergence of Ivoirien capitalist farming, and the role they continue to play in

the emergence of new entrepreneurs, gives the class a broad, multiethnic character. Ivoirien capitalists come together in Abidjan, but that is not where they come from. Many of the country's leading capitalists—Pierre Billon, Lamine Diabaté, Amara Karamoko, the various Konés—are northerners, and one of the most important families of the bourgeoisie, the Coulibaly family, is from Korhogo and maintains its political power base there. In fact, most capitalists who come to Abidjan maintain regional power bases, especially if they become involved in politics as so many of them do: the Coulibalys in Korhogo and Boundiali, the Konés in Kouto, Léon Amon in Dimbokro, the Ekra-Améthier-Niamké network in Bonoua, the Houphouët-Boignys in Yamoussoukro; the list goes on.

Given that Ivoirien capitalists come from all over the country, it follows that virtually all of the country's ethnic groups are represented in the bourgeoisie, none of them being significantly overrepresented. More importantly, there are no important divisions among ethnic groups. Instead, Ivoirien entrepreneurs of differing ethnicities mix with a freedom and fluidity not found in several other African countries. There are large family businesses in Côte d'Ivoire (e.g., Pechazur, a fish-processing and -canning firm belonging to the N'Dione family; and Interaco, belonging to the Konan family), but other than these there do not appear to be large companies made up of shareholders of only one ethnic group. The large Ivoirien companies typically draw their shareholders and directors from a variety of ethnic groups. The degree to which ethnic divisions have been weakened is revealed by the eagerness with which members of different ethnic groups intermarry and establish business contacts with one another. When asked about ethnicity in the business world, Ivoirien businesspeople sometimes react with surprise, as if the subject were one to which they gave little thought. They will say such things as "you hire only brothers," but the African concept of brotherhood differs greatly from the Western one and the term only occasionally implies an actual blood relationship: brothers are simply people one knows well, trusts, and feels a certain responsibility for, as well as expecting an equivalent responsibility in return. Even white colleagues are sometimes referred to as brothers.

Abidjan itself reflects the cosmopolitan nature of the class that has turned the city into its administrative and economic center. It is located in Ebrié country, but the Ebriés today comprise only a very small part of the city's population. There is a mixture of peoples and cultures in Abidjan that rivals those of the world's most famous international cities. In the corporate and political elite of this city, one finds names that represent a cross-section of Ivoirien society: Baoulés (Kouakou, Houphouët-Boigny, Boni, Kouassi), Bambaras (Bambara), Didas (Laubhouet, Dacoury-Tabley), Senufos and Malinkés (Karamoko, Coulibaly, Diabaté, Koné, Cisse, Camara), Abourés (Ablé, Ekra, Améthier, Kacou, Niamké), Touras (Fofana), Bétés (Donwahi, Dacoury-Tabley), Alladians (Yacé), and so on through all the country's ethnic

groups. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the country's political elite is as heterogeneous as its economic elite: representation among the country's various ethnic groups is roughly equivalent,[31] unlike the situation in a number of other African countries, Kenya being a case in point.

This cosmopolitanism, and this national basis, appear to give the class a unique identity and consciousness.[32] One would expect to find that a dynamic and expanding class that has been asserting itself through business organizations and building its national cohesion would also develop an ideological confidence and cohesion to match. There is evidence of this, in the form of a rising nationalistic consciousness. One businessman, interviewed in March 1990, went so far as to say that Ivoirien capitalists are retaking control of the national economy, nudging it out of foreign hands. The creation of Ivoirien companies that break a foreign monopoly evokes a common pride: in the last few years, the new SIALIM plant shattered the jealously guarded Nestlé monopoly on sweetened condensed milk—an Ivoirien staple—while the PRIMA supermarket brought an end to the much-resented Lebanese-Pakistani supermarket monopoly. The founder of SIALIM spoke with pride about the incommensurable odds the company's founders had to surmount in taking on Nestlé, and how the struggle helped African entrepreneurs to recognise the common interests that they share.[33]

The ideology of the Ivoirien bourgeoisie appears to be pan-Africanist as well, albeit a pan-Africanism which Ivoiriens see themselves as leading. Ivoirien capitalists seek new markets in other African countries but also new ventures with businesspeople of different African nationalities. PRIMA, for example, is designed to be the first supermarket in a chain that will establish branches in Zaire, Cameroun, Guinea, and Rwanda, where the company has found investors, as well as in other African countries, the intention being to increase the flow of goods among African economies. The president and director-general of the corporation stated that the philosophy behind the company's creation was to increase contacts among African businessmen of differing nationalities in order to compensate for the dwindling European investment that, he expected, would follow the growing Western interest in Eastern Europe. Another such joint venture is La Financière, the mutual fund in which non-Ivoirien Africans own a 28 percent share. The company's founder was proud of the fact that La Financière has spawned the creation of similar companies in Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mali, Benin, and Cameroun, all of which are autonomous but linked to one another through the Ivoirien branch.[34]

But this nationalism and pan-Africanism, as one businessman took pains to emphasize, is not xenophobic. Retaking control of the economy does not imply pushing foreigners back out. Ivoirien capital continues to coexist with foreign capital in a mutually satisfactory relationship. Some foreign companies have uprooted, others have been bought out by Ivoiriens, and

intense foreign-Ivoirien conflicts like the Nestlé-SIALIM one take place. However, such conflicts are seen as taking place at the level of the firm, and Ivoirien businesspeople continue to solicit foreign partnerships and to share interests with foreigners in a number of corporations.

From the moment of its birth, Ivoirien capitalism has been closely intertwined with foreign capital, and the history of the Blohorn family in Côte d'Ivoire neatly encapsulates much of this history. Joseph Blohorn came to Côte d'Ivoire in 1929 and soon took an interest in the possibilities of taking advantage of the country's plentiful supply of palm oil in order to make soap. Early on, he made the acquaintance of Philippe Yacé, at that time an instructor at the Collège Technique d'Abidjan and a man whose family went on to become one of the most prominent in the country; Yacé's contact with Blohorn was initiated when he advised Blohorn on a more suitable location for his factory.

The senior Blohorn died in 1939 (in Abidjan), at which time his son André took control of the corporation, building it into a highly successful enterprise. In 1957, Côte d'Ivoire's small bourgeoisie organized itself into the Syndicat des Industriels et Entrepreneurs de Côte d'Ivoire, with Blohorn as the first president. In 1965, Blohorn was among the founders of the Chamber of Industry, and subsequently became its first president as well. In the same year, Côte d'Ivoire's *patronat* organized itself into the AICI, and once again, Blohorn was the president. All the while, his company was carrying out a policy of Ivoirizing its cadres, and with the creation of the stock exchange in 1975, took advantage of this new mechanism to begin Ivoirizing its capital as well. Meanwhile, André Blohorn had become an associate of Joseph Aka Anghui, who became the director-general of the company. The two worked together as directors of various companies in the Blohorn group. In 1984, the Blohorn family sold its assets in the company that bore the family name, though it retained shares in other companies, and Blohorn still worked alongside Aka Anghui on, for example, the board of SIERI.[35]

The long residence of the Blohorn family in Côte d'Ivoire made it one of the "French Ivoiriens" discussed in Chapter 5. Alongside this component of capital developed Ivoirien capital in a symbiotic relationship in which foreign capitalists first led, to be later overtaken—amicably enough—by Ivoirien entrepreneurs.

Ivoirien entrepreneurs do not today see themselves as subordinate to foreign capital. But they are still eager to work with it, because capital is capital, and offers access to resources that Ivoirien entrepreneurs may not have in hand at any given point in time. As it always has, foreign capital continues to play an important role in Ivoirien capitalism. Contrary to what dependency theorists have sometimes supposed, the rise of national capitalism does not automatically entail a beating back of foreign penetration; it does, however, mean more direction by Ivoirien capitalists.

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In a 1981 article, P. Anyang' N'yong'o pointed out the distinction between capitalists and a bourgeoisie in the following words:

> A bourgeoisie arises among capitalists when, in politics, they can represent their 'community of interests' hegemonically and spearhead the drive towards economic and social progress.[36]

To put it in other words, the presence of investors and corporate directors is evidence of the rise of capitalists. However, if this collection of capitalists does not come together through interest groups, kinship links, professional ties; if it does not communicate both within itself and to society at large; if it has no independent and internally generated "voice," then it does not really constitute a class in the full sense of the term. It remains, as both Marx and Kautsky said, a class-in-itself, but not a class-for-itself.

It has sometimes been said of Ivoirien capitalism that it is a collection of entrepreneurs who operate essentially under the direction of, and with a considerable dependence upon, the state. But such conclusions have focused on the wrong side of the chicken-and-egg debate regarding the state and capital in Côte d'Ivoire. Ivoirien capitalism preceded the capitalist state. So too did the Ivoirien bourgeoisie. Long before they had taken control of the postcolonial state Ivoirien capitalists had organized themselves into a class. It only followed that they would use the state they had captured to further that organization, but they did more than just use the state to patronize their interests. The organization of Ivoirien capital has continued at several levels throughout the postcolonial period in official, informal and other private ways. It is true that the state has provided much of the fuel for the growth of postcolonial Ivoirien capitalism, but it has done so because the engine is operated by the Ivoirien bourgeoisie. In the final analysis, to speak of Ivoirien capitalism is to speak not of the state but of Ivoirien capitalists.

NOTES

1. Jean Chevassu and Alain Valette, *Les Industriels de la Côte d'Ivoire: qui et pourquoi?* (Abidjan: ORSTOM, Centre Petit-Bassam, 1975 [Série sciences humaines]), pp. 15–16; Clause de Miras, *La Formation de capital productif privé ivoirien: le secteur menuiserie à Abidjan* (Abidjan: ORSTOM, Centre Petit-Bassam, 1975 [Série sciences humaines]), pp. 65–71; Claude de Miras, *La Formation de capital productif privé ivoirien: le secteur boulangerie* (Abidjan: ORSTOM, Centre Petit-Bassam, 1976 [Série sciences humaines]), pp. 46, 47, 53, 55.
2. Andrea Calamanti, *The Securities Market and Underdevelopment* (Finafrica-Cariplo-Milan: Giuffre, 1983), pp. 121–123.
3. Miras, *La Formation de capital productif privé ivoirien: Le secteur boulangerie*, pp. 46, 47, 53, 55; Calamanti, *The Securities Market and Under-*

development, p. 121; Jean-Marc Gastellu and Affou Yapi, "Où situer les grands planteurs villageois?" *Cahiers ivoiriens de recherche économique et sociale* 30 (Sept., 1981): 45.

4. Didier Kouadio Koffi, *La Création des entreprises privées par les nationaux en Côte d'Ivoire* (Abidjan: CEDA, 1983), pp. 55–57. Note that the survey covered the full range of Ivoirien entrepreneurs, from single-owner businesses with limited capital—who accounted for the majority—to large-scale owners of industry.

5. See the discussions in Koffi, *La Création des entreprises privées*, pp. 60–63, and Remy-Louis Budoc, "De l'argent pour les PMI ivoiriennes!" *Le Journal de l'économie français*, Feb. 27, 1986.

6. This figure, moreover, is incomplete. Only reinvestments that could be verified were recorded. The actual total is certainly much higher. The data were gleaned from the same sources that were used to construct Appendix 1, with the principle source being *Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens* (Moreux, 1973–1985).

7. Majority Ivoirien-owned firms accounted for 20.5 percent of the reinvested profits (4.241 billion CFAF out of a total of 20.767 billion CFAF) yet only about 14 percent of the registered capital of the firms surveyed.

8. Côte d'Ivoire, Ministère du Plan, *La Côte d'Ivoire en chiffres 1976*, p. 41. On lending by foreign banks see *Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens*, and *Hommes et organisations d'Afrique noire* (Ediafric: La Documentation africaine, 1972–1978).

9. Claude de Miras, *La Formation de capital productif privé ivoirien: Le secteur menuiserie*, p. 71; Claude de Miras, *La Formation de capital productif privé ivoirien: le secteur boulangerie*, p. 60.

10. *Fraternité-Matin* (Abidjan), March 14, 1990.

11. Diagne Loum, Interview, Feb. 19, 1990 (Abidjan).

12. Eddy Lee, "Export-Led Rural Development: The Ivory Coast," *Development and Change* 11 (October 1980): 637; Koffi, *La Création des entreprises privées*, p. 71.

13. *L'Economie ivoirienne*, 10th ed. (Paris: La documentation africaine [Ediafric], 1982), p. 163; Calamanti, *The Securities Market and Underdevelopment*, p. 122.

14. *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), Oct. 12, 1989, section B; *Time*, May 28, 1990, 42–43.

15. In creating the exchange, the government established very strict guidelines regarding which firms could join the exchange, taking into account such criteria as size, past balance sheets, and likely level of profits. On the one hand, the effect has been to restrict to a few dozen the number of firms eligible to join. On the other, the exchange and its management have a good reputation, although critics allege that share prices are not determined by market forces but by administrative decisions on the part of the firms. The exchange is open one day a week, and the country's four largest commercial banks act as brokers. The most complete—if slightly dated—study of the Abidjan stock exchange is Calamanti, *The Securities Market and Underdevelopment*.

16. Notes for the following section on kinship linkages are drawn from: *Fraternité-Matin*, Jan. 19–May 19, 1990; Pascal Koffi Teya, *Côte d'Ivoire: le Roi est nu* (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1985), pp. 16–20; Centre d'Affaire International, *Annuaire Statistique Economique et financier* (Abidjan: 1988), pp. 24–26; Côte d'Ivoire, Office National des Télécommunications, *Annuaire officiel des*

abonnés au téléphone (Abidjan: 1987, 1988); PDCI-RDA, *Annuaire 1985–1990* (Abidjan: Editions Fraternité-Hebdo, 1987), pp. 11–180; Fraternité-Hebdo, *1946–1986, il y a 40 ans naissait le PDCI* (Abidjan, 1986), p. 211; Côte d'Ivoire, Ministère du Plan et de l'Industrie, *Répertoire des industries et activités de Côte d'Ivoire* (Abidjan: 1990); Chambre d'Agriculture, Chambre de Commerce, Chambre d'Industrie, *Annuaire des chambres consulaires de Côte d'Ivoire: l'entreprise ivoirienne* (Abidjan: 1988); *Le Grand dictionnaire encyclopédique de la Côte d'Ivoire* (Raymond Borremans), 4 vols, (Abidjan: Les Nouvelles Editions Africaines, 1986); Loum, Interview, Feb. 19, 1990; Blohorn, *Blohorn: Un demi siècle, 1929–79* (Abidjan: 1979); "Côte d'Ivoire: 30 hommes pour gérer la crise," *Jeune Afrique Economie* (Nov. 1989): 46–59; Etienne Daingui, Interview, May 2, 1990 (Abidjan); l'Abbé Jean-Albert Ablé, *Histoire et tradition politique du pays Abouré* (Abidjan: Imprimerie Nationale, 1978); Y.-A. Fauré, "L'économie politique d'une démocratisation: Elements d'analyse à propos de l'expérience récente de la Côte d'Ivoire," *Politique Africaine* 43 (Oct. 1991): 31–49; *Africa Confidential*; Paul-Henri Siriex, *Houphouët-Boigny ou la sagesse africaine* (Paris Editions Nathan, and Abidjan: Nouvelles Editions Africaines, 1986); *Mémorial de la Côte d'Ivoire*, vols. 2 and 4 (Abidjan: Edition Ami, 1987); see also Appendix 1.

17. Siriex, *Houphouët-Boigny*, pp. 36–37.

18. Pascal Koffi Teya has suggested that 50 families control Côte d'Ivoire. See *Côte d'Ivoire*, pp. 16–20.

19. Loum, Interview, Feb. 19, 1990.

20. See, for example, Claude de Miras, "De la bourgeoisie d'Etat à l'avènement d'un milieu d'entrepreneurs ivoiriens?" in *Entreprises et entrepreneurs en Afrique*, vol. 2, edited by Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch and Alain Forest (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1983), p. 210.

21. "La Chambre de commerce," *Structures et actions socio-économiques de la république de Côte d'Ivoire*, special no. of *Regards sur la France* (Jan. 1975): 344–347.

22. "La Chambre d'industrie de la Côte d'Ivoire," *Structures et actions socio-économiques de la république de Côte d'Ivoire*, special no. of *Regards sur la France* (Jan. 1975): 348–350.

23. Guy Cangah and Simon-Pierre Ekanza, *La Côte d'Ivoire par les textes* (Les Nouvelles Editions Africaines, 1978), pp. 225–226.

24. Nidgin Aoussi, Interview, March 22, 1990 (Abidjan).

25. Loum, Interview, Feb. 19, 1990.

26. See Centre d'Affaire International, *Annuaire Statistique*, p. 31; O. Philmon Thierry and K. N'Dri Dally in *Fraternité Hebdo*, Feb. 1, 1990, 22; *Fraternité Matin*.

27. Aoussi, Interview, March 22, 1990.

28. Guy Camara, Interview, March 15, 1990 (Abidjan); *Fraternité-Matin*, April 25, 1990, 2.

29. Aoussi, Interview, March 22, 1990.

30. See Gail Omvedt, "Class, Caste and Land in India: An Introductory Essay" (mimeo) and "Development of the Caste System in South Asia: Notes Towards a Theory," *In the Wake of Marx* 11 no. 4 (Oct. 1985): 3–18; Carol Boyack Upadhya, "The Farmer-Capitalists of Coastal Andhra Pradesh," *Economic and Political Weekly* 23 no. 27 (July 2, 1988): 1376–1382, and 23 no. 28 (July 9, 1988): 1433–1442; Stanley A. Kochanek, *Business and Politics in India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), chapters 1 and 5.

31. Tessilimi Bakary, "Elite Transformation and Political Succession," in *The*

Political Economy of Ivory Coast, edited by I. William Zartman and Christopher Delgado (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 26–28, 34–37.

32. The notes for the following section on consciousness and ideology are taken from Diaby Aboubakar, "La compétition: la règle d'or" (Interview with Bemba Saloma, PDG of SIDECO-PRIMA), *Fraternité Matin*, March 6, 1990, 7; Aoussi, Interview, March 22, 1990; Camara, Interview, March 15, 1990; Christophe Anet Kouakou, Interview, Feb. 16, 1990 (Abidjan); Loum, Interview, Feb. 19, 1990; Gwénola Possémé, "Le Patron de SIALIM a confiance," (Interview with Blaise Kouadio Tanoh, founder and president of SIALIM), *Jeune Afrique Economie* (Feb. 1990): 38; Yapi (Basil), Interview, Jan. 30, 1990; Yapi (Isidore), Interview, Jan. 30, 1990.

33. Possémé, "Le Patron de SIALIM a confiance."

34. Loum, Interview, Feb. 19, 1990.

35. Blohorn, *Blohorn: Un demi siècle.*

36. P. Anyang' N'yong'o, "Editorial," *Review of African Political Economy* 20 (Jan.–Apr. 1981): 5.

7

Capitalism in Africa

Under what circumstances does capitalism emerge in Africa? Under what circumstances does the state act to further rather than inhibit the development of African capitalism? Does indigenous capitalism exercise a beneficial or harmful impact on a country's economic and social development? What implications do the findings in Côte d'Ivoire have for the theory of development: Can an existing paradigm explain the phenomenon, or must we begin the search for a new paradigm?

Before turning to these questions, it is worthwhile to retrace briefly the outlines of the argument put forth in this book. From these particular conclusions, one may deduce the rudiments of a general theory of African capitalist development.

Capitalism, as it is usually understood, did not exist in Côte d'Ivoire prior to the colonial period; the *ancien régime* effectively prevented its emergence. Colonial rule largely demolished the economic and political underpinnings of this regime, thereby eliminating the obstacles to the development of capitalism.

However, capitalism did not follow this outcome as a matter of course. What led to the development of Ivoirien capitalism was the implantation of a settler class (plantation operators) in the colony. They exercised a demonstration effect on the African population, mainly on the plantation workers who tilled their land. Many of these laborers, and a smaller number of civil servants, traders, and traditional chiefs, went on to establish plantations of their own, yet in so doing they were not merely mimicking the French. They adopted their crops, hired wage labor, reinvested their profits, and did other things that the settlers did. However, they also improved upon their techniques of cultivation and business operation, in so doing becoming more competitive than their French counterparts. (This innovative and adaptive characteristic of the Ivoirien bourgeoisie appears to persist.)

So competitive were the Ivoirien planter capitalists that they incurred the wrath of the settlers. The latter took advantage of an ideological affinity with the Vichy colonial regime to try and have the planters suppressed. This provoked the planters to organize themselves for political action. Thereby, Ivoirien capitalists united into a bourgeoisie, and in turn drew advantage from an ideological affinity with the Gaullist colonial regime. The legacy of this wartime posturing was a well-organized political party that ended up leading the independence movement and capturing the postcolonial state. The class rapidly reinforced its hold on the state by filling its upper ranks with its members. It then proceeded to use the state to promote the growth and development both of capitalism in general and of Ivoirien capitalism in particular.

The expansion of postindependence Ivoirien capitalism has been even greater than that of the economy as a whole. Moreover, this expansion has been accompanied by development: Ivoirien capitalists are constantly moving into new subsectors of the economy, improving productivity, and running their own firms rather than relying on foreign expertise.

As the number of Ivoirien entrepreneurs increased, the class's organization and cohesion were threatened. The class responded by increasing the number of its organizations, bringing new entrants to the class into these, and building up an elaborate and comprehensive network of kinship and professional linkages. As a result, today the Ivoirien bourgeoisie is arguably as well organized as any in the world, making its hold on political power all the more secure.

So, given the circumstances under which capitalism emerged in Côte d'Ivoire, where else on the continent can we expect capitalism to have emerged? Although some have argued that colonialism predated capitalism in other parts of Africa,[1] capitalism in Côte d'Ivoire was clearly a by-product of colonialism. Most of the literature on precolonial economic history in Africa concurs, and thus African capitalism can probably be generally seen as a product of colonialism. The question, therefore, is under what circumstances did colonialism lead to indigenous capitalism?

In the Ivoirien context, and apparently in the broader French West African context, the findings of this book affirm G. B. Kay's theory of imperialism: colonial exploitation led to development—specifically capitalist development—whereas under-exploitation led to underdevelopment. In Côte d'Ivoire, colonial exploitation took the form of settler agriculture. Among other things, this exploitation provided a demonstration effect for African farmers. However, settler agriculture was not the only form of colonial exploitation, it was only one particular form. Elsewhere in Africa, colonial exploitation that took other forms may well have led to the emergence of indigenous capitalism.

From such regions, indigenous capitalism may well have spread to

neighboring colonies and, later, countries. For example, although Mali and Burkina Faso were both under-exploited, capitalists emerged here because some of the Ivoirien planters were migrant laborers who invested some of their profits in enterprises in their home colonies. Or, today Ivoirien businesspeople search for investment opportunities and partnerships in these countries. Nonetheless, relative to Côte d'Ivoire, capitalism in these countries remains less developed because of their different colonial legacies. In the economy of this part of Africa, Mali and Burkina Faso are the spokes to Côte d'Ivoire's hub. Colonial exploitation in Côte d'Ivoire produced far more indigenous capitalists than under-exploitation did in its neighbor colonies.

However—and this is the rub—capitalists do not capitalism make, at least not necessarily. The presence of capitalists is obviously a necessary condition in the emergence of capitalism, but it is not a sufficient one. Even if they could transcend the hostility of their European counterparts, as did the Ivoirien capitalists, indigenous capitalists still faced the hostility of rival indigenous classes. Colonialism created other classes, including peasantries, working classes, and urban petty bourgeoisies. These classes could be co-opted by indigenous capital, but it took organization to achieve this. In the absence of this organization other, hostile classes could come to power and use the state to thwart the bourgeoisie's continued expansion if they so chose.

Most notably, this was the case for the urban petty bourgeoisie. Made up of salaried professionals whose well-being derived in most cases entirely from the state, whose interests in the private economy were usually insignificant, whose education made them most receptive to radical policies, and whose positions in the state gave them a high regard for the possibilities of statist policies, Africa's urban petty bourgeoisies often had little reason to be patient with its bourgeoisies. Ideologically they were polarized, since bourgeoisies threatened to undermine the egalitarian development policies the urban petty bourgeoisies frequently espoused. Politically they could afford to be hostile, as the postcolonial African state was in no way structurally bound to indigenous capital. In advanced capitalist countries, even socialist parties will temper their socialism once in power, if only because capitalist hegemony means that undermining capital necessarily undermines the state's very resource base. But in most of Africa, indigenous capitalist classes were economically weak; only as a class united for political action could they ensure the defense of their interests.

In Côte d'Ivoire, such organization by African capitalists materialized. But elsewhere in Africa, where such organization failed to occur, emergent indigenous classes likely faced rocky futures. Although they can continue to exist as individuals, their failure at organization makes it difficult if not impossible to establish a capitalist system as such and leaves them vulnerable to the depredations of regimes governed by hostile classes.

The key point is that classes do not develop in vacuums; they develop in the context of class conflicts (including intraclass conflicts). These conflicts can lead to open struggles, or to mediated solutions. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the success of the Ivoirien bourgeoisie can in large part be attributed to its successful use of the latter approach. Earlier in the book it was emphasized that Ivoirien capital has not prospered to the detriment of the peasantry and foreign capital, but rather has existed in a symbiotic relationship with them. In the case of foreign capital, Ivoirien capital's continued reproduction has depended on the continued expansion of the economy, a process in which foreign capital has played an important part. Foreign capital, in turn, has depended on the Ivoirien bourgeoisie for the favorable treatment the latter has given—by means of state policies—foreign enterprises operating in the country. In the case of the peasantry, Ivoirien capital has relied on export agriculture to raise the revenue it has used for its expansion, and the agroindustrial operations that have been popular among Ivoirien capitalists have relied on the peasantry for inputs. The peasantry, in turn, despite its evident exploitation by the ruling class, has perceived (at least until recently) that its economic interests have been advanced by the state, and has continued to expand output and provide the state with the revenue it needs.

In any African context, let alone the Ivoirien one, it is controversial to suggest that the state has ruled in a political alliance with the peasantry. The work of influential theorists like Michael Lipton[2] and Robert Bates[3] has argued that in Africa ruling alliances are urban, with the peasantry being the loser in development policies. In the Ivoirien case, Eddy Lee and Robert M. Hecht have reached similar conclusions.[4]

There is no doubt that, on balance, the Ivoirien peasantry has been exploited. The state has taken money out of the hands of the peasantry in order to build up Ivoirien capital. However, from the point of view of realpolitik, what matters to a ruling class is not whether a subordinate class is badly treated, but whether it perceives itself to be badly treated. An effective ruler does not play a zero-sum game, but distributes enough of the gains of power to retain the support of the governed. There is sufficient evidence to conclude that, certainly until recently, the Ivoirien bourgeoisie has played this game well. While skimming off immense amounts of export agricultural revenue, the Ivoirien regime has ensured that the Ivoirien peasantry has been probably West Africa's most prosperous.[5] During most of the postcolonial period, consistent increases in producer prices have given farmers the impression of a generous marketing board, even if these price increases were only marginally better than the rate of inflation.[6] Being atomized classes (peasants are geographically dispersed and relatively independent in economic terms), peasantries, when over-exploited, are in most cases less likely to unite in political action than to respond in

disorganized fashions, such as to retreat from production or resort to smuggling their output. This has happened in many African countries, but has rarely occurred in Côte d'Ivoire. On the contrary, Ivoirien peasants have continually expanded production throughout most of the postcolonial period, which indicates a favorable response to government policies.[7]

Ivoirien capitalism's dependence on foreign capital and the peasantry has been not merely economic, but also political. The ruling class has depended on the peasantry for its political support base throughout the postcolonial period: while its hold on the cities has recently been weakened by the opposition, the ruling class remains largely secure in the countryside, where reside most of the country's voters. Meanwhile, its warm relationship with foreign capital has ensured that the Ivoirien government receives a more sympathetic hearing from First World creditors, governments (particularly the French government), and multilateral lending agencies (such as the IMF and World Bank) than do those of most Third World countries. Indeed, the Ivoirien government enjoys the support of many key players in the international political economy, something which favors the Ivoirien state as it struggles to come to grips with the present economic crisis. This tripartite political alliance—the Ivoirien bourgeoisie ruling, depending on the Ivoirien peasantry for internal support and on foreign capital for external support—in combination with the Ivoirien bourgeoisie's economic interests, helps to account for the behavior of and the policies adopted by the postcolonial Ivoirien state.

It is unlikely that any African bourgeoisie can develop extensively without such a political-economic alliance, but the success of the Ivoirien bourgeoisie in this regard raises an interesting question, and that is the circumstances under which African states can effectively intervene to promote the growth and development of indigenous capital. Over the past decade, neoclassical economic literature has tended to assume that when states intervene in the economy, they "crowd out" the private sector. In contradistinction to this, exponents of the infant industry model point out that several countries—most notably those of East Asia—have successfully promoted the development of indigenous industry through a period of carefully nurtured growth.

It is questionable that the Ivoirien state made use of the infant industry model as such. Among other things, the Ivoirien regime did not engage in the practice of "picking winners" that has been done so effectively in countries such as South Korea and Japan. At least in the period in which it nurtured the Ivoirien bourgeoisie most extensively, namely the 1970s, the Ivoirien state probably lacked the relative autonomy from capital that would be necessary to such a task (after all, how would a cabinet minister react to the discovery that a bureaucrat had picked his company to be a "loser"?). The Ivoirien bureaucracy has developed to the point that it might now be able to

engage in this task. However, for the most part the policy environment provided by the Ivoirien state can be summed up as relatively indiscriminate assistance to Ivoirien capital in the context of a favorable environment for capital accumulation in general (indeed, sprinkled in amid the winners have been some impressive losers). Given the administrative capacities of most African states, it would perhaps be inappropriate to look for the effective implementation of the infant industry model in most countries, yet a slightly more haphazard development model, like that of the Ivoirien regime, can yield fruitful results.

For one thing, the activities of the Ivoirien state could scarcely have crowded out indigenous capital; state inactivity, by contrast, would have probably hindered Ivoirien capital's development. One has to take into account the venues for capital accumulation in the postcolonial period. In an advanced capitalist country, state borrowing and taxation for accumulation can sometimes take away capital that would otherwise be available to the private sector.[8] However, had the Ivoirien state not drawn the revenues it did from the agricultural sector, some of these monies would have eventually found their way into private banks. Given that private banks were foreign-dominated and reluctant to lend to Ivoirien investors, this would mean that a noninterventionist Ivoirien state would have served to benefit foreign capital. By drawing money from the agricultural sector and establishing means to channel it to private Ivoirien capitalists, the state accelerated the growth of Ivoirien capital.

Nevertheless, while state intervention is necessary to promote the development of African capital, this does not mean that any state intervention will serve this purpose. In several African countries, interventionist states have often been positively detrimental to the development of both indigenous bourgeoisies and national economies. The argument of this book has been that in Côte d'Ivoire, the state has avoided this pitfall because it is a bourgeois state. In principle, one would not expect a bourgeoisie to use the state it controlled to crowd itself out and inhibit its own development—not unless the bourgeoisie is so disorganized as to be at war with itself, an important trap into which the Ivoirien bourgeoisie has avoided falling. Where African capitalists control the state, and if they have been able to organize themselves into a class that shares a coherent class project, one can expect policies likely to favor the development of indigenous capital.

And yet, there have been tensions in the behavior of the postcolonial Ivoirien state. On the surface, the state appears at times to have been dysfunctional to the development of the economy in general, and Ivoirien capitalism in particular. While the state intervened effectively to promote Ivoirien capital, the firms it established itself were typically inefficient, saddling the state with an immense debt that hampers its future ability to promote indigenous capital's development. Moreover, the state behaved in an

apparently contradictory fashion in promoting the Ivoirization of capital on the one hand, yet staffing its own corporations with foreign technical experts on the other. The outcome is that state capital and Ivoirien capital are quite distinct, which seems odd since Ivoirien capital is said ultimately to control state capital.

On closer inspection, this may not be as odd or dysfunctional as it appears. That state firms were inefficient may tell us no more than that. For political reasons, state firms all over the world are prone to inefficiency, because they are governed not only by economic logic, but by a host of competing political claims (for example, to appease consumers the government may instruct a state firm to keep its prices at lower than market levels). What is significant is how the state responds to this problem. A regime that is able to rectify public-sector inefficiencies, against the will of influential political interests, reveals itself to be governed by a coherent class project rather than merely a series of particular interests. Powerful interests can, and will, secure alterations in the overall restructuring policy, but they will not normally be able to reverse it. Broadly, this has been the experience of advanced industrial countries' policies of restructuring during the 1980s. Arguably, it was so in Côte d'Ivoire, where the government embarked on a "clean-up" and restructuring program fairly early on. It has been shown that the Ivoirien regime's restructuring and privatization of the state sector predated IMF pressures, and resulted from an internally generated policy.[9]

As to the build-up of debt by these firms, this may also reveal little about the ineptitude of the Ivoirien state. In the 1970s, when these debts were incurred, borrowers all over the world were amassing huge debts on the widely shared and apparently reasonable assumption that loan capital would remain cheap into the foreseeable future. The Ivoirien government may have been incautious in allowing these debts to be built up, but it is doubtful that it was being stupid. After all, some big foreign firms have made bad investments in Côte d'Ivoire.[10] On that point, it is interesting to note that Ivoirien capital will be the most sheltered from the direct problems of the debt crisis,[11] as it seldom had access to the cheap capital of the 1970s and thus built up a smaller debt load than its foreign and state counterparts.

Moreover, the Ivoirien state consciously set out to take responsibility for those enterprises that were necessary to the economy's overall development, but were too unprofitable to be taken up by private entrepreneurs. Thus, one should expect to have seen losses or poor performances in at least some of the state firms. For example, the public bank BIDI (Banque Ivoirienne de Développement Industriel) made a number of loans that would never be recovered, and by 1989 it had to be liquidated. On first impression, this seems to be evidence of poor management. However, a number of the Ivoirien-owned firms surveyed in Appendix 1 might never have survived had it not been for BIDI loans, because BIDI was the only major bank willing re-

peatedly to lend substantial sums of money to Ivoirien investors. Other banks avoided the risk of bad loans by only lending to firms with very large capital bases, namely foreign and state ones. By taking on this high risk, loss-making role, the Ivoirien state may appear to have acted in an unbusinesslike manner, but its activities were necessary to the continued rise of the Ivoirien business class.

Finally, with regard to the apparent contradiction between the state promoting Ivoirien capital yet preferring to use foreigners in its own firms (as if it distrusted its own capitalists), this may be neither here nor there. Few directors of private Ivoirien corporations were directors of public corporations. However, this was equally the case for the directors of foreign corporations, who were also eschewed by state firms. In relying on foreign technical expertise, the state was adhering to a different logic. Richard Crook has argued that this policy, which was used throughout the state and not only in state firms, made for a smooth transition to the postcolonial period, and ensured that the Ivoirien regime preserved a relatively high degree of administrative capacity; that is, its ability to translate policies into effective action was greater than in most Africa regimes.[12] The Ivoirien government sought public administrators to staff its firms, and there was a persuasive if contentious political logic in looking abroad for at least a part of this expertise.

But what has been the effect of the Ivoirien bourgeoisie's rise on the economy and society of Côte d'Ivoire? What can we infer will be the beneficial or harmful effects of indigenous capitalist development in Africa? In short, can the African bourgeoisie serve as an indigenous source of dynamism?

The answer derived from the Ivoirien experience appears to be yes. If we assume that Third World development requires industrialization, and that industrialization in turn cannot be successfully engineered by a state sector alone—both of which are contentious assumptions, but around which a broad consensus has emerged in the field of development studies in recent years—then it follows that the development of an indigenous bourgeoisie can be central (and possibly even essential) to this process. There are both political and economic reasons for this. The political lies in the direction to the economy that can be provided by a bourgeois-led state, as has been shown not only in the experience of Côte d'Ivoire, but also in those of the advanced capitalist countries.

In the economic domain, there is an important distinction between domestic and foreign capital. It is not that domestic capitalists beat back the evil of foreign capitalist penetration, as dependency theory has assumed. Rather, domestic capitalist development ripples through the economy to a greater degree than does foreign capitalist development. Given their natural connections to the country and its people, and their lower initial cash reserves

than foreign capitalists, domestic entrepreneurs are more likely than foreign ones to purchase local inputs, produce for local demand, and hire locals to run their firms. Their greater linkages with the rest of the local economy mean that their growth pulls the economy in their train. Profits and salaries are more likely to be reinvested than remitted abroad; if not reinvested, they will tend to be spent at home, such that there is a greater multiplier effect on salaries paid by local firms than on those paid by foreign ones. Domestic entrepreneurs may be better positioned to adapt their technology to local conditions, leading to learning by doing and greater technology assimilation, and they will likely produce goods appropriate to local demand. In sum, domestic capitalists' economic activities appear to lead to a greater degree of capital deepening than do the activities of foreign capitalists. This has been the Ivoirien experience, and it appears to stem not from some national peculiarity but from a compelling economic logic in the activities of capitalists. Ivoirien entrepreneurs do not deepen their involvement in the economy because they are nationalistic (even if they do appear to be so), but because they see it as good business. Thus, one can expect that indigenous capitalist development will lead to similar results in other parts of Africa.

But will indigenous capitalist development lead to social development? In the end, if the population is no better off from the development of an indigenous bourgeoisie, then the process can hardly be considered progressive. There are two answers to this question: yes, and possibly.

Yes, capitalist development can lead to social development for the simple reason that the economic growth it generates provides the state with more revenue which can be spent on social programs. But there are also economic reasons why capitalist development might necessarily—not just possibly—entail social development. As capitalism develops, production becomes more sophisticated. This requires a literate, skilled labor force as well as technical experts to supervise the operation and maintenance of the machinery. Demands on the businesses servicing industries increase in step, requiring them to take on an educated workforce that can respond to these demands. It is too costly and time-consuming for companies to spend years educating their workers; instead they demand of the state an educated labor force, leading the state to expand public education. Where firms do train their own workers, they want to reduce labor turnover to avoid having constantly to retrain workers, so they will often raise wages above market levels in order to encourage workers to stay.

Well-educated workers are more expensive and less easy to replace than unskilled ones. This raises the costs of absenteeism, especially if workers are not easy to replace, so employers demand a healthy work force, leading to the creation of health care programs. In addition, as consumer industries develop there is a logic behind increasing minimum wage rates so as to expand the domestic market,[13] a market upon which many Ivoirien capitalists, for

example, rely. This has been partly behind the historic trend in First World countries for developing economies to produce more social services and higher standards of living for their workers.

The criticism of capitalism's potential for this type of development in the Third World has been that foreign capital does not engage in this type of production in poor countries. What attracts foreign capital to set up factories in the Third World is low wages or privileged (usually behind tariff barriers) access to markets. Thus, rather than move their whole production process abroad foreign firms simply source out that part of production that can make use of unskilled, cheap, easily replaceable labor like, for instance, assembly. The more advanced, higher-wage engineering and production are left back in the home countries. Thus, foreign capitalist penetration introduces no compulsion to raise wages or provide public health care.

This criticism is substantially correct, and it also highlights the development potential of indigenous as opposed to foreign capitalism. African entrepreneurs have not yet reached the degree of maturity or the scale of production at which they engage in world sourcing; they locate all their production at home, and therefore rely on local labor at every step of the production process. While it may be partly true that foreign capitalism may do little to develop Africa, African capitalism may be compelled to do more. In addition, a state controlled by local capitalists—who depend on economic stability and rely on local support bases, and who also rely on a well-paid population to buy their goods—will be inclined to adopt policies that distribute some of the gains of capitalist expansion to the local population. Foreign capitalists have other options they can and do use: they can call upon home country governments to apply political, and in extreme cases military, pressure to safeguard their interests, and if a firm is not too deeply involved in the economy it can simply uproot. One recalls that many of the big foreign firms in Côte d'Ivoire are involved in trade and services, not production, and so are more mobile than their Ivoirien counterparts. But local entrepreneurs lack these options, and through the agency of the state will be likely to want to keep the population reasonably contented.

However, the extent to which social development will occur is not simply a function of capital. In the First World, social development was historically a response not merely to capital's development, but to the development of other classes, particularly the working class. This is why it is said that indigenous capitalism will "possibly" lead to social development, because the degree to which a ruling class will want to keep its population contented will depend in part on what that population threatens to do if it becomes discontented. In the First World, capitalist states produced generous social legislation when they were forced to do so: when they were confronted with the choice of either partial payoffs or possible revolution, sharing the wealth suddenly became an attractive option. When the workers of Europe

and North America began piling up behind the barricades and enlisting in communist or anarchist parties, or even in the socialist parties that were resigned to capitalism but called for heavy taxation of the rich, the Western world's capitalists suddenly showed how very liberal they could be. After all, one of the pioneers of social legislation was Otto von Bismarck, who has never been venerated as one of the modern period's great socialists. It is just that higher wages, shorter work weeks, public education, and, later, health care meant that workers, not just capitalists, had a vested interest in capitalism. This is why Lenin bemoaned the trade unions that had sold out to capitalism, as workers began crossing the street, renouncing the *Internationale* and the red flag for summer holidays in Brighton.

But individual capitalists have always fought tooth and nail to resist concessions to labor. For one thing, the logic of competitive capitalism often compels them to do so: if a factory manager raises his workers' wages, offers them a generous benefits plan, and provides education for their children, he raises his costs and thereby reduces his profit margin.[14] Low profit margins mean less surplus for accumulation, so the manager cannot purchase the new technology that will improve his production and reduce his labor needs. But if he tries to recover his costs by passing them on to the consumer in the form of higher prices, he will lose business to his lower-priced competitors. Either way, he will end up on the sidelines in the competitive struggle for customers in the marketplace.

If, on the other hand, the government enacts legislation that compels *all* employers to pay a higher minimum wage, and taxes them equally in order to provide the same benefits, all the capitalists bear the same costs and everyone will end up raising their prices.[15] Individual capitalists will not be victimized. So by using the state as an agent for capital, social development can occur without hindering the development of capitalism. This brings us back to the point made earlier: a state that is governed by, and governs in, the interest of the indigenous bourgeoisie will be inclined to foster social development. If domestic capitalists are well organized into a bourgeoisie, they will be able to recognize their common interests. Policies enacted will tend to tax the class fairly evenly, rather than discriminating among individual capitalists in such a way as to lead to political conflict and instability.

In her critique of dependency theory, Anne Phillips pointed out that most theories of underdevelopment had been so concerned with the relationship between domestic and foreign capital that they forgot that other domestic classes than capitalists existed.[16] Early dependency theory held that if the domestic bourgeoisie were parasitic, development would not occur, whereas if it were truly a national bourgeoisie, it would drive out foreign capital and develop the economy. However the struggle for social development does not take place between the domestic bourgeoisie and the foreign one alone. It also

takes place between the bourgeoisie and the other classes in society, what Phillips called the oppressed classes. The history of Western capitalism confirms this point: national bourgeoisies have rarely led the struggle for social justice; they have merely responded to it. But the passage of time has proved that capital is a stone from which a good deal of blood can be squeezed. It is now clear that modernization theorists have been wrong to assume the wealth from capitalist expansion would inevitably trickle down to the population. Nevertheless wealth can trickle down, but only in the same way that dew is shaken from a tree, and if a population does not demand its fair share there is no guarantee that it will ever get it.

Given these assumptions, that indigenous capitalist development will in some ways trickle down to the population as a matter of course (whereas foreign capitalist development might not), and in some ways will trickle down in a response to class struggle (with indigenous capitalists and their state being more responsive to this class struggle than foreign capital), what does the evidence from Côte d'Ivoire lead us to expect? It appears that indigenous capitalist development in Africa will lead to much the same results as it has elsewhere: an overall increase in the population's standard of living accompanied by a highly inequitable distribution of income. As mentioned earlier, for most of the postcolonial period Côte d'Ivoire's farmers have been among the richest in Africa. Meanwhile, the wages paid to Ivoirien workers have regularly topped those of any other country in West Africa.[17] The country's record on nutrition is among the best in Africa, and it provides health and education services on a par with those of Africa's socialist states.[18] In rankings of social development by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), it is in the top third of sub-Saharan African countries, while its overall score in the index (if not its ranking) drops considerably when income distribution is taken into account.[19] Undoubtedly, given the resources at its disposal, the Ivoirien government could have done better; by rights, its UNDP ranking should have been higher. The fact that it was not probably lies in the reputed passiveness of the Ivoirien population, a passiveness which however resulted from the fact that Ivoiriens for long felt they were benefiting from the country's development.[20]

Finally, what does this case study tell us about the theory of development? Presently, development theory is in flux. In the 1960s and 1970s, underdevelopment theory appeared to provide a coherent and persuasive paradigm, but the theories of the left have now been discredited. Confidence in the state's ability to replace capital has given way to mistrust. This has opened the field to the right. The result has been a neoclassical assault that virtually ignores the state and places an exaggerated confidence in the possibilities of unimpeded markets. Those who ignore the state ignore the fact that the most successful cases of capitalist development in this

century have occurred under state direction. One could go further and say that in the history of all capitalist development, the classical model of the minimalist state has been the exception, not the rule.

One cannot ignore the state, nor is the state a black box: the state is a battleground of class struggle, and the way in which that struggle is resolved will exercise a profound influence on the way a state behaves. It is a futile endeavor to study the state—or to propose development policies for states to adopt—without taking account of the state's class dimension.

On the other hand, one cannot ignore markets either. In the past, the mistake of the left has perhaps been that it regarded the state with the same confidence with which the right regards markets, while regarding markets with the same distrust with which the right regards the state. This is not a feature of leftist development theory alone, but of almost all leftist thought. However, a balance is required. History has shown that while it is possible for the state to abolish markets, the enterprise is a dubious one. Moreover, it is difficult, if not impossible, to sustain over the long term. Anyhow, no African state has reached the level of development of, for instance, the Tsarist state inherited by the Bolsheviks, so it is unlikely that any African state could abolish markets in the near future. Indeed, the activities of informal economies all over Africa reveal that markets continue to function in spite of state actions. The key is in getting them to function well. To date, no model for the operation of markets has been found that has been proved to be more productive than capitalist ones. However, capitalist markets do not function well unless they operate within a conducive state framework. As Colin Leys once said, die hard libertarians who refuse to accept that can all go to Zaire. To understand how states behave brings us back to the subject of class conflict; to understand class conflict brings us back to the subject of class formation (and in the case of capitalist classes, to markets).

The best analytic tools for the study of class formation and class conflict are still to be found in the Marxist literature, in particular Marx's own writing.[21] But in the past, Marxist literature has perhaps been saddled with a certain amount of ideological baggage. Whatever their subject of study, Marxists were expected to perform a few Marxist rituals, to look for a socialist transformation, to draw attention to the internal contradictions of capital that would lead to its certain downfall. Taken alone, these may or may not have been noble endeavors. But they do appear to have placed limits on the development of Marxist theory.

However, the assault of the right has exercised a purgative effect on the academic left. Among other things, it has made heresy possible. Marxists can, and do, say things like "the time for a socialist transition has passed" or "capitalism is not inherently doomed to destroy itself." This may offend orthodoxy, but it has allowed Marxist theory to transcend its own limitations. Studies of class formation and capitalist development can be

academic exercises, and academic honesty requires the observer to sometimes draw conclusions that are inconsistent with his or her school's ideological penchants.

Among other things, it is important to do away with the teleological inclinations of much Marxist literature and reemphasize the importance of the dialectic. By this is meant not the Hegelian or classical Marxist dialectic, which were certainly teleological, but rather a conception of history and change that focuses on conflict and its resolution, with each conflict having innumerable different possible resolutions. When contrasted with other African cases, the Ivoirien one illustrates that there was nothing automatic about the process of capitalist development in Côte d'Ivoire. The process begun in Côte d'Ivoire had started elsewhere, but led to different results. At several conjunctures in the history of Côte d'Ivoire, alternative paths were open to the country. Other governments chose different paths at different points, and they did so because of the way in which their economic and political struggles were resolved.

The rediscovery of political economy will exercise a salutary impact on development studies, particularly as political economy becomes more refined and sophisticated. Economists have for long dismissed political scientists for being unable to handle economic concepts, while political scientists have similarly dismissed economists for being naive in their understanding of politics. A good political economist recognizes that the two fields need one another. In addition, the study of the dialectic requires a historical approach to the study of class formation, not the static approach that economic literature has sometimes been prone to adopt.

The conclusions reached by good political economic analysis may offend some cherished ideals, and cause not a few skeletons to turn in their graves. However, this sort of purgative process will keep the dialectic—in the form of debate—going. And it is only through such debate that new theories will ever be attained.

NOTES

1. See, for example, D. Mukaru Ng'ang'a, "What Is Happening to the Kenyan Peasantry?" *Review of African Political Economy* 20 (Jan.–Apr. 1981): 7–16.

2. See *Why Poor People Stay Poor* (London: Temple Smith, 1977).

3. See Robert H. Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).

4. See Eddy Lee, "Export-Led Rural Development: The Ivory Coast," *Development and Change* 11 (October 1980): 607–642, and Robert M. Hecht, "The Ivory Coast Economic 'Miracle': What Benefits for Peasant Farmers?" *Journal of Modern African Studies* 21 no 1 (March 1983): 25–53.

5. In 1978, middle-range peasant households farming 10–20 hectares of land earned an average per capita income of U.S. $387. While this was well below the

national figure for that year, it was higher than the national figures for all neighboring countries (with the exception of Ghana, whose per capita income that year was U.S. $390), as well as all the former colonies of French West Africa (see Hecht, "The Ivory Coast Economic 'Miracle,'" p. 44; World Bank, *World Development Report*, 1981). If one applies the general rule that urban per capita incomes in Africa are higher than rural ones, this means that the per capita income of a middle-range Ivoirien peasant household was far higher than that of a similar household in any neighboring country. Hecht points out that most Ivoirien farmers till plots smaller than ten hectares, but the plentiful supply of land and security of tenure, especially in the 1970s, meant that the goal of becoming a middle-range farmer was probably a reasonable aspiration. In sum, the attainment of a level of relative prosperity was a fairly realistic hope for Ivoirien peasants. This would help to explain the large number of foreigners who come to Côte d'Ivoire to set up farms.

6. Hecht, "The Ivory Coast Economic 'Miracle,'" pp. 30–31.

7. However, the Ivoirien government's ability to satisfy the peasantry has been threatened by its recent inability to preserve high producer prices, and this may constitute an even greater threat to the regime than its urban opposition. Rural salaries have plummeted, and smuggling has emerged for the first time. It is too early to tell whether this will be transitory, or will develop into a serious political crisis.

8. Of course, this assumes all things are equal. There are times when state intervention will not crowd out capital in a First World economy, and this is when demand is so flat that resources go unutilized or underutilized (i.e., when there is idle capacity). At such times, Keynesian intervention will draw in, not crowd out, capital.

9. See Bernard Contamin and Y.-A. Fauré, *La bataille des entreprises publiques en Côte d'Ivoire* (Paris: Editions Karthala, Editions de l'ORSTOM, 1990).

10. This has been particularly so in the textiles sector, as has been documented by Professor Mytelka. See Lynn Krieger Mytelka, "The Limits of Export-Led Development: The Ivory Coast's Experience with Manufactures," in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., *The Antinomies of Interdependence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); see also "Investissement étranger direct et choix technologique dans les industries ivoiriennes du textile et du bois," *Revue canadienne d'études du développement* 4 no. 1 (1983): 95–123. Cf. Bonnie Campbell, "Neocolonialism, Economic Dependence and Political Change: A Case Study of Cotton and Textile Production in the Ivory Coast 1960 to 1970," *Review of African Political Economy* 2 (1975): 36–53.

11. Of course, it will be as vulnerable as other classes to the indirect effects, namely the economic downturn provoked by public austerity.

12. See Richard C. Crook, "State Capacity and Economic Development: The Case of Côte d'Ivoire," *IDS Bulletin* 19 no. 4 (Oct. 1988): 19–25, and "Politics, the Cocoa Crisis, and Administration in Côte d'Ivoire," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 28 no. 4 (1990): 649–669.

13. The French School of Regulation writers cite this as the logic behind the growth of the welfare state. See, for example, Alain Lipietz, *The Globalisation of the General Crisis of Fordism* (Kingston, Canada: Queen's University Programme of Studies in National and International Development, Occasional Paper no. 84–203).

14. Of course these costs can sometimes be overcome by increases in

productivity activated by such measures. Robert Owen's experiments in New Lanark provided one of the earliest proofs of this. However, there is no guarantee that generous treatment of labor will reap benefits for the owner, and all things being equal, there are limits to this approach to improving cost-output ratios.

15. As early as the mid-nineteenth century, Karl Marx observed this sort of behavior by the British state in its labor legislation. See *Capital* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983), vol. 1, p. 257.

16. See "The Concept of Development," *Review of African Political Economy* (1977).

17. In a survey of 14 African countries at various intervals between 1957 and 1974, Côte d'Ivoire always had either the second-highest or highest minimum wage rate. In the late 1970s, it was estimated that rural laborers in Côte d'Ivoire earned between three and four times what their counterparts in neighboring countries did. See Jacques Lecaillon and Dimitri Germidis, *Inégalité des revenus et développement économique* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France), p. 55, and Jon Woronoff, "Ivory Coast: The Value of Development," *Africa Report* 24 no. 4 (July–Aug. 1979), p. 19.

18. In a survey comparing Côte d'Ivoire's performance to Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, and Zimbabwe, all of which are countries that have experimented with socialist policies at various times and with varying degrees of success, Côte d'Ivoire fares best in terms of daily calorie supply per capita and proportion of babies with normal birth weight and is surpassed only by Zimbabwe in access to education and educational attainment (World Bank, *World Development Report* 1989, p. 218).

19. See the United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1992* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 20–22.

20. Ironically, Ivoiriens have now become restive, but unfortunately it is at a time when the state is much more constrained in the resources it can use for social development.

21. The best starting point arguably remains volume 1 of *Capital.*

Appendix 1

Survey of Ivoirien Corporations Having Private Domestic Investors

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Management	Inputs	Markets	Comments
SN-ABI (Société Nouvelle Industrie) 1960 factory in Abidjan	400	steel foundry: railcar manufacture; air conditioners; refrigerator production; mechanical manufacturing	55% (1982) Ivoirien and foreign	n.d.	90% Côte d'Ivoire, 10% export of shelling machines to neighboring countries	Created/ operated by Alcide Kacou; one of the first Ivoirien firms created by private Ivoirien interests after independence; virtually monopolizes repair and construction of railway equipment
AFRIC INTER FREEZE 1982 factory in Abidjan	555	imports, warehouses, distributes perishable goods	100% Ivoirien	—	Côte d'Ivoire	
AFRIC-TRANSIT (Société Africaine de Transit, Transport, Tourisme) 1976 head office in Abidjan; branches: Ouangolo-dougou Pogo, Takikro, San Pedro, Bouaké, Bamako	225	shipping	100% Ivoirien	—	shipping throughout francophone West Africa	

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Management	Inputs	Markets	Comments
AGCI (Assurances Générales de Côte d'Ivoire) 1979 head office in Abidjan	230	all types of insurance	20% (80% foreign-held by 2 French firms; CNA holds shares in AGCI-Vie) Ivoirien and foreign	—	Côte d'Ivoire only	Joachim Richmond has interests in AGCI
ALLIBERT 1961 factory in Abidjan	761	produces chemicals, plastics	33% (67% foreign, 52.5% of which held by Allibert France) mainly foreign	local only	85% Côte d'Ivoire, 15% other African countries	ALLIBERT owns SIMPAGRI; l'Union Africaine owns 17.5% of ALLIBERT
API (Industries de Transformation des Produits Agricoles) 1968 factory in Abidjan	900 (1988)	cocoa processing	85% (15% foreign: Cacao Barry, a French firm) Ivoirien	local only	export only: USA, France Italy, Netherlands	Dia Houphouët-Boigny has interests
ASIA AUTO PARTS 1976 office in Abidjan	250	imports auto parts, mainly from Japan	100% Franck Falletta	imported merchandise	Côte d'Ivoire only	
BACI (Banque Atlantique Côte d'Ivoire) 1978 Abidjan	1,000	commercial banking	65% (35% divided among 4 European banks) mainly Ivoirien	—	Côte d'Ivoire only	once part of the Emmanuel Dioulo "empire"; he has since sold his share
BANAFRIQUE (Union des Banques en Côte d'Ivoire) 1980 2 offices in Abidjan	1,000	commercial banking	10% (90% foreign, mainly Lebanese) mainly foreign	—	Côte d'Ivoire only	

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Management	Inputs	Markets	Comments
BERNABE CÔTE D'IVOIRE 1951 head office in Abidjan; branches: San Pedro, Bouaké	1,380	manufactures/ sells metal products, building materials	35% (65% foreign, owned mainly by BERNABE, a French firm) Ivoirien and foreign	n.d.	Côte d'Ivoire only	
BICICI (Banque international pour le commerce et l'industrie de la Côte d'Ivoire) 1962 (formerly BNCI) head office in Abidjan; 15 Abidjan branches, 26 in rest of country	7,500	full-service banking	27.34% (combined with the state's share, Ivoirens hold a majority; Swiss and French minority shares, with BNP owning 21% and SFOM 28%) foreign and Ivoiren	—	Côte d'Ivoire only	second largest bank; affiliate of BNP (Banque Nationale de Paris), owns 55% of COFINCI, and BICIBAIL, each a major financial firm; Lambert Konan and Joachim Richmond have interests
Blohorn Group 1971, following a merger; original Blohorn investments date from 1938 1938 factory in Abidjan	5,034	produces soaps, oils, margarines, extracts; affiliates in packing, chemicals	19.47% (80.57% foreign, owned by UNILEVER, which took over Blohorn family share) Ivoirien and foreign	local agricultural products	national market and export (Africa and to Europe)	Joseph Aka Anghui has interests; Blohorn owns MECANEMBAL, SAPROCSY, PHCI, SCI, SIERI, the Société de gestion huilerie et savonnerie des lagunes, and shares in others
BRACODI (Société des brasseries de la Côte d'Ivoire) 1949 head office in Abidjan, factories in Abidjan, Daloa	3,363	produces beer, soft drinks, ice cream	22.5% (majority-owned by SOGEPAL, which has multiple owners; other minority foreign shareholders) mainly foreign	most imported from Europe	Côte d'Ivoire	owns shares in SICOGI, SOBOCI, SOBRAGUI, SBB, COMHOTEL, 3I

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Management	Inputs	Markets	Comments
BROSETTE FLUTEC	192	import-export trade	18% (20 % owned by Brossette Intl., 62% by management) largely foreign	—	n.d.	
CACI (Consortium des Agrumes et plantes à parfum de Côte d'Ivoire) 1969 office and factory in Abidjan, branches in San Pedro and Bouaké	295	produces juice and juice concentrate	34.9% (47% state and BIDI) created by planters with assistance from SONAFI; ownership being restructured Ivoirien	Côte d'Ivoire only	exports to USA, France, England, Spain, West Germany; very small amount sold in Côte d'Ivoire	
CAPA (Compagnie Africaine de Produits Agricoles) 1978 office in Abidjan	100	exports coffee, cocoa	50% (50% owned by French interests) mainly foreign	local only	exports only	
CAPRAL-NESTLE (Compagnie Africaine de Préparations Alimentaire) 1959 office and factory in Abidjan	3,600	agroindustry; produces Nescafé, chocolate, malted drinks	22% (balance is owned by Nestlé, which bought into corporation in 1985) foreign, but president is Ivoirien	all Côte d'Ivoire, except im-ported packag-ing labels	12% of output sold in Côte d'Ivoire, balance exported to other African countries, Middle East, Western Europe	
CDI (Continental Développement Industriel) 1976 factory in Abidjan	350	manufactures refrigerators, water heaters, freezers	100% Ivoirien	n.d.	Côte d'Ivoire only	

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Management	Inputs	Markets	Comments
CFAO-CI (Compagnie française de l'Afrique occidentale) 1973 office in Abidjan	2,480 (1988)	Import-export trade; holdings in many West African companies	16.7% (due to 1975 share offering restricted to Ivoiriens) mainly foreign but some Ivoirien	—	—	Charles Donwahi has interests in CFAO-CI; firm also owns Agence Centrale Côte d'Ivoire, run by Donwahi
CIP (Comptoir Ivoirien des Papiers) 1968 factory in Abidjan	400	stationery, office/school supplies, other paper products	50% (50% Moroccan) Ivoirien and Moroccan	imported from Europe	n.d.	
CNA (Compagnie nationale d'assurances) 1972 head office in Abidjan; 10 offices throughout country	400	business and personal insurance	52.25% (minority-owned by German and French interests; formerly affiliate of the French GFA, now fully autonomous) Ivoirien	—	Côte d'Ivoire only	Léon Amon, who owns largest share, was behind company's break with GFA in 1970s; Sounkalo Djibo also has interests; company owns shares in SIALIM and AGCI-Vie
COSMIVOIRE (Omnium chimique et cosmetique) 1974 factory in Abidjan	702	produces soap, toothpaste	87% (13% owned by state) Ivoirien	mostly from Côte d'Ivoire, but some imported from Brazil, Great Britain	90% Côte d'Ivoire, 10% other African countries	created by Alain Bambara; Félicien Kodja Konan has interests; until firm's creation, Blohorn monopolized manufactures based on palm oil
COTIVO (La cotonnière ivoirienne) 1972 factory, office in Agboville	3,500	produces textiles	12.5% (87.5% owned by SOTEXICODI-BIDI) largely foreign	Côte d'Ivoire	70% Côte d'Ivoire, 30% exported	one of country's 4 biggest textiles firms

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Management	Inputs	Markets	Comments
DAF-CI (Daniel Ancel et Fils Côte d'Ivoire) 1946 office in Abidjan, factories in Duékoué, Danane; uses UNICO factory in San Pedro	1,000	trades tropical goods; processes coffee, cocoa	35% (65% owned by UNIDAF, French trading company with branches in Paris, Lausanne, London) run largely by foreigners, but some Ivoiriens on admin.	coffee, cocoa produced in Côte d'Ivoire	export only	formerly wholly foreign; Ivoirien investors diversified into secondary sector
DECORTICAF 1978 office in Abidjan, factories in Oumé, Danané, Duékoué	600	processes coffee	81.5% Ivoirien and foreign	Côte d'Ivoire	output sold to local exporters	
EMBACI (Manufacture d'Emballage de la Côte d'Ivoire) 1980 office, factory in Abidjan	750	produces cardboard boxes	71% (29% foreign) Ivoirien	imported	—	
ERG (Etablissement R. Gonfreville) 1921 head office, factory in Bouaké	3,000	produces varied textiles	16.4% (37.1% owned by CAISTAB, 10.5% other state interests; 17.6% foreign; 7.3% SONAFI share being privatized) Ivoirien and foreign	Côte d'Ivoire	68.3% of output sold in Côte d''Ivoire, 16% in other African countries, 15.1% in Europe, 0.6% other	Sounkalo Djibo has interests; one of Côte d'Ivoire's 4 biggest textiles firms
La Financière 1980 head office in Abidjan	221	mutual fund (*club d'investissement*), shareholders in corporations; has consulting branch	72% (28% owned by other Africans) Ivoirien	—	all investments in Côte d'Ivoire	provided start-up capital for SIALIM

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Management	Inputs	Markets	Comments
GFCI (Groupement Foncier de la Côte d'Ivoire) 1955 office in Abidjan	711	construction, property management, Abidjan area	75% (25% foreign)	—	all in Côte d'Ivoire	Moussa Konet has interests
GMA (Grands Moulins d'Abidjan) 1963 head office in Abidjan, factories in Abidjan, San Pedro	2,000	agroindustry: flour mills, produces animal feed; also owns/ operates CIPA (cap. 375)	25% (75% foreign, among several groups; GMA is affiliate of Mimran group) Ivoirien and foreign	imported	97% of output sold in Côte d'Ivoire, 3% in other African countries; 60% of CIPA output sold in Côte d'Ivoire, 40% in other African countries	Kouadio Kouassi and a member of the Coulibaly family (Karpé Coulibaly) have interests in GMA
GOMPCI (Groupement pharmaceutique) 1955 head office in Abidjan, branches in Yamoussoukro, Gagnoa, Bouaké, Abengourou, Daloa	1,231	wholesale pharmaceuticals distributor	100% (formerly majority-owned by foreigners, taken over by Ivoirien pharmacists) Ivoirien and foreign	—	Côte d'Ivoire	
IKAFI (Imprimerie Kacou Flock-Ivoire) 1967 office, factory in Abidjan	100	printing	100% Ivoirien	n.d.	Côte d'Ivoire	
3I (Imprimerie Industrielle de la Côte d'Ivoire) 1973 office, factory in Abidjan	360	packaging (e.g., beer bottle labels, cigarette packages, calendars, posters)	53% (47% foreign) n.d. on administration	imported from Sweden, Brazil, Spain, other EC	96% of output sold to Ivoirien industrial firms, 4% in other African countries	BRACODI owns over 10% of 3I; prior to 3I's creation, all such goods were imported

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Management	Inputs	Markets	Comments
INTERACO (International Commerce for African Commodities) 1984 office in Abidjian	110	trades in tropical goods: mainly cocoa, coffee, also palm oil, rice, rubber	100% (owned by Konan family: Camille, Johane, and Mlle Konan N'Guessan) Ivoirien	all produced in Côte d'Ivoire	some goods sold in Côte d'Ivoire, most exported to Europe, small proportion elsewhere	
IVOIREMBAL 1978 office, factory in Bouaké	947	makes polypropylene and polyethylene products (e.g., ropes, bags)	50% (50% foreign; Ivoirien share is a portfolio investment in this multinational affiliate) foreign	n.d.	84% of output sold in Côte d'Ivoire	part of FIBAKO group, which includes FIBAKO, SOFITIS, SETCI, COFIPECHE, PRMOPLAST
JAG (Etablissements Jean Abile Gal) 1959 factory in Abidjan; shelling operations in Kotobi, Abengourou, Daloa	1,200	agroindustry: refines cocoa, coffee	94.6% (47.55% of which held by Ivoiriens, balance by Abile Gal family, resident in Côte d'Ivoire many generations and thus considered Ivoirien; some Africans, though, do not consider them truly Ivoirien) Abile Gal family and Ivoiriens	Côte d'Ivoire	all exported	Gilles Valley Laubhouet, Lambert Aka, and the Houphouët Boigny family all have interests in JAG, Côte d'Ivoire's biggest coffee exporter and second-biggest cocoa exporter; owns STOCACI, primary share of UTPA, 50% of SICOB, 90% of SORIZCI

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Management	Inputs	Markets	Comments
MACACI (Manufacture de caoutchouc de Côte d'Ivoire) 1967 office, factory in Abidjan	178	manufactures rubber products, mainly mattresses, also balls, cups, mugs	99.4% (70% owned by various Ivoirien interests, 30% by CCP, itself 98% Ivoirien-owned) Ivoirien	most produced in Côte d'Ivoire: some bought from ERG, but rubber supplied by sister firm CCP; chemicals imported from Europe	90% of output sold in Côte d'Ivoire, 10% in other African countries	
MIAM (Manufacture Ivoirien d'Article de Ménage) 1968 office, factory in Abidjan	222	manufactures household goods	10% (90% foreign: investors from Hong Kong and Taiwan) mainly Chinese, some Ivoirien	inputs are imported from France, Hong Kong, Belgium and EC	79.2% of output sold in Côte d'Ivoire, 20.8% in Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso	Lambert Aka, president and director-general, owns interests
MICE-MIVET (Manufacture Ivoirien de Confection Enfantine et Manufacture Ivoirien de Vêtements) 1972 office, 2 factories in Abidjan	180	manufactures children's, men's clothing	100% Ivoirien	n.d.	85% of output sold to Ivoirien retailers; 15% exported to France, West Germany, other African countries	Frédéric Ablé, PDG, owns interests
MICI (Manufacture d'Imprimerie et de Cartonnage Ivoirienne) 1974 office, factory in Abidjan	250	manufactures paper products; printing	76% (24% foreign) mainly Ivoirien	imported from Brazil, EC, U.S., Japan	n.d.	

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Management	Inputs	Markets	Comments
MROMIR 1973 office, factory in Abidjan	600	produces construction materials	18.6% (48.4% foreign, remainder *non appelé, non amorti*) mainly foreign	n.d.	n.d.	
NELCI (National Electric Côte d'Ivoire) 1983 office, factory in Abidjan	975 (1988)	assembles radios, televisions	40% (60% Japanese-owned) Japanese	imported	most output sold in Côte d'Ivoire	
Nouvelle SIACA (Société ivoiro-allemande de conserves d'ananas) 1968 (merged in 1973 with Taiwan Pineapple Corp. to form Nouvelle SIACA) head office in Abidjan, factory in Bonoua	293	cans and exports pineapple (juice and slices)	65% (35% foreign, divided among French, German, Taiwanese; at time of merger, Ivoirien share was only 29.25%) Ivoirien	local	all output exported, mainly to West Germany, Italy, France, Holland	Ekra family and Jean-Baptiste Améthier have interests and directorships in Nouvelle SIACA
Nouvelle SIFCA 1958 office, factory in Abidjan	1,750	produces coffee, cocoa	65% (35% foreign) Ivoirien and foreign	all local	all output is exported: 20% to USA, 70% to Europe, 10% elsewhere	COMAFRIQUE[b] owns 45% of Nouvelle SIFCA, which in turn owns its own marketing firm CIC (cap. 400 million)
PECHAZUR 1980 head office in Abidjan, factory in Dabou	100	cans fish and shrimp	100% Ivoirien	fish from Senegal and Mauritania, shrimp from Côte d'Ivoire	30% of output sold in Côte d'Ivoire, 70% exported to Europe	

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Management	Inputs	Markets	Comments
Peyrissac Côte d'Ivoire 1963 head office in Abidjan, outlets in Bouaké, San Pedro, Yamoussoukro	800	trade and distribution; owns interest in SAFCA; also brick-making, bicycle sales, electrical repair	27% (since 1974 73% owned by French/ Dutch OPTORG group) mainly foreign	—	95% of sales in Côte d'Ivoire, 5% other African countries	
PFCI (Société Pêche et Froid de Côte d'Ivoire) 1977 office, factory in Abidjan	250	tuna refrigeration	34% (66% divided between 2 French firms; 15% sold to private Ivoiriens when SONAFI dissolved) foreign	n.d.	100% of output exported to Europe	
PROMOFROID-AFRIPECHE 1969 head office in Abidjan, 42 agencies across Côte d'Ivoire	200	distributes frozen fish, meat	100% managed by UNACI, part of SCOA group, so mainly foreign-run	n.d.	all sales in Côte d'Ivoire	Sounkalo Djibo has interests
SADEM (Société Africaine des Eaux Minérales) 1979 office, factory in Abidjan	300	bottles, distributes mineral water	65% (10% BIDI being sold off; 20% SODECI; 24% SCCI; 10% G. Houphouët-Boigny) (remainder foreign) Ivoirien	all water from local sources	n.d.	Houphouët-Boigny family has interests

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Management	Inputs	Markets	Comments
SADO-FOSS (GORI-FOSS prior to 1976) office, factory in Abidjan	524	chemicals industry: produces glue, wood preservatives, paint, ink	20% (80% foreign, divided evenly between SADOLIN, a Danish firm, and Danish government) Ivoirien and foreign	n.d.	n.d.	Houphouët-Boigny family has interests
SAFARRIV-AIRD (Société Africaine d'Assurances et de Réassurances en République de Côte d'Ivoire; previously Société Africaine d'Assurances en République Ivoirenne, created 1975) 1976 offices in Abidjan, Bouaké	700	insurance, all types	34.5% (65.5% French) Ivoirien and foreign	—	Côte d'Ivoire only	Coulibaly family has interests, through Tiémoko Yadé Coulibaly; owns/operates SAFARRIV-VIE, life insurance firm created 1985, cap. 300 million
SAFCA (Société Africaine de Crédit Automobile) 1968 head office in Abidjan, branches in Bouaké, Daloa, Gagnoa, Man, San Pedro	1,000	automobile lease purchase	25% (all shares, including 75% foreign-owned, are widely held) Ivoirien and foreign	—	Côte d'Ivoire only	SAFCA also owns shares in 7 other companies, Société Ivoirienne de Financement (capital 200 million)

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Management	Inputs	Markets	Comments
SAFICA (Société Africaine de Fabrication et d'Impression de Cahiers) 1969 office, factory in Abidjan	160	prints office and school supplies	100% (initially, state owned 23.33%, but this was later sold to private Ivoirien interests) run by Ivoiriens	local and imported	80% of output sold in Côte d'Ivoire	Houphouët-Boigny family has interests
SAGECO (Société Abidjanaise de Gérance et d'Exploitation Commerciale) 1969 based in Abidjan	110	operates 18 bakeries in and around Abidjan	91% (9% French) Ivoirien	local	Abidjan area only	Gbon Coulibaly has interests
SAMELA (Société des Ateliers Métaliques et d'Entreprises de Laon-Afrique) 1951 office, factory in Abidjan	270	manufactures metal products	20% (80% foreign) foreign	imported from EC	65% of output sold in Côte d'Ivoire, 35% exported to Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso, Niger	
SARI 1949 office in Abidjan, branch in Bouaké	1,355	sells, services Ford, Subaru, Hino/Komatsu, Daihatsu vehicles	10% (90% foreign) Ivoirien and foreign	—	Côte d'Ivoire	
SAT (Société Abidjanaise de Torréfaction) 1960 office, factory in Abidjan	100	processes coffee	100% Ivoirien	produced in Côte d'Ivoire	80% of output sold in Côte d'Ivoire, 20% in other African countries	Lambert Aka has interests
SATOM IVOIRE 1957 office in Abidjan	500	public works, construction	15% (85% foreign: SATOM) foreign, some Ivoirien	—	Côte d'Ivoire only	Germain Coffi Gadeau has interests

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Management	Inputs	Markets	Comments
SCCI (Société pour le Compoundage en Côte d'Ivoire) 1975 office, factory in Abidjan	540	manufactures chemicals: paint, varnish	90% (10% foreign) Ivoirien, foreign	imported from Europe	45% of output sold in Côte d'Ivoire, 55% in other African countries	
Scierie du Bandama 1935 head office in Abidjan, sawmills in Gueyo, Oumé	396	sawmill operations	20% (80% owned by Jacob family) Jacob family	all produced in Côte d'Ivoire	n.d.	One of the few industrial firms established during colonial period; Ivoirien investors later bought portfolio shares
SCOA-CI 1957 office in Abidjan	500	wholesale, retail trade	22% (78% foreign: SCOA) foreign, Ivoirien	mostly imported	Côte d'Ivoire only	Coffi Gadeau family has interests
SCODI (Société de Conserves de Côte d'Ivoire) 1960 office, factory in Abidjan	908	cans tuna	41% (59% French, owned by SAUPIQUET) foreign	inputs from France, Portugal, Atlantic ships, Côte d'Ivoire	99% of output exported	
SEC (Société d'Echanges Commerciaux) 1964 office in Abidjan	500	exports coffee, cocoa	58% (plus 28% Nouvelle SIFCA) (14% French) Nouvelle SIFCA	Ivoirien	Europe	See Nouvelle SIFCA; Pierre Billon has interests
La Sécurité Ivoirienne 1971 head office in Abidjan, branch in Bouaké	300	Insurance	72% (28% divided among 3 British owners) Ivoirien	—	Côte d'Ivoire	Jean-Baptiste Babo Zobo has interests, as does Dia Houphouët-Boigny

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Manage-ment	Inputs	Markets	Comments
SEEE-CI (Société d'Etudes d'Entreprises et d'Equipe-ment, formerly TUNZINI-Afrique, after 1979) 1963 office, factory in Abidjan	363	manufactures refrigeration, plumbing, industrial laundry, fire protection systems, ele-vators, marine motors; developing solar energy	55% (45% owned by TUNZINI-NESSI, a French firm) minority Ivoirien share increased to majority in 1979 Ivoirien and foreign	im-ported from U.S., EC	80% of out-put sold in Côte d'Ivoire, 20% in other African countries	SEEE-CI ex-panded into solar energy R&D only after Ivoirien takeover
SEPBA (Société d'Exploitation du Parc à Bois d'Abidjan) 1960 head office in Abidjan, branch in San Pedro	392	loads, unloads ships in port	ca. 20% (35% TRANS-AFRIC, 17% SOCOPAO, 16% SOAEM-CI, Syndicat des Producteurs Industriels 12%, others 5%) foreign	—	Côte d'Ivoire	
SERIA (Société d'Etudes et de Réalisations Industrielles Africaines) 1979 office, factory in Abidjan	195	Produces industrial metals, capital goods	100% Ivoirien	n.d.	Côte d'Ivoire only	Victor Amagou, director-general, owns 61%
SETAO (Société d'Etudes et de Travaux pour l'Afrique de l'Ouest) 1950 office in Abidjan	672	construction, public works	21% (majority-owned by Compagnie Française d'Entreprise) Ivoirien and foreign	Côte d'Ivoire	most opera-tions in Côte Ivoire, but projects done in Niger, Guinea, Burkina Faso	the Zadi Kessi family has interests, as does Victor Amagou; SETAO owns shares in BIDI and SICOGI

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Management	Inputs	Markets	Comments
SETCI (Société d'Extrusion et de Tissage de Côte d'Ivoire) 1971 office, factory in Bouaké	200 (1988)	produces jute bags	ca. 30% (20% private + 20% share owned by COMAFRIQUE) (majority-owned by Bachelier group, Senegal) Sengalese	n.d.	80% of output sold in Côte d'Ivoire, 20% in Burkina Faso	COMAFRIQUE owns shares
SGBCI (Société Générale des Banques en Côte d'Ivoire) 1962 head office in Abidjan, 56 branches throughout Côte d'Ivoire	8,000	commercial banking	28.79% (state owns shares; majority owned by French interests and foreign banks) Ivoirien and foreign	—	Côte d'Ivoire only	Lancina Konate, Tiémoko Yadé Coulibaly, and Jacques-André Delafosse all have interests; SGBCI owns majority of Sogefinance
SHAC (Société Havraise Africaine de Commerce) 1952 head office, factory in Abidjan, factory in San Pedro	555	processes coffee, cocoa for export	52% (48% owned by French interests) (initially French, SHAC gradually taken over by Ivoiriens who gained majority share in 1985) Ivoirien and foreign	Côte d'Ivoire	n.d.	
SIALIM (Société des Industries Alimentaires et des Produits Laitiers) 1986 office, factory in Abidjan	1,723	produces sweetened condensed milk[c]	62% (38% French, Senegalese, British, IFC) Ivoiriens, some European	most inputs imported, but SIALIM plans to use all Ivoirien inputs	Côte d'Ivoire only	l'Union Africaine, CNA, and La Financière all own shares in SIALIM; market for this product once monopolized by importer Nestlé; Gbon Coulibaly has interests

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Management	Inputs	Markets	Comments
SICOGI (Société Ivoirienne de Construction et de Gestion Immobilière) 1965 merger head office in Abidjan	2,000	construction, property management	31% (53% state, 16% foreign) administered by Ministry of Public Works and Transportation	—	Côte d'Ivoire only	also owns SICOGERE (cap. 45 million); Adiko Niamké has interests
SICM (Société Ivoirienne de Ciments et Matériaux) 1963 office, factory in Abidjan	504	produces cement	20% (80% foreign) foreign	imported	72% of output sold in Côte d'Ivoire, 28% in other African countries	
SICOR (Société Ivoirienne de Coco Râpé) 1974 head office in Abidjan, factory in Jacquerville	500	processes coconut	20% (51% state, 15% COFINCI, 14% BEI) foreign	Côte d'Ivoire, other African countries	93.9% of output exported to Europe, 4.6% to other African countries, 1.5% sold in Côte d'Ivoire	
SIDECO (Société Ivoirienne de Distribution Economique) 1961 office in Abidjan	600	Import-export trade	50% (originally, the major portion of this share was owned by the state) (50% foreign, owned by SCOA) Ivoirien	—	mostly coffee, cocoa exports	

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Management	Inputs	Markets	Comments
SITAB (Société Ivoirienne de Tabacs) 1971 head office in Abidjan, factory in Bouaké	2,993	manufactures cigars, cigarettes, cigarillos	40% (60% foreign, divided among several owners, largest [30%] being SOFICAL, affiliate of French Bolloré group) Ivoirien and foreign	Ivoirien, imported tobacco from U.S., China, Philippines, South America, other African countries	93% of cigarettes, 5% of cigars sold in Côte d'Ivoire; remainder exported to France, Senegal, Niger, Burkina Faso, Togo, Reunion	Léon Amon has interests in SITAB
SITP (Société Ivoirienne de Transports Publics) 1964 head office in Abidjan	110 (1988)	truck transportation	51% (49% foreign; 35% of total capital owned by Compagnie Transafricaine, a SAGA affiliate) Ivoirien	—	Côte d'Ivoire only	
SIVELEC (Société Ivoirienne d'Electricité) 1974 office in Abidjan	133	industrial electrical work (e.g., installs power lines)	10% (90% foreign, owned by SPIE Batignolles, a French firm) foreign, but president is Ivoirien	n.d.	Côte d'Ivoire only	in 1985, SIVELEC merged with TRINDEL-CI, a similar company; Léon Amon has interests
SIVEM (Société Ivoirienne d'Emballages) 1975 office, factory in Abidjan	160	makes bags for cement, flour, rice, cocoa, etc.	35% (65% foreign, divided among several corporations) Ivoirien and foreign	n.d.	95% of output sold to Ivoirien industrial producers, 5% to other African countries	Clement Anet Bile, firm's PDG, is linked to Denis Bra Kanon family

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Management	Inputs	Markets	Comments
SIVIE (Société Ivoirienne d'Installations Electriques) 1971 head office in Abidjan, branches in Bouké, San Pedro	185 (1988)	installs industrial electrical, telephone lines	90% Ivoirien	n.d.	Côte d'Ivoire only	Lambert Aka has interests
SIVOCLIM (Société Ivoirienne de Climatisation) 1980 office, factory in Abidjan	150	manufactures air conditioners	52% (remainder divided among 5 foreign owners, with Air Conditionée—French—owning largest share: 13%) Ivoirien	mostly Ivoirien some imported from France	Côte d'Ivoire only	
SIVOMAR (Société Ivoirienne de Navigation Maritime) 1977 head office in Abidjan	602	maritime shipping	70% Ivoirien	—	routes between Côte d'Ivoire and Mediterranean) (Adriatic, Spain, France, Italy) and Far East	the Zinzou family has interests
SOAEM-CI (Société Ouest-Africaine d'Entreprises Maritimes) 1945 head office in Abidjan, branch in San Pedro	1,138	shipping, transportation, travel agencies	25% (majority-owned by SAGA—Société Anonyme Gérance et d'Armement —part of Rothschild group) foreign	—	n.d.	owns SOAEMCI TRANSIT, SCI COTON, SCI PORT BOUET, minority shares in SEPBA, Grands Moulins Voltaiques, BIDI, SERIC, SIRT, SICOGI, SAGIS, 3S, STST, SOAEM Mali, SCIPAV

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Management	Inputs	Markets	Comments
Société Moderne du Pneumatique Ivoirien Distributeur Michelin 1979 office in Abidjan	200	imports, distributes Michelin products	27.5% (72.5% foreign) Ivoirien	all merchandise imported	95% of sales in Côte d'Ivoire, 5% in other African countries	Frédéric Ablé has interests
SOCIMAT Côte d'Ivoire 1975 office, factory in Abidjan	400	produces, imports construction materials	20% (80% foreign, by same owners of SICM: Origny Desvroise) foreign (same admin. as SICM)	n.d.	91% of sales in Côte d'Ivoire, 9% in other African countries	
SOCOPAO-CI (Société Commerciale des Ports de l'Afrique Occidentale–Côte d'Ivoire) 1959 head office in Abidjan, branches in Bouaké, San Pedro	2,401	shipping, travel agency, air freight, branch in oil production	36.3% (63.7% owned by SCAC, a foreign firm) Ivoiren and foreign (initially, there was no Ivoiren ownership, and share was built up gradually)	—	n.d.	Zinzou family, through Simplice Zinzou, has interests; SOCOPAO-CI owns shares in SIPAC, AVIMAR, SCACBRAS SEPBA, SOCEF, SOGEF, URA, STST, 3S, IPAFI, PECI, PRODEXI, BIDI, SICOGI, MTS Niger, Fruitiére, Ivoirienne, SIETRANS
SODECI (Société de Distribution d'Eau de Côte d'Ivoire) 1959 head office in Abidjan	2,000	provides water to households, industry throughout Côte d'Ivoire	53% (47% foreign) Ivoirien (state once held small share, but sold out to private Ivoiriens)	all water is from local supplies	Côte d'Ivoire only	PDG of SODECI is Marcel Zadi Kessi; SODECI owns Socaf and minority shares in SADEM and SATRAV; Koffi Aoussou has interests

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Manage-ment	Inputs	Markets	Comments
SOFACO (Société Africaine de Fabrication, de Formulation et de Conditionnement) 1961 office, factory in Abidjan	390	produces pesticides, veterinary goods, pharmaceutical goods	15% (85% foreign, owned by PROCIDA) foreign	40% from Côte d'Ivoire, 60% imported	89% of output sold in Côte d'Ivoire, 11% in other African countries	
SOGIMEX (Société Générale Import-Export) 1978 office in Abidjan	145	export of tropical goods, mainly coffee, cocoa	100% Ivoiren	purchased in Côte d'Ivoire	most of business involves exports	
SOGIATRAC 1977 office in Abidjan	300	distributes tractors, front end loaders, bulldozers, etc.	33% (Ivoiren share owned by SOGIEX-CI; 67% foreign share owned by SCOA) foreign	imported	Côte d'Ivoire only	
SOGIEXCI (Société Générale d'Importation et d'Exportation de la Côte d'Ivoire) 1966 based in Abidjan	1,150	general trade, including coffee and cocoa exporting; subsidiaries—FIT, PREMOTO, La Galerie, BELAFON, SOGIAGRI, SOCIVEX—sell wide range of wholesale, retail goods	100% (SONAFI took it over from private Ivoiriens in 1976; by 1984, it had reverted to private Ivoiriens) Ivoirien (Diallo family)	—	import-export	combined assets of SOGIEXCI member firms exceed 3 billion CFAF, making it one of Côte d'Ivoire's largest groups of companies
SOGIP (Société Générale pour l'Industrialisation de la Pêche) 1961 office, factory in Abidjan	100	tuna canning, shipping	34% (66% foreign, owned by OTC)	n.d.	15% of output sold in Côte d'Ivoire, 85% exported to Europe	Germain Coffi Gadeau has interests

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Management	Inputs	Markets	Comments
SOLIBRA (Société de Limonaderies et Brasseries d'Afrique) 1955 head office in Abidjan, 2 factories in Abidjan, 1 each in Bouaké, Bouaflé	3,000	2 breweries, 4 soft drink plants	21% (Belgian majority; French hold 14%) foreign	n.d.	output is almost entirely sold in Côte d'Ivoire, small amount exported to U.S. (Mamba label)	
SONACO (Société Nouvelle Abidjanaise de Carton Ondulé) 1964 office, factory in Abidjan	1,200	manufactures packaging for fruit and vegetables for shipping (originally packaged only bananas)	100% (created by banana planters to lower shipping costs; long 90%-owned by state, which ceded its its share in 1980s) Ivoirien	some imported	95% of output sold in Côte d'Ivoire, other 5% sold in other African countries	Société Nationale de Conditionnement when created, essentially as a cooperative of banana planters; production later diversified
SOTRIPA (Société de Transformation Industrielle des Produits Agricoles) 1968 office, factory in Abidjan	110	manufactures cotton products (e.g., swabs, bandages, tampons, diapers)	100% Ivoirien	imported	98% of output sold in Côte d'Ivoire, 2% in other African countries	
SOTROPAL (Société Tropicale des Allumettes) 1959 office, factory in Abidjan	480	produces matches	90% (10% foreign, owned by CIS) (until 1980s, SOTROPAL was majority-owned by SIFA,[d] a foreign company) run by Ivoiriens	local wood, imported chemicals and packaging	65% of output sold in Côte d'Ivoire, 35% in Niger, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mauritania	Lamine Fadiga has interests

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Management	Inputs	Markets	Comments
Tôles Ivoire (Société de galvanisation de tôles en Côte d'Ivoire) 1969 office, factory in Abidjan	865	produces corrugated roofing steel[e]	23% (76% foreign, divided among several owners, none of whom has majority share) Ivoirien	imported from EC	65% of output sold in Côte d'Ivoire, 35% in neighboring African countries	Madatali Sidi has interests
Total Côte d'Ivoire 1976 head office in Abidjan, regional office in Bouaké	1,800	retails gasoline	24.17% (75.83% owned by Total Afrique, a branch of CFP,[f] itself divided among PARIBAS, SUEZ, French state) foreign	—	Côte d'Ivoire only	Total group owns 10.1% of the SIR consortium, an exploration company with capital of CFAF 26 billion
TRANSAFRIC (Société Navale Transafric) 1938 head office in Abidjan, regional office in San Pedro	1,688	maritime shipping, air freight, transit, travel agencies	20% (80% foreign, owned by SNCDV) foreign	—	Côte d'Ivoire only	TRANSAFRIC owns shares in SEPBA, SIFI, SCI Port-Bouët, EECI, 3S, STST, SICOGI; Ivoiriens owned no shares in TRANSAFRIC until 1975, when the company adopted an Ivoirization policy
TSP-Tribois (Tranchage-Sciage-Plots and Transformation Industrielle de Bois) 1976 office and sawmill in San Pedro	700	sawmill	17% (83% French) foreign	wood produced locally	8% of output sold in Côte d'Ivoire, 6% in other African countries, 84% exported to Europe	

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Management	Inputs	Markets	Comments
UNICAFE (Union Industrielle de Cafés) 1977 head office in Abidjan, factories in Man, Issia, Gagnoa, Divo, Daoukro, Anyama, Aboisso	2,000	coffee processing (mainly shelling of raw beans)	91% (jointly owned by Nouvelle SIFCA, INTERAF, SEC, COMAFRIQUE, EBURNEA, CIPEXI group, EXIMAT, SGBCI, BICICI) mainly foreign	Côte d'Ivoire	all output sold to local companies (i.e., owner), which then complete the processing and export output through EBURNEA[g] and SOPRIVO	Pierre Billon has interests
UNICAO 1987 office, factory in Abidjan	1,100	produces cocoa butter, paste, extracts	45% (55% foreign) foreign	Côte d'Ivoire	60% of output exported to Europe, 40% exported elsewhere (outside of Africa)	
UNICO (Union Industrielle et Commerciale) 1977 office, factory in San Pedro	500	processes coffee, cocoa	64% (JAG 25%, DAFCI 25%, Nouvelle SIFCA 35%, SEC 10%, COMAFRIQUE 5%; combined foreign share in these firms=36%) Ivoirien and foreign	Côte d'Ivoire	all output sold to local companies (i.e., owners) which complete processing and then export output	
l'Union Africaine d'Assurances et de Réassurances 1980 branches in Abidjan, 1 branch each in Bouaké and San Pedro	1,500	all types of insurance	30% (70% foreign, owned by UAF, a French insurance firm) Ivoirien	—	Côte d'Ivoire only	co-owns UA-Vie and owns 40% of SORARAF, a small insurance company

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Management	Inputs	Markets	Comments
UNIRIZ (Union Industrielle du Riz) 1982 head office in Daloa, factories in Daloa, Gagnoa, warehouse in Man	750	processes rice	80.7% (remaining 19.3% is owned by local banks, making actual Ivoirien share somewhat higher) Ivoirien	Côte d'Ivoire	all output sold in Côte d'Ivoire	
UNIWARRANT (Mutuelle Universelle de Garantie) 1970 head office in Abidjan, branch in Bouaké	405	insurance, small-scale consumer and corporate credit	100% Ivoirien	—	Côte d'Ivoire only	
UNIWAX 1967 office, factory in Abidjan	1,000	manufactures wax print cloth for clothing	15% (majority-owned by Société FRAGECI, a a foreign firm with 68% of shares) Ivoirien and foreign	Côte d'Ivoire, also some from Far East, EC, other Europe, U.S.	most output sold in Côte d'Ivoire, some in Burkina Faso, Niger	only producer of wax prints in Africa; one of Côte d'Ivoire's 4 largest textile manufacturers
UTPA (Usines de Traitement des Produits Agricoles) 1978 head office in Abidjan, factories in Daloa, Kotobi, Abengourou	2,000	processes coffee	59% (25% French, 16% other foreign capital) (JAG, banks and local exporters comprise ownership) Ivoirien and foreign (dominated by Calmel and Abile Gal families)	Côte d'Ivoire	all output sold to local exporters	Patrice Gnahoui has interests

Company Name Year Created Location	Capital (millions CFA francs)[a]	Activities	Ivoirien Share Ownership and Manage-ment	Inputs	Markets	Comments
Wonder Côte d'Ivoire 1973 office, factory in Abidjan	500 (1988)	produces batteries, steel wool, mosquito repellent coils	22% (majority-owned by foreigners: Wonder—a French firm—owns 70.3%) foreign	n.d.	95% of output sold in Côte d'Ivoire, 5% in other African countries	

Sources: EDIAFRIC, la documentation africaine, *Côte d'Ivoire sélection*, 1985–1986; *Réalités ivoiriennes* (Oct. 1967–Jan. 1968); Côte d'Ivoire, Ministère du Plan, *La Côte d'Ivoire en chiffres 1976*; Centre d'information et de documentation ivoirien, *Le marché ivoirien* (Paris: 1968); Didier Kouadio Koffi, *La création des entreprises privées par les nationaux en Côte d'Ivoire* (Abidjan: CEDA, 1983), pp. 53–54, 104–105; Lynn Krieger Mytelka, "Foreign Business and Economic Development," in *The Political Economy of Ivory Coast*, edited by I. William Zartman and Christopher Delgado (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 160–161; Henrik Secher Marcussen and Jens Erik Torp, *The Internationalization of Capital: Prospects for the Third World* (London: Zed Press, 1982), pp. 110–111; M. G. K. Ahombo, "Industries Métallurgiques de la Côte d'Ivoire I.M.C.I.," *Structures et actions socio-économiques de la république de Côte d'Ivoire*, special no. of *Regards sur la France* (Jan. 1975): 71–74.; "La SODECI," Ibid., pp. 75–80; "La Société Ivoirienne de Fabrication de Colles SIFACOL," Ibid., p. 83; "La Banque Ivoirienne de Développement Industriel,"Ibid., pp. 168–170; "La Société Générale des Banques en Côte d'Ivoire," Ibid., pp. 178–181; "La Société Nationale de Conditionnement SONACO," Ibid., pp. 263–266; "La société ivoirienne de tabacs," Ibid., p. 311; Ibrahima Kone, Une Société d'Encadrement et de Promotion: La S.I.E.T.H.O.," Ibid., pp. 583–592; *Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens* (Moreux Publisher), 1970–1985; *Africa South of the Sahara* (London: Europa Publications), 1975, pp. 416–418, 1985, pp. 521–524; Jean Suret-Canale, *Afrique et capitaux*, 2 vols. (Paris: L'arbre verdoyant, 1987), pp. 113, 150–151, 181–183, 213–215, 225, 239, 247, 277–280, 372, 375–385, 649–654, 701; Pascal Koffi Teya, *Côte d'Ivoire: le Roi est nu* (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1985), pp. 52, 57, 126n; *Jeune Afrique Economie*, 1981–1987; *L'Industrie ivoirienne* (Special no. of *Fraternité Matin*, July 1978), pp. 14–15, 83–85; Yann Le Galès, "Jok: un coup de poker," *Jeune Afrique Economie*, Jan. 1982, 70–71, and Galès, "Le numéro un du textile se redresse," *Jeune Afrique Economie*, Dec. 1981, 69–73; Jacques Gautrand, "Aprés vingt ans, un redémarrage," *Jeune Afrique Economie*, July 1982, 66–68, "Côte d'Ivoire: On a même rencontré des banquiers heureux," *Jeune Afrique Economie*, Nov. 1986, 52, "L'Empire Unilever s'étend," *Jeune Afrique Economie*, Nov. 1984, 68–70, and "Tanti est arrivé," *Jeune Afrique Economie*, June 1982, 58–59; Mamadou Alpha Barry, "Industries: En attendant la reprise," *Jeune Afrique Economie*, Jan. 1983, 50–53; Irène de Bretteville and Isabelle Leclerc, "Wonder sous tension," *Jeune Afrique Economie*, Oct. 1984, 50–51; *Investir en Côte d'Ivoire* (supplement to *Jeune Afrique Economie*, June 21, 1983), IX–XII, VII; Siradiou Diallo, "Côte d'Ivoire: y-a-t-il une affaire Dioulo?" *Jeune Afrique Economie*, Feb. 1985, 8–12; *Hommes et organisations d'Afrique noire* (Ediafric—la documentation africaine), 1972–1978; *L'industrie ivoirienne* (supplement to *Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens* no. 2094, Dec. 27, 1985); *Fraternité-Matin* (Abidjan), Jan. 19, 1990–May 19, 1990; PDCI-RDA, *Annuaire 1985–1990* (Abidjan: Editions Fraternité-Hebdo, 1987), pp. 11–180; O. Philmon Thierry and K. N'Dri Dally, "CHAFI: Les hommes d'affaires français et ivoiriens reçus par leurs rains," *Fraternité Hebdo*, Feb. 1, 1990, 22; Chambre d'Industrie de Côte d'Ivoire, *L'industrie ivoirienne en 1980* (Abidjan: 1981); Jacques Huot, Interview, Feb. 8, 1990 (Abidjan); Jean Chevassu and Alain Valette, *Les Relations intermédiaires dans le secteur industriel ivoirien* (Abidjan, ORSTOM, Centre Petit-Bassam, 1975 [Série études industrielles]); Centre d'Affaire International, *Annuaire Statistique Economique et Financier* (Abidjan: 1988); Côte d'Ivoire, Ministère du Plan et de l'Industrie, *Répertoire des industries et activités de Côte d'Ivoire* (Abidjan: 1990); Chambre d'Agriculture, Chambre de Commerce, Chambre d'Industrie, *Annuaire des chambres consulaires de Côte d'Ivoire: l'entreprise ivoirienne* (Abidjan: 1988).

Notes:

a. All figures are in millions of CFAF francs (50 CFA francs:1 French franc). Figures are reasonably accurate: while it is not uncommon for companies to understate their capital for tax purposes, they are usually conservative in their understatements in order to retain the respect that comes with large size. Unless otherwise indicated, figures are for 1990.

b. COMAFRIQUE, with a capital of 810 million, is a majority Ivoirien-owned trading company (the state owns the balance) that holds shares in several Ivoirien corporations. COMAFRIQUE was created in 1966 as a state corporation, but it was gradually privatized. Pierre Billon has interests in COMAFRIQUE.

c. Sweetened condensed milk is the base product in Ivoirien breakfasts, mixed with coffee or spread on bread.

d. Société Industrielle et Forestière des Allumettes.

e. Corrugated steel is the standard roofing used in Ivoirien housing.

f. Compagnie Française de Pétrole.

g. EBURNEA, with a capital of 250 million, is 52 percent owned by Ivoiriens and is run by Ivoiriens. Lambert Konan has interests in EBURNEA.

Appendix 2
Use of Sources

Compared to many other African countries, particularly those in English-speaking Africa, Côte d'Ivoire provides a relatively hospitable environment to researchers. With sufficient notification, access to government archives and libraries is easily obtainable. In addition, ORSTOM maintains a research center in Abidjan. Both it and the excellent INADES library are open to accredited researchers.

The Ivoirien government publishes a fair bit of data on business in the country. In addition to the Centrale des bilans, the ministries of economy and finance and of planning and industry, as well as the chambers of agriculture, commerce, and industry, all publish documents relating to the activities of Ivoirien firms. By and large, the data reported in these documents is reliable, and all Côte d'Ivoire specialists rely on them. This data can be supplemented by company reports, which are also comprehensive and reliable. Several companies publish summaries of their annual reports in the business pages of *Fraternité-Matin*. The creation of new companies and share issues are also listed in that daily newspaper's business pages. The best secondary source for information on Ivoirien corporations is *Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens*. It takes a patient researcher to browse every edition carefully, but just about every piece of noteworthy activity by large Ivoirien firms is duly reported in the pages of this magazine.

A good way of obtaining information on family networks and kinship linkages is by browsing the obituary section of *Fraternité-Matin*. It is the tradition in Côte d'Ivoire for all members of an extended family to be mentioned in a death announcement. Direct family members are mentioned first; those related by marriage are listed as *alliés*. In addition, the *Grand dictionnaire encyclopédique de la Côte d'Ivoire* and the multivolume *Mémorial de la Côte d'Ivoire* provide a significant amount of biographical data on the country's leading individuals.

The primary purpose of interviews was not to gather new data, but to confirm or elucidate data acquired elsewhere (for instance, interviews revealed government data on Ivoirien firms to be reliable). The chief exception to this rule was the section in Chapter 6 on Ivoirien capital's national identity, where interviews provided the bulk of information.

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About the Book and Author

Though studies of capitalism in Africa traditionally focus on the activities of foreign investment, in Côte d'Ivoire capitalist development has been largely the work of a domestic class of entrepreneurs.

This book traces the history of Côte d'Ivoire's capitalist development, beginning with early European contact and bringing the story up to the present decade. Drawing on new data, Rapley's provocative argument refutes all standard assumptions about capitalism in the country. He demonstrates that a dynamic capitalist class has emerged in Côte d'Ivoire, one neither subordinate to foreign interests nor synonymous with the bureaucratic or political elite. These indigenous entrepreneurs, Rapley posits, as a class control the Ivoirien state, and it is indigenous Ivoirien capitalism that has been primarily responsible for the growth of the country's economy.

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